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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
* GOALS AND STRUCTURE 
* INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
*TRANSITION 
* STUDY OUTLINE 
Winnipeg has now completed its second year under a new system of 
civic government. Since its inception, the new system has been a focus of 
attention, both locally and throughout Canada. In tUnnipeg there has 
been a growing concern about how well the new government is working, and 
already major changes are being proposed. The perspective of those outside 
the city is a little more detached -- they see the Winnipeg system as an 
interesting innovation in the structure of local government, one that 
could provide some answers to the general problem of how to manage an 
urban area. From either perspective there is a need to assess the new 
system and determine the degree to which the new structure is attaining 
the goals it was set up to achieve. This paper, then, will examine: 
1) the transitional implementation of the re-organization, 
2) the effectiveness of structural change, and 
3) the preliminary impact of the new system. 
Goals and Structure 
The City of t.Jinnipeg Act, "1hich came into effect January 1, 1972, 
was based on a very clear set of objectives. The provincial government 
1 had issued a White Paper outlining what it considered to be the four 
major purposes behind local government reform in Winnipeg. First was to 
achieve financial equity between the fourteen municipal jurisdictions then 
existing in the Greater 't-Jinnipeg area. Second was the need to eliminate the 
conflict and stalemate then existing between the municipalities, especially the 
1. Government of Manitoba,_ "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the 
Greater Winnipeg Area", December 1970. 
City of Winnipeg, and the Metropolitan Corporation of Winnipeg. Under the 
Metro Act of 1960, the second tier government of Metro had responsibility 
for planning, but the constituent municipalities had power of implementation. 
The result was a breakdown in implementing the long range development plan 
of the city. Third~ there was the desire to achieve greater efficiency in 
municipal services through amalgamation of fire, police, administration, 
public works, etc. And, fourth 9 was the need to develop and encourage a 
greater degree of involvement and interest by the citizen in local government. 
To achieve these goals, the provincial government introduced a 
regional government structure based upon the principle of administrative 
and financial centralization. The form of political organization~ however, 
was decentralized, providing representation on a small scales giving 
communities within the city some responsibility for governing their own 
local affairs, and opening access to government for the private citizen. 
This was achieved by electing councillors through a ward system based on 
approximately lOsOOO population (50 in number), a community committee 
arrangement that combined three to six wards in a structure that had 
supervision over local services and local planning, and the attachment to 
each community committee of a resident advisory group composed of private 
2 
citizens who could work with and advise councillors on local matters. 
two of the most troublesome problems facing urban areas: overcoming the 
fragmentation of jurisdictions, with the resultin~ inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of separate governments to cope with urban-regional problems; 
and developing closer involvement of urban citizens with their government. 
2. For a more detailed account of the structure, see Meyer Brot~stone~ 
Lionel Feldman, "Innovation and City Government: Winnipeg 1972", 
Canadian Forum~ May 1972; Lloyd Axworthy ~ "Winnipeg: An Experiment in 
Innovation"~ Canadian ForWll~ May 1972. 
4 
It is this particular combination of goals that makes the Winnipeg innovation 
somewhat unique. ~~ile some urban areas have developed new forms of 
:regional government, and others have experimented with local decentralization 
schemest the Winnipeg system is designed to achieve both these goals in one 
integrated system. One of the important questions 9 then, is how well does 
this new structure in Winnipeg achieve these goals? 
Institutional Reform 
Related to this questi.on is another issue that has been of some 
interest to political scientists in recent years: namely, how effective 
is institutional reform? In earlier years~ when the study of local 
government was dominated by public administration theorists~ it was 
naturally assumed that changes in local government institutions were the 
natural and only way to bring about improvements in local government. 3 With 
the emergence of a more behavioural-oriented study of politics, however, 
the focus was altered. The emergence of community power studies centered 
attention on the power of informal political alliances and elites to make 
decisions, 4 and the formal structure and organization of government was 
downplayed. Subsequently, social scientists began to examine how the 
social and economic characteristics of a city related to the kind of policy 
decisions that were made. For example, the work of Terry Clark related 
3. Luther Gulick, The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas, New York, 
Knopf, 1962. 
4. For an overview of this~ see Robert Dahl~ Who Governs, New Havens Yale 
University Press, 1961; Floyd Hunter~ Community Power Structu~9 Chapel 
Hill~ University of North Carolina, 1953; Robert Agger, The Dynamics of 
Local Political Participation» Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Oregon, 1954. 
variables such as population density. income levels and religious affiliation 
5 to expenditure patterns of government. Again the role of formal structures 
of government was downplayed. 
There have also been attacks on the conventional wisdom that the 
way to overcome fragmentation and multiplicity of urban areas was through 
regional government. Banfield, Long and l,1ood, in particular~ have emphasized 
that ri!:!gional decisions can be made effectively by bargaining among different 
jurisdictions. 6 Harold Kaplan's study of the Toronto Metro system highlights 
how political patterns in the urban community can seriously alter the 
performance of a regional system away from its original intentions. 7 
Equally critical of institutional reform are many advocates of 
community participation. They see the formal structure of government as 
being of limited impact in the system of making decisions. To them, economic 
and class distinctions within a city are more significant determinants. 
They believe that the way to achieve greater citizen control is through 
mobilization of new power groups~ not through tinkering with the governmental 
8 
structure. 
5. Terry N. Clark, "The Concept of Power: Some Overemphasized and 
Underrecognized Dimensions", in Bonjeau et al, Community Politics, 
The Free Press, New York 1971. 
6. Banfield~ Political Influence, Glencoe, The Free Press 1960; Norton and 
Long~ The Polit;y, Chicago, Rand HcNally, 1962; and Robert lvood, 
1400 Governments, Cambridge~ Harvard University Press, 1961. 
7. Harold Kaplan, Reg_ional CitY,:v Politics and Planning in Metropolitan 
~reas, Toronto CBC, 1965. 
8. James Lorimer, The Real l•Yorld of City ]>plitics, Toronto, James Lewis 
& Samuel~ 1970. 
6 
Of late~ there has been renewed interest in the relevancy of 
institutional reform. t~ile acknowledging the importance of the underlying 
social and economic characteristics of a local community and the behavioural 
attributes of the sy9tem~ it is n~1 evident that the formal structures of 
a system also have a determining effect upon the policy decisions of local 
government. To give an example~ Harlan Hahn points out that both the 
individual citizen and the public office holder may be prevented from playing 
constructive roles in government because of certain structural barriers, 
such as the nature of the electoral jurisdictiont the kind of suffrage, the 
powers given the mayor~ the accessibility of government structures, and so 
on.9 Thus, a complete analysis of local government must relate environmental 
and behavioural features to institutional arrangements. 
The research problem this creates is complex. There needs to be a 
separating of the different variables and then determine how divergent 
institutional variables affect the performance of the system. In some 
cases, the institutional structure may be the operative variable; in others 
it may not. The role they do play, however, is a very critical consideration 
at a time when there is increasing interest in matters of urban government 
reform, because it does influence the kind of strategy one chooses. Does 
one work towards a change in the politics of the city as has recently occurred 
in Toronto and Vancouver, only to have that reform thrust frustrated by 
institutional barriers? Or does one change the structure of local government, 
as in Winnipeg and lately in Montreal~ but leave the politics of the system 
in the hands of the same people? There is also the question, particularly 
'. Harlan Hahn~ "Reas:s~ssing and Revitalizing Urban Poll. tics", in 
H. Hahn (ed.), ~eople and Politics in Urban Society, Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, 1972. 
political alignments, or brings new political forces into play. The conflict 
between suburban politicians and central city politicians may now be 
exercised within the same structure of government, as opposed to the previous 
case, where the same political forces battled from separate jurisdictional 
bases. As well~ to what extent does a resident advisory system on the 
neighbourhood level provide a focus for citizen activism and become a forum 
in which new community political groups can be heard and exercise some 
leverage? 
Unfortunately, this kind of analysis of local communities in Canada 
is sadly lacking. There are very few community power studies~ little 
behavioural work~ and almost no system analysis that attempts to relate 
structural variables to environmental variables in an effort to assess their 
influence on policy outcome~0 There is also almost a total lack cf 
comparative analysis essential for the testing of hypotheses about the 
impact of different environmental or structural variables. Therefore, 
while there is now emerging some sense of what a basic framework for analysis 
of decision-making on the local level should be, and therein a way to 
determine the impact of different structural or institutional changes, there 
is not sufficient data or relevant findings to enable a full assessment of 
the Winnipeg scheme to be made at this time. 
There must be the build-up of a research design that would fill in 
more of the missing elements, particularly those related to the economic~ social 
and political factors, and provide for a comparative testing of the 
institutional component of the Winnipeg scheme. This will take time. 
10. See Edmund Fowler and Robert Lineberry~ "Reformism and Public Policies 
in American Cities", in Bonjeau et al, ~:f:Eics, The Free Press, 
New York, 1971. 
8 
Transition 
Another difficulty related to the examination of the Winnipeg system 
the problem of how to introduce and implement a major :i:nnovation in 
government. There is some literature on the question of implementation of 
u innovation~ and it indicates that normally there are serious problems in 
having the original intention of a piece of legislation carried out exactly. 
The fact is that innovations must overcome the built-in resistance of 
people's attitudes~ perceptions and beliefs and the result can be a major 
distortion between the original idea and the way it is put into effect. 
This is especially true in a situation such as Winnipeg, where a 
new system of government is replacing the old~> but where many of the same 
politicians and administrators assume important roles in the new structure. 
They tend to bring with them the outlook and behaviour nurtured under the 
old system and will therefore be likely to react against new concepts and 
practices and to shape the system to suit their accustomed mode of thought. 
It may be that sooner or later, a new group of elected and appointed 
officials will emerge, bringing with them a different set of attitudes, or 
that the transplanted officials will over time become accustomed to working 
in a new structure. But, at present, the new institutions are being managed 
by people who acquired their experience and outlook in more traditional forms 
of local government. Thus, it is important not to judge the operation of 
U. See Lawrence Mohr, 11Deteminants of Innovation in Organization"~ in 
American Political Science Review I~ March 1969; and Ronald G. Havelock, 
Planning for Innovation, Center for Research on Utilization of 
Scientific Knowledge, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1971. 
9 
the system too early~ as there are bound to be highly negative feelings in 
the first stage of the new system. Nonetheless~ one of the dangers faced 
in this transition stage is that the early behaviour of hold-over decision-
makers could substantially alter the new structure~ before it has a chance 
to work as intended. 
In a transition period there are problems in developing different 
administrative techniques of transferring people and resources. A particular 
issue in a period of transition is personnel. A change in government 
affects the security of civic employees, and there is confusion in trying 
to forge single hiring, payroll, and labour relation policies out of the 
different systems that existed in the former municipalities. Thus, a 
major focus of the transition period is on problems of conversion and 
there is little time and often resources to apply to new policies or 
directions. 
What happens in this transition period is critical for the longer 
term prospects of the new system. Certain bureaucratic practices, on~e 
established 9 can become enshrined$ A rule is interpreted by policy makers~ 
and through a process of precedent, that interpretation becomes hallowed, 
though it may in fact contradict the original intention of the Act. For 
example, there is ambiguity over the role of Resident Advisors in the new 
system, and differences over the meaning of citizen participation as 
contained in the Act. Depending on what actions are taken in the early 
stages of the new system, the usefulness of the Resident Advisory system 
might be forestalled or enhanced. 
In fact~ there are already serious efforts being made by ~ertain 
councillors and administrators to have the present structure altered. They 
10 
would like tc ~ee the size of eoundl reducl!ld to half~ perhap~ have the 
community committees eliminated or reduced to six in number, have the mayor 
elected directly~ and perhaps eliminate the Resident Advisory eystem. 
There also are apparent problems in the way various proees~e~ of government 
are carried out, the most obviou~ being the lengthy procedure for the 
hearing and passage of building applications and zoning variations. 
Any judgement of these proposed changes should be taken against 
the backdrop of the longer term development of city government in Winnipeg. 
It would be unfortunate if changes were made too hastily, based upon 
assessments that did not specify causes, but only symptoms of problems. 
Equally, any proposed changes must be evaluated from the point of view of a 
realistic appreciation of the limits of institutional reform. The problems 
experienced in the operation of the new system of local government might 
very well lie in the political setting of the system, not in its ins~itutions. 
Therefore, tinkering with the machinery will not necessarily help. For 
these reasons, a careful assessment of the significance of developments in 
the system during its transitional phase is important. 
Study Outline 
It is with these considerations in mind that this present report 
on the first transition phase of Winnipeg 1 s new local government is based. 
It was not possible, nor was the time right~ for a full, comprehensive 
evaluation to be made. That would require a major research undertaking and 
the lapse of at least three to five years. But~ it was deemed important 
to provide an independent look at the transition phase~ record the. significant 
pattern~ that are beginning to emerge, provide some base line information 
u 
and an assessment framework for a longer term evaluation 9 and make some 
comment on existing proposals for changes in the system. The purpose of 
this report, therefore, ia to examine the initial period of implementation 
of the new system and de.l:llcribe what appears to be happening in that systemt 
how people in the system perceive it to be working, and whether the 
objectives set out in the legislation have some chance of being attained. 
To achieve tbis 9 the report utilizes the following information: 
an overview of events and developments based upon documents, newspaper 
accounts and monitoring of various Council, Community Committee and Resident 
Advisory meetings; case studies of major planning and development issues 
designed to show certain dynamics of the system; a series of interviews 
with City Councillors~ civil servants~ provincial officials, resident 
advisors; a survey of public views of the new system; and a budget analysis 
to determine whether there are any departures in expenditure that indicate 
significant shifts. 
Using this data, the report will contain observations on the 
following: 
the nature of problems encountered in the transition process, 
the emergence of certain political cleavages and alignments, 
the perceptions of a number of participants as to how well the system is 
operating~ 
the identification of certain trends in the practice and operation of 
the new system, along with an isolation of certain serious problems 
related to the structure, 
commentary on the present proposals for change, 
an outline of what research and evaluation program should be introduced 
to ensure a full and comprehensive assessment of the new Winnipeg system. 
12 
Th~se areas do not~ ~f course, answ~r the central que~tion that 
. should be asked of any institutional r~form; namely~ does it in fact 
significantly change the impact of gov~mment upon it11 c:U:izens? It will 
provide~ hopefully, the beginning of an answer upon which more extensive 
evaluation might be based. 
SECTION 1I 
THE NEW SYSTEM 
* HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
* THE STRUCTURE 
*.THE ElECTION CAMPAiGN 
14 
Historical Backgroun~ 
Winnipeg is a city of just over half a million people. Being 
the province's single large urban centre, it is the dominant unit in 
Manitoba~ with approximately half the population of the province. It is 
one of the most ethnically heterogeneous urban areas in Canada~ 12 with 
approximately 45% of the population being of British origin, approximately 
8% of French origin and 47% of other ethnic origin, consisting of 
Ukrainian, German, Polish and Jewish. The greater part of all the goods 
and services produced in the province are produced or generated in the 
Winnipeg area. It provides the most jobs and produces most of the tax 
dd h . 13 revenues nee e to run t e prov1nce. Greater Winnipeg~ it has been 
written, was a social and economic whole fragmented into a number of 
14 
municipalities for the purposes of local government. 
The city has~ over the years, been transformed by successive 
waves of European immigration until it is now one of the most cosmopolitan 
areas in Canada -- and one of the few in which Anglo-Saxons are in a 
minority. Governed throughout its history by representatives of the 
Anglo-Saxon business elite, within the last two decades the ethnic 
majority has been making its political power felt. In terms of culture, 
Winnipeg is definitely a major urban centre supporting a symphony orchestra, 
one of the best ballet troupes in North America and a professional theatre 
company. 
12. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census. 
13. Government of Manitoba 9 "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the 
Greater Winnipeg Area", December 1970, p. 2. 
14. George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years", in 
Ralph Krueger and Charles Bryfogle, eds., Urban Problem~~ Toronto, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston~ 1971~ p. 359. 
15 
Historically~ there has been an underlying socio-political con~ensus 
shaping the city's political environment. This consensus about the main 
principles and directions of urban politics is inherited from the business 
oriented Anglo-Saxons who were firm believers in 11 good governmentn 9 
"efficiency" and "business principles". This was translated into strong 
feelings about keeping politics out of local government, and operating local 
government according to sound no-nonsense administrative procedures. The 
smaller ethnic groups which have taken over these political posts seem to 
have an even stronger belief in these principles of non-partisanship, 
efficiency and conservatism. This state of the political mind in Winnipeg 
is~ therefore, not different from that in most Canadian cities. 15 
A breakdown is beginning to appear in this view of local government, 
most noticeably in Toronto and Vancouver§ but it is still a dominant feature 
in Winnipeg. In part, this can be attributed to Winnipeg's lack of growth. 
The population increase of Winnipeg from 1966 to 1970 was only 5% as compared 
to 16% for Toronto, 15% for Vancouver, 16% for Edmonton and 21% for Calgary. 16 
Thus, while Winnipeg's heterogeneity in population would seem to indicate 
the development of a more divergent set of political values, the slow growth 
has promoted until just recently, the continuation of the more traditional 
outlook. 
However~ Winnipeg is experiencing the same kind of pressures for 
development and change that are generally part of the urban scene elsewhere 
in the country. Differences over downtown renewal, transportation systems~ 
15. See J. D. Anderson, ''Non Partisan Urban Politics in Canadian Cities", 
in J. K. Masson, James W. Anderson~ eds., Emerging Party Politics in 
Urban Canada 9 McClelland and Stewart Ltd.~ Toronto, 1972. 
16. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), November 9~ 1971. 
16 
suburban land development and the provision of public hou~ing have emerged 
as major issues in Winnipeg as it moved into the 1970ws. In addition, 
there is the particularly striking problem of substantial in-migration of 
Native people from rural areas~ so that it is estimated that there are over 
20,000 urban Native people, many of whom are on the lowe~t income scale. 17 
These developments have had the impact of creating highly 
politicized issues and engendering growing cleavages over issues. Thus 9 
just at the time when a new organization of local government was being 
introduced, the political 9 social and economic environment of the city was 
shifting and new political forces were coming into play. 
This imposes important questions for any assessment of the new 
scheme of government. To begin with~ it is hard to calculate the comparative 
weight the changed environment or the changed governmental structure has 
had on the policy outcomes. There is also the interaction between the 
structure and the environment to consider. For example~ if the changing 
political and social environment is tending to develop major differences 
between suburban and inner city populations over an issue such as transport-
ation~ does the new structure which brings the conflict within one 
jurisdiction as opposed to between jurisdictions, provide for easier or a 
more difficult conflict resolution.18 
17. Don McCaskill, "Migration~ Adjustment, and Integration of the Indian 
into the Urban Environment", unpublished Masters Thesis, Carlton 
University, 1970. 
13. For an extensive discussion of the structure-environment relationship 
and its impact upon policy outcome, see Brett Hawkins, Politics and 
Urban Policies, New York, Bobs Merrill, 1971. 
17 
In other W(n::-ds, there are some ve10r practieal questions a!'ising 
out of this relationship between structure and environment, because any 
alterations or amendments to the local government system should take into 
account the alterations in the political, economic and social context 
of l~innipeg if they are to be at all relevant. 
The Structure 
In June of 1969, a very important factor in the shaping of ~annipeg 
emerged with the surprise election to the provincial legislature of the 
New Democratic Party. 
Prior to 1969, the NDP had been third in provincial s~ats with all 
of their members coming from urban areas, mainly from North Winnipeg. This 
switch from a rural-based Conservative government to one based primarily 
in the Central City was a major factor in the re-shaping of Winnipeg's 
system of government. 
l~ile Metropolitan reform was not a major is~ue in the provincial 
election campaign~ a week prior to election day, the leader of the 
NDP, Ed Schreyer~ held a news conference at Union Centre to announce 
his urban policy. Schreyer stated that, if elected, he would set up 
a new regional government with wider powers than the existin~ Metro 
structure. Such a new regional council might unify such services as 
fire, police and sanitation. But, he said, such a new eouncil t.Yould 
not necessarily mean that there would be total amalgamation. Mr. Schreyer 
acknowledged that this represented a change in the party's policy 
of favouring a single unit of municipal government, but that this 
was his position. Although little noted at the time, the Premier's 
statement was an important one; at one and the same time he announced 
a policy of major reform while opposing total amalgamation and supporting 
18 
the idea of community units. It may be that the Premier was thinking 
of Ontario's scheme of regional governments and particularly the Ottawa-
Carleton arrangement -- a scheme he may have been familiar with while 
living in Ottawa as a Member of Parliament. In any case, Bill 36 certainly 
follows the general outline of the June 24 statement, which suggests 
that the Premier may have had a more important role in developing the 
Unicity concept than many observers thought. 
It is difficult to judge when the Government decided to opt 
for its own scheme~ but sometime during the year Finance Minbter Saul 
19 Cherniack began to set up a research team. Mr. Cherniack, one of the 
strongest members of the Government, had served on the first Metro 
Council and was a known supporter of amalgamation. Mr. Sidney Green, 
the runner-up to Mr. Schreyer as leader of the NDP, and one of the most 
powerful men in the Manitoba NDP, had also served on the first Metro 
Council and was a strong advocate of amalgamation. The "Cherniack-Green 
axis" t.Yas a powerful combination 'V7hich pushed for urban change and 
particularly for unification. 
The goal of the research was pre-determined -- Greater ltlinnipeg was 
to be united into one city. The job of the research team was to come up 
with a workable plan. To direct the research, Mr. Cherniack employed 
Meyer Brownstone, a professor of political science at the University of 
Toronto. Mr. Brownstone~ a well known supporter of the NDP, had worked for 
the CCF government in Saskatchewan from 1947 to 1964 as a research economist. 
There he had made the acquaintance of Earl Levin, the Metro Planning 
Director who had also worked for the CCF and who joined him on the research 
19. Separate from the work of this research team was a blue-ribbon study 
group called the Local Boundaries Commission which had been established 
by the previous Conservative Government. It too was working on a 
scheme for re-organizing Winnipeg, but it was ignored by the new 
government. See Tom Axworthy. Politics of Innovation, IUS, 1972. 
19 
team. Other members of the team included Lionel Feldman~ an urban 
specialist from Toronto~ and C. N. Kushner, a former suburban mayor. In 
the summer of 1970, the Government asked the Local Boundaries Commission 
to make their files and :research totally accessible to Mr. Brownstone and 
his associates. Mr. Br~mstone 1 s research has undoubtedly influenced by 
many sources; both he and Mr. Feldman would be aware of the large literature 
on citizen participation and the desire for participation is an important 
part of the ~~ite Paper. The possible influence of the example set 
by the Ottawa-Carleton regional government s:chern.e has already been 
noted. Another research source was the Redcliffe~Maud Royal Commission on 
Local Government in England which is quoted approvingly in the vlhite 
Paper. It is likely that the Government got its idea of community 
councils from Redcliffe-Maud. Mr. Brownstone consulted with various 
individuals in ~Unnipeg but he did not go through the usual motions 
h . . h h M c '1 d h C' f T.l' • 20 sue as meet1ngs w1t t e .etro ounc1 an t e .1ty o w1nn1peg. 
Sometime during the fall or early winter of 1970 the Brownstone 
recommendation went to Cabinet. There was definitely controversy 
within the cabinet over the Brownstone proposals and many were eventually 
changed. One highly placed source has said "what was left out of the 
21 White Paper is more important than ~,rhat remains". The main issue of 
contention apparently was over the continued identity of the local 
municipalities. The main proponents of amalgamation were Cherniack 
and Green while Al Mackling, the Attorney-General and a former alderman 
forSt, James, and Saul Miller, Education Minister and former mayor of 
20. Interviews. 
21. Interviews. 
West Kildonan 9 opposed them and sought to preserve the separate identities 
of the suburban municipalities, The impasse ~.ras resolved with the com-
promise of the community councils. l'\l'ith his known talent for conciliation, 
it may 't-1ell have been the Premier who engineered the compromise (a 
final policy l>Yhich followed his statement of June 24th). In fact, 
Bill 36~ is almost a perfect example of compromise; it allows a suburban 
member to emphasize the community council and a central city representative 
to praise unification. 
Although the report of the Local Boundaries Commission had been 
submitted September 10~ the Government held up its publication until 
the cabinet had decided on an alternative plan. Finally in late December 
the Local Boundaries Report was released and a week later on December 23, 
1970 the trfuite Paper ~.ras unveiled at a news conference. !1r. Cherniack 
t.rho had been designated Minister of Urban Affairs, said the report vras 
a "~vholly new approach" which ~-1ould continue the efficiency of centrali~ 
zation with more citizen participation. The Premier, for his part, 
emphasized that the Hhite Paper meant one city but "l.rith provision for 
. . . . i . " 22 reorgan1z1ng ex1st1ng commun t1es Hr. Cherniack, ~~as made Minister 
of Urban Affairs and charged with the responsibility to implement the 
vfuite Paper which advocated: 
- a 48 member council 
- 10 community committees staffed by the respective members 
of the central council 
- mayor of the central council elected by the council members 
- equalization of mill rates 
~ school division boundaries to remain unchanged. 
22. Winni~_Free Press~ December 23. 1970. 
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There was much opposition expressed to the bill to create a one-
city structure both in the legislature, in the public hearings held by 
the Municipal Affairs Committee and in the Press. 
During the legislative debates both the Conservative and the 
Liberal Party leaders presented their plans for the restructuring of 
local government. The Progressive Conservative approach to urban 
reorganization would have consisted of a regional government based on 
representation from local councils where the division of powers would 
be by voluntary agreement. Such a plan ~.rould have in effect, created 
a regional government in name only as, an evidenced by their positions 
and their briefs, the municipalities wanted more and not less control 
over themselves. The Liberal Party Plan for Reorganizing Local Government 
was essentially the same as that of the Conservatives. It was perhaps 
a little more structured, a little less voluntary and would have been 
another bigger and better Metro system, 
At the height of the Unidty debate in March of 1971, the Institute 
of Urban Studies~ in cooperation with the CBC, conducted a public opinion 
survey. The survey (see Appendix I) was designed to test public opinion 
regarding the issues and debate surrounding the Government l·-lhite Paper. 
While the survey did not claim to be definitive 5 it was indicative~ 
comprising a statistically acceptable percentage of the population and 
carried out through application of established techniques. 
The following data illustrate some of the results: 
1. People did not see the question of local government reorganization as 
a really vital one. 
- 51% said the i~sue would not affect the way they would vote provincially. 
- 47% yes 
- 32% no 
~ Change supported by those in Winnipeg~ Transeona and East Kildonan. 
~ Change opposed by St. James-Assiniboia and Tuxedo. 
- 7 other municipalities divided on question. 
- 20% unable to indicate any preference (showing again lack of real 
concern on question). 
3. People did not really understand the proposals and the debate. 
- 52% said there had not been enough discussion. 
- Misunderstanding pointed out by the fact that 39% were in favour of 
government plan and 59% were in favour of strong council and 
community committee system. 
4. On the question of direct election of the mayor, 87% of the people 
were in favour of it. 
5. On the question of support for government plan or Boundaries Commission 
plan: 
- 39% favoured government plan. 
- 46% favoured small change. 
- 35% of people in suburbs favoured government plan. 
- 60% of people in Winnipeg favoured government plan. 
- Only 2 cities, St. Boniface and St. James-Assiniboia, strongly 
opposed the government plan. 
- The remaining cities (except Winnipeg) divided on question. 
6. In correlating the question of whether or not change was desirable 
with job classifications, income, and rent-own situation: 
- The highest status job, highest degree of mobility and highest income 
people favoured change and the government plan and would be willing 
to pay higher taxes for a more democratic government. 
- The lm~est status job, lowest degree of mobility and lowest income 
people favoured change and government plan and would be willing to 
pay higher taxes for a more democratic government. 
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- The average stiltus job~ average mobility and middle level income 
people were more opposed to change and the government plan and would 
!12!; be willing to pay higher taxes for a more democratic government. 
7. 30% of the people favoured party politics in city elections. 
= Results showed that the Liberal Party supporters were as much in 
favour of party politics as were NDP party supporters, and the 
Conservatives were the major group opposed to party polities at 
the local level. 
The Legislative Municipal Affairs Committee started receiving 
public briefs on the government's proposed central city bill in July of 
1971. In all~ more than 30 presentations were made to the Committee. Of 
all the briefs presented by the mayors and reeves, only one brief 
expressed outright approval of Bill 36~ that of Mr. Juba, the mayor of the 
City of Winnipeg. However, there was dispute over the issue of election 
of the mayor. The original proposal to have the mayor elected by Council 
appeared contrary to the interests of Mr. Juba, as it would appear unlikely 
that he would take his chances under such circumstances. Several of the 
briefs directed .themselves to the issue~ and there was obviouS! public 
support for a system of direct election. 
the government announc~d their 
amendments to Bill 36. Most of the amendments were minor in nature, but 
there were some which were of major significance. Firstly, the mayor was 
to be directly elected for the first term while all subsequent mayors would 
be elected by and from the members of the central Council. Secondly~ the 
new city was to be called Winnipeg instead of Greater t<linnipeg. Thirdly 9 
the mayor's salary was to be $18,000 per year (one-third tax free)t and 
the councillors' to be $5,700 per year. Fourthly, the new city would 
gain all rights formerly held by the City of Winnipeg to operate its own 
hydro alld utilities but the suburban rates must be equalized, meaning a 
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rise in cost to the residents of the City of and a reduction in· 
cost to the suburban residents. Regarding committees~ the executive 
committee was increased from seven members to ten members and no members 
of a standing committee were to be allowed to sit on the executive committee. 
Also, after the second term of office~ the mayor may be removed by a two-
thirds majority vote. Community Committees were given the authority to 
strike their own subcommittees. The joint Winnipeg Community Committees 
(six of them) were renamed the Inner City Joint Committee. 
Of these amendments, the most important was the direct election of 
the mayor~ because it fundamentally altered the political/organizational 
theory of the authors of the reform. They had built a structure based on 
parliamentary model, wherein the chief executive would have to enjoy the 
confidence and support of a majority of elected members of Council. In 
this way a .degree of executive leadership could be assured~ and a 
corresponding discipline imposed upon Council. It was also assumed that 
a party system would evolve because of the need to develop a working 
majority on Council. With the direct election provision, however, the 
mayor was freed from the necessity to command majority support, and there 
was far less imperative to develop cohesive working coalitions to support 
executive action. It was introducing a presidential type system into 
a parliamentary base~ making for a hybrid arrangement. The government, 
however~ didn't follow the logic of their illogical act, because they 
gave the mayor's office no powers such as a veto, right of appointment 
or budget-making that could give some leverage vis-a-vis Council. Thus, 
he became a weak mayor~ at least as far as official powers were concerned. 
This hasty political judgement on the election of the mayor was to result 
in a major handicap in the new system and the cause of major difficulties 
in developing an effective decision-making system. 
Bill 36 wa~ passed in the 
Criticism had not subsided and some parties were left rather bitter as 
Sidney Spivak~ the Conservative Party Leader, took some parting shots at 
the amendments and Mayor Turner of St. Boniface flew their flag at City 
Hall upside down and at half-staff as a signal of distress. 
The City of Winnipeg Act was scheduled to come into effect on 
January 1, 1972, which provided approximately six months to plan and 
organize the transition. The provincial government established a team of 
task forces to help guide the transition, but other than preparing 
background papers and helping with some aspects of the transition~ the 
provincial government appeared to take a hands-off attitude towards its 
new creation. 
The final structural organization set out in Bill 36 saw the 
twelve separate municipalities disbanded and formed into one city. The 
city was then divided into fifty wards with one councillor per ward 
elected from that ward. Three~ four, five or six of these wards would 
form a Community Committee area which are roughly contiguous with the 
old municipalities. The councillors represent their ward, sit on their 
Community Committee and sit on Council, as well as sitting on Community 
Committee subcommittees and Council committees. 
The executive arm of the new structure would be the fifty man 
Council and the mayor (who was elected at large for the first term~ but 
who, according to the Act, should be elected from and by the fifty man 
Council). In order to facilitate the Council's decision-making role and 
its policy execution role, there are four major committees -- Environment 
Committee, Finance Committee, Committee on Works and Operations and 
Executive Policy Committee, 
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This Executive Policy Committee would be the overall policy arm 
of the Council and the other committees would be administrative ones. The 
Executive Policy Committee would consist of the mayor and the other 
committee chairmen as well as six members of Council. 
The administrative arm would be the Board of Commissioners,' 
consisting of four commissioners and the mayor. They are the link between 
the Council and the administration and theoretically would make recommendations 
on all matters concerning the carrying out of executive and administrative 
functions and would also be responsible to the central council for general 
management~ direction and (:ontrol of the city's administration. 
This B<iard of Commissioners system is similar to that found in 
Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Board is chaired by a Chief 
Commissioner and its members are the various commissioners of the 
executive departments. 
While the foregoing reorganizational elements were new to Winnipeg 
and innovative in the way that they were put togethert their purpose 
was a standard one -- an attempt to increase local government efficiency. 
The other objective of the new structure~ that of providing for 
and legislating for citizen participation, becomes one of the most innovative 
and exciting concepts in the history of local government. This was the 
Community Committee and Resident Advisory Group concept. This concept 
grew out of the desire to devise at the community level a framework within 
which the citizen could clearly perceive the issues affecting him and act 
forcefully and effectively in his own self-interest. 
The Community Committees would be akin to Neighbourhood Councils 
and were intended to provide ready access to the people in that area and 
supervise local administrative functions. Their primary role was a 
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Council. Their most important responsibility~ and the one which in 
practice has been the most neglected, is the responsibility of developing 
effective ways and means of keeping citizens informed of what their Council 
23 is doing, planning or p~~~singo 
The Community Committee also had been given the responsibility of 
supervising the delivery of local services. 
The meaning of the word 'supervise' soon required qualification 
and this came about during the summer of 1972. Some suburban Community 
Committees had continued to operate their administration in the same 
style as when they were municipalities exercising hiring and firing 
responsibility. The intentions of the Manitoba Government were for central 
Council and administration to have this power and not Community Committees. 
The redefinition of 'supervise 1 became "to watch, observe, and make 
24 qualitative assessment". The ne'V7 definition made clear that Community 
Committees have no real power and that power is centralized as intended. 
It was clear from these provisions that the notion of citizen 
participation envisioned by the government fit into the conventional 
formula of representative government. It was designed to bring people 
into closer contact with government~ not to give them a role in making 
decisions on the local level. 
23$ For a discussion of the origin of the new City of liJinnipeg Act and 
its original purposes, see the two publications~ I and II, of the 
Future City Series~ published by the Institute of Urban Studies. 
24$ For a further discussion of Resident Advisory Groups and Community 
Committees~ see 11Meeting the Problems and Needs of Resident Advisory 
Groups", Institute of Urban Studies, 1973. 
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The ward which to1as built into the new structure also 
deserves some attention. Previously~ the City of tHnnipeg had been divided 
into three large wards and the Metropolitan Corporation Council divided 
the entire Greater Winnipeg area into ten large wards. These large ward 
systems had the advantage of including a diverse erose-section of a city 
for a councillor to represent. 
But they also had many disadvantages: they did not make their 
representative responsible to a homogeneous and parochial intere~t; the 
representative tended to lose contact with the people simply because of 
the large number of people he had to represent; in areas where poorer and 
more affluent areas comprised a ward~ the representative almost always 
tended to come from, and to work for, the more affluent area. 
A small ward system has the advantage of "intense representation", 
since a councillor represents a relatively small population (about 10,000 
to 20,000). The residents have a better chance of knowing who he is and 
the councillor finds it easier to be in contact with and know the problems 
of a smaller ward. It ensures strong representation for the ward. But 
on the other hand, a small ward system can and does often yield 
representatives who are concerned exclusively with their ~~ wards~ 
representatives who can't see or don't care to see the larger problems of 
the area or the city. The small ward system also discourages discussion 
of issues and ends up electing favourite sons or well known people in the 
community. A small ward system of a large city inevitably results in a 
large Council -- fifty in Winnipeg's case. The problems of parochialism 
and a disorganized large Council are reported to be two of the internal 
problems facing Unicity. But for the first time in this city's history, 
many of the disadvantaged and minority groups find that they have a voice 
on Council and that their feelings and attitudes are being heard. 
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The Election Campaign 
In August of 1971~ the Provincial Government selected October 6s 
1971 5 as the date for new city elections. Early that summer, during June 
and July~ many former city and suburban councillors had announced their 
intentions of seeking a seat on the new Council, but very little actual 
campaigning went on over the summer. 
What did emerge over the summer was a new municipal election 
organization. This Independent Citizens' Election Committee replaced the 
old Greater Winnipeg Election Committee. Like the previous election 
committees on the l\linnipeg scene, the ICEC was organized to oppose the 
NDP party at the local level, and any concern with policies was secondary. 
As one prominent politician remarked, "The main thing is to get organized 
h P 1 1 ,.25 in opposition to t e ND • Po ieies we can sort out ater. · 
The NDP provincial party did not seem terribly anxious to field 
and/or support a full slate of NDP municipal candidates. But great pressure 
was being exerted by some of the more radical elements of the local NDP 
organizations. A total of 39 NDP municipal candidates declared and in 
August of 1971 they held their municipal policy convention. Some 500 
delegates from the Winnipeg area attempted to formulate policy in six areas 
of urban concern -- community participation, transportation, environment, 
housing~ urban development and taxation. 
This discussion of and consensus on policy direction for the new 
city put the ICEC in an awkward position. The ball was now in their court 
25. !'Election Committee Folds After 46 Years 9 " ~1innipeg Tribune, June 22, 
1971. 
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and the emphasis was now on them to say something about policy for the 
new city. The ICEC called a policy convention for September -- the first 
time a civic election committee in Winnipeg had ever done so. The ICEC 
convention was much more elaborate than the NDP convention had been, with 
four guest speakers and five workshops. The workshops were to cover 
policy areas and were similar to those of the NDP, although the NDP 
included one extra area -- community participation. 
However, due to speakers at the convention who stressed the 
community aspect, a sixth workshop dealing with this subject was established. 
Very little policy was forthcoming from the convention and what did come 
out was not binding on any of the 48 municipal ICEC candidates. 
Little or no time was ever spent by the ICEC on attempting to 
discuss the one-city concept, the role of citizens and resident advisors, 
the community committee concept and its potential or the potential of the 
50 man Council to deal with the large urban problems looming on the 
horizon. 
From their early campaigning and from their convention, it became 
apparent that the Independent Citizens' Election Committee was a. loose 
coalition of Liberals and Conservatives designed to keep the NDP party from 
getting control of local government. The election cry was one of "People 
before Party" with very little mention of what the 'people' believed in. 
The real Unicity Council campaigning took place only in the six 
weeks prior to election day. The NDP attempted to run on policies while 
the ICEC attempted to run on personalities~ on an anti-NDP, anti-party 
platform~ using the slogan "People before Party". This anti-campaign was 
very successful~ especially in the middle class suburban areas wh~re fear 
of socialism was widespread. 
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All campaigns were fairly quiet even though a total of 
candidates were seeking election to the 50 seats. Interestingly enough~ 
the ICEC, which claimed to be the organization of independent candidates~ 
ran 48 candidates, while 69 other true independents also ran. The battle 
between these two camps then came down to one of 'who was the more 
independene. The ICEC, with "free-enterprise" backing, was the more 
successful electing 37 candidates. Of the 64 independents who had not 
the backing of a political machine, only five were elected~ two in the 
suburban community of Transcona, one in the inner city area of Lord 
Selkirk~ one in the suburban area of East Kildonan~ and one in the inner 
city area of St. John's. The NDP elected only seven councillors, four 
of them in the inner city community of Centennial, two in the inner city 
area of St. John's and one in the inner city area of Fort Rouge. 
The Labour Election Committee which ran eight candidates saw only 
one elected, in the inner city area of Lord Selkirk. 
The ICEC, with 37 successful candidates, had effective control 
of the new City Council, with the greater part of their power lying with 
the suburb3n areas. 
Running concurrently with the City Council campaign, was the 
mayoralty campaign. In its original form, the bill creating the new 
city called for the election of the mayor from among the councillors. 
There was, however, much opposition to this concept of a council-elected 
mayor. It was felt by many people that the bill created a framework for 
an efficient city administration but that without a strong mayor elected 
by the voting public, the city's civil servants could end up running the 
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city instead of the elected politicians. One of the strongest proponents 
for the area wide election of the mayor was Winnipeg's mayor~ Stephen Juba. 
Juba felt that a council-elected mayor would be "a little puppy dog to 
the majority of cotmdl"26 who would be able to "do things for fear of 
21 being thrown out of the next council meeting". A further argument on 
this part was that "the public have indicated that they want to elect the 
28 
mayor". 
As mentioned earlier, Winnipeg had a history of being governed 
by Anglo-Saxon businessmen, but in 1956 the City witnessed a change in 
the ethnicity of the power structure. Stephen Juba, a third generation 
Canadian of Ukrainian origin, defeated G. E. Sha.rpejj the incumbent, for 
the position of mayor of the City of Winnipeg. Only two non Anglo-Saxon 
candidates had run for mayor prior to World War I 9 and Juba himself had 
been unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954 tV'hen he lost by 15,.000 votes. In 1956, 
however, Juba was presented with an issue concerning alleged misuse of 
public money and this gave him enough "good government" votes~ combined 
with his ethnic support to defeat Sharpe. The major issue in the campaign 
was Juba's ethnic origin, with the Winnipeg Free Press believing that 
"Juba would be a larger risk than the citizens of lUnnipeg should wisely 
29 
take" and the ethnic papers were all behind him. In l-Jard I~ which had 
a majority of Anglo-Sa.xons, 64.5% turned out and Sharpe received twice as 
26. Winnipeg Tribune, July 7~ 1971. 
21. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Winnipeg Free_ Press, October 19, 1956. 
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many votes as Juba~ but in Ward 3, where Slavic groups predominate, Juba 
won by nearly 11,000 votes. Since 1956, Juba has become almost a folk 
hero to many ethnic citizens and this~ combined with his political skill 
and conservative outlook (thus insuring that the business community did 
not mass against him)~ has made him unbeatable. Juba has expanded his 
political appeal beyond his ethnic base but it is his strength in the 
north end which has made him the most powerful politician in Metro Winnipeg. 30 
His political skill was also evident during and prior to the 
Unicity elections. He was constantly equivocating on whether or not he 
would run for t:he post of "super mayor" and he held back his announcement 
until he generated much public discussion and until it was too late for 
new political figures~ who would have emerged had he not run, to emerge. 
When Steve Juba finally announced his intention of running for 
the position of ~uper mayor he became the third mayoralty candidate. 
The first mayoralty candidate had been former Metro Councillor 
Bill Hutton and the second candidate was former 1:-:tetro Chairman Jack ~Jillis. 
Then at the end of August~ Steve Juba in his usual flamboyant manner 
announced at the sodturning ceremony at the Holiday Inn site his intention 
to run. Almost a month had elapsed between the first two declarations and 
that of Steve Juba. A politically astute move, it kept the two former 
Metro candidates wondering about the strength if any of any opposition to 
them. 
30. Ethnicity may also affect turnout. In 1956 about 58% of the 
electorate went to the polls~ the largest turnout since 1938~ when 
an ethnic candidate had also run. In 1960 when Juba was elected by 
acclamation the turnout fell to 38% but rose in 1962 when another 
candidate appeared (even though Juba was in no trouble). In 1971, 
when a real contest appeared to be threatening Juba's position, the 
turnout rose to a record 60%. 
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In early September~ a fourth candidate declared. Gordon Anderson~ 
a real estate agent, was running on the is@ue of pollution and was never 
considered a serious threat to either Mr. 1-lillis or Hr. Juba who were 
obviously the only real contenders. 
A fifth candidate announced but withdrew his name before election 
day. 
The only real contest was between Juba and Willis, with Willis 
running on a comprehensive policy platform and Juba running as always~ 
as the voice of the working man. After the votes were counted, it looked 
like no contest with Juba winning by over 90,000 votes. 
The voter turnout of this election set a Manitoba record of 
199,713 votes being cast-- 60.7% of the total eligible voters. 
The reason for the large voter turnout in the Unicity elections 
was not due to relevant policies or burning issues, but rather to two 
factors. The first was the area-wide election of the mayor and the 
candidacy of the very popular City of Winnipeg Mayor, Stephen Juba. The 
second factor was, as recognized a.nd propagated by the anti -NDP forces, 
the strong fear of a NDP takeover of the city. 
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In th~ following sections, different aspects of the system's 
performance will be described and assessed. Th~ data used for this is 
drawn from documents, council records, newspaper accounts, interviews, 
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in part from a survey questionnaire administered to councillors, municipal 
and provincial officials, and a telephone survey of Winnipeg residents 
using a sample size of 300. It should be noted that this survey 
represents under 1% of the total Winnipeg population. Its results should 
be treated as indicative only. 
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A. OVERALL PERFOID!iANCE 
With little exceptionf the prevailing view of both decision-
makers involved in the system and citizens alike is that the new system 
has as yet brought little change or improvement in the performance of city 
government. If anything, there is a feeling that thus far the new system 
is not performing as well. Among the councillors, only seven (14%) out 
of the 49 interviewed believe there has been an improvement in service, 
while 12 (24%) believe there has been a deterioration and 25 (50%) believe 
services have remained the same. There was a slight difference in the 
views between suburban or inner city councillors, with more of the former 
seeing a deterioration and a small difference between councillors who 
previously were in favour of the scheme against those who were opposed, 
the latter having no-one among their ranks who see improvement, not an 
inspiring result. 
Table 1 
Councillors' Perceptions of Services 
Respondents 50 29 21 25 11 
Suburban Inner City In Not In Services Total Favour Favour 
Improved 7(14%) 4(13%) 3(15%) 5(20%) 0(0%) 
Deteriorated 12(24%) 8(28%) 4(16%) 4(16%) 5(29%) 
Same 25(50%) 12(42%) 13(62%) 13(52%) 9(53%) 
N.A./D.K. 6(12%) .5(17%) 1(5%) 3(12%) 3(18%) 
This feeling of the deterioration of services, illustrated in 
Table 1, is not shared by the commissioners and by others in the 
municipal administration. They feel that most of the service levels 
have remained constant and that following the transition period those 
level~ will rise. 
This view was generally shared by the media people who were 
interviewed. 
As the following table illustrates, a random public opinion 
survey indicates that most citizens also share the view that services 
have not changed. This table also illustrates the large degree to 
whieh people are unaware of the service level beeause of these 
services being s:o taken for granted that they are never thought about. 
Table .it 
Citizen Perception of Local Services 
Respondents 300 
Service Improved Same Deteriorated N.A./D.K. 
Garbage 
Collection 21(7%) 186(62%) 0{0%) 93(31%) 
Streets 66(22%) 132 (44%) 9(3%) 93(31%) 
Recreation 33(11%) 132(44%) 0(0%) 135(45%) 
In terms of service areas where specific views were held, seven 
councillors saw improvement in personnel against two who saw changes for 
the worse. On the other hand~ six councillors commented negatively on 
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zoning procedures while none saw any improvement. In other areas~ there 
were no significant comments. 
~fuen asked about specific services~ however, the view was a much 
more positive sense of improvement, as can be seen in Table 3. 
Respondents so 
Service 
Garbage 
Table 3 
Councillors' Perceptions of Changes 
in Specific Services 
Improved Same Deteriorated 
Collection 3(6%) 30(60%) 0(0%) 
Streets 9 (18%) 22(44%) 1(2%) 
Recreation 5(10%) 21(42%) 0(0%) 
N .A./D.K. 
17 (34%) 
18(36%) 
24(48%) 
This table is reinforced by the citizen perception table~ and the 
conclusion that must be drawn from the difference in councillors' attitudes 
towards services in general~ in which they see a fair amount of deterioration, 
and services in more specific terms which they feel have generally remained 
the same, is that many councillors have a tendency towards generalization 
built on old prejudices. 
One specific area of distinct improvement mentioned by both the 
civic administrators interviewed and provincial officials, but unmentioned 
by both the politicians and public, was the achievement of a uniform tax 
base~ This is an expected dichotomy, however, as one can expect 
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administrators to appreciate th~ significance of thi~ particular 
achievement from a planning~ administrative~ economic development point 
of view, while its value would not be as important at this stage to the 
public or the politician. 
On the question of whether the new system was more successful 
in running the city than the old system, our public opinion survey showed 
the following results: 
Table ft 
Perceptions of Whether New Syste~ 
is More Successful Than Old 
Better 
Same 
Worse 
D.K./N .A. 
66(22%) 
21(7%) 
12(24%) 
141(48%) 
On this question of the success of the new system, most provincial 
people, municipal administration people and media people felt that it 
was really too early to make generalized assessments, and most felt that 
things would eventually sort themselves out. 
Generally, in terms of an overall assessment, the views of those 
involved are not too severe, considering this to be a transition period 
when numerous problems could be expected. While there is no significant 
approval, there is limited criticism of performance in the service fields. 
The same cannot be said, however, for the views on the organization and 
operation of Council, the administrative system, and the Community Committee-
Resident Advisory System. 
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B. PERFORMANCE OF COUNCil. 
Council Characteristics 
The ne~-t Council, which formally took office on January 1, 1972, 
was composed of 31 ICEC councillors~ 7 NDP councillors, 5 Independents 9 
and 1 Labour Election Committee councillor. In total, 21 councillors are 
from the inner city area, 2 are Independents, 1 is Labour Election Committee, 
7 are NDP and 11 are ICEC. This gives the ICEC caucus control of the 
Council and gives the suburbs control of the ICEC caucus. 
The other characteristics of the Council are all factors which, 
in part, can be somet~s U$ed to explain behaviour and attitudes~ but 
not with any real degree of accuracy. These character!$ tics have been 
divided into the following categories and many will have some significance 
at a later point in the discussion. 
Residency in Ward: About two-thirds of the councillors or 66% live in 
the ward they represent while 32% did not and 2% offered no answer. The 
32% figure runs a little high for a political office where closeness to 
the elected officials is considered more important than on provincial 
and federal politics. This is abated by several councillors reporting 
living just off the edge of the constituency they represent. 
Political Experience: Most of the councillors have had some previous 
political experience. Thirty-two or 64% had office previously, while 
17 or 34% had not and there was no answer from 1 or 2%. 
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Ieason for Being in Politics: In response to the question as to why the 
councillors sought election, 18 or 36% indicated that they had previous 
political experience and felt they could make a contribution, 13 or 26% 
said they were involved before (mostly as local councillors) and wanted 
to continue, 10 or 20% indicated that they ran on a particular issue, 6 or 
12% because they had a "desire to be in politics", while 3 or 6% offered 
other reasons. When asked whether they had fulfilled their reason for 
being involved as councillors, 18 or 37% said no, 15 or 30% partially, 
and 13 or 26% yes, while 4 or 8% didn't know or offered no answer. 
Amount of Time Spent .in Duties as Councillors: Councillors devote 
var,ing amouats of time to their office of councillor, depending on their 
committee responsibilities, their available time and their interest in 
the office. They were asked to estimate how many 8 hour days they serve 
as councillors. Of course, they sometimes serve 12 to 15 hours in a day, 
which works out to 1~ to 2 days. Their responses were as follows: 
24 or 48% reported spending over 3~ days a week. This category 
included retired councillors, housewives, and busy committee chairmen, 
as well as some with an active interest in local affairs. 
13 or 26% spend 3 to 3~ days a week, 8 or 16% spend 2 to 3 days a 
week, while only 4 or 8% work at it for less than 2 days a week. 
Had Councillors Appeared as a Delegation before any Council Committee: 
The intent of this question was to determine how active they were in 
representing the interests of their ward and in community with one -- •ll· 
another. Party-two or 84% said they had appeared as a delegation. 
Seven or 14% had not and 1 or 2% did not reply. Forty~six or 92% of 
the councillors are men, while 4 or 8% are women. 
or 50% of the councillors are between 36 
and 50 years of age, 13 or 26% are between 26 and 35 years, 1 or 14% are 
between 51 and 65 years~ 3 or 6% are over 65~ and there was no answer 
for one. 
In terms of profession: Seventeen or 34% described themselves as 
businessmen of one kind or another~ 16 or 32% as professional men~ 4 or 
8% as salesmen, 4 or 8% as retired~ 3 or 6% as housewives, 3 or 6% as 
technical and tradesmen, 1 or 2% full time politici~s, and 2 or 4% 
offered no reply. 
Education: Twenty-six or 52% reported having high school education, 14 
or 28% as being university or near university graduates, 4 or 8% as 
having professional university degrees, 2 or 4% had technical training, 
while 1 or 2% said he was self-educated and 3 or 6% did not reply. 
Income: Councillors appear to have incomes much higher than average 
people. Most councillors were modest and underestimated their income. 
In some cases they were probably not including their Council stipends. 
Accordingly no appropriate guess was used by the interviewer. 
Fourteen or 28% reported incomes of $12,001-$18,000, 10 @r 20% 
reported $25,001-$50,000 9 9 or 18% of $18,001-$25,000, 2 or 4% reported 
incomes of over $50,000 a year~ and 8 or 16% did not answer the question. 
Political Affiliation: Eighteen or 36% reported belonging to the 
Conservative Party, 13 or 26% as being Independent and in other categories~ 
9 or 18% as belonging to the Liberal Party, 5 or 10% as being NDP and 5 
or 10% gave no answer. 
Had C~unci~lors Favoured Amalg~ation Prior to the Passage of the Act: 
Seventeen or 34% said no, 25 or 50% said yes and 13 or 16% were unsure as 
to what effect it would have. 
As mentioned~ the initial composition of Executive Policy and the 
three standing committees was completely ICEC, but with the amendment to 
the Act, three NDP and four Independent councillors were added to the 
standing committees. 
As they are now constructed~ Executive Policy Committee is composed 
of ten councillors plus the mayor. All of these councillors belong to 
the ICEC caueus 9 and eight are from the suburbs~ while two are from the 
inner city. 
The three standing committees, Finance, Works and Operations, and 
Environment are each composed of eleven councillors. 
Finance Committee has nine ICEC members, one NDP and one 
Independent member. Works and Operations has the same proportion, while 
Environment has eight ICEC members, one NDP and two Independents. 
In terms of inner city-suburban distribution~ Finance Committee 
has six suburban ICEC members plus a suburban Independent. The Committee 
on Environment has six suburban ICEC members plus two suburban Independents. 
The suburbs then have a great deal of weight on all of the committees~ with 
the suburban ICEC councillors having a clear majority on all but one 
committee. 
This will prove at a later point in the discussion to be a factor 
in explaining the behaviour of attitudes of the Council. 
In asses~ing the performance of Council~ there have been strong 
expressions of dissatisfaction with the new government's capacity to make 
decisions and operate ~fficiently. Councillors are critical of the size 
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of Council~ the lack of leadership in Council, the role of Community Committees, 
and the independence of commissioners. On the issue of the size of Council~ 
out of the 49 councillors interviewed, 24 thought it was too large, while 
only 14 thought it to be the right she, the other 8 complaining of 
miscellaneous faults. In this vi~v there was a slight difference between 
councillors from the suburbs or the inner city, or from those who had 
previously been in favour of the system or not, but not a wide variance. 
Respondents 
Council 
Size 
Too large 
Right Size 
Other Comments: 
too split; too 
much polities. 
D.K./N.A. 
Table 5 
--
Councillors' Perceptions of 
Present Council 
50 29 21 
Total Suburban Inner City 
24(48%) 15(52%) 9(43%) 
14(28%) 7(24%) 7 (33%) 
8(16%) 5(17%) 5(24%) 
8%) 2(7%) 0(0%) 
25 17 
In Not in 
Favour Favour 
24(56%) 9(53%) 
7(28%) 3(18%) 
3(12%) 4(24%) 
1(4%) 1(5%) 
However, the councillors were ~venly split on whether the Council 
can work without changing Council size. Twenty-five thought it could; 24 
thought there should be a change. Table 6 shows the preference of 
councillors for the size of Council. 
Respondents 50 
Right Size 
of Council 
Table 6 
Councillors' Perception of 
Council Size 
0-18 18-24 25-35 
1(2%) 19(38%) 5(10%) 
36-50 
15(30%) 
N.A. 
10(20%) 
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Other groups intervie~.Yed expressed a llf'lss definite attitude 
towards the size of Council. The senior officials of the provincial 
government thought that size was no problem at all. Among senior officials 
of the city government views were evenly split~ two saying it was too 
large; two saying that size was not a problem. Of the eight department 
heads of city government interviewed~ five thought Council was too large 
one thought it not an issue, and two didn't kn~. It is important to 
note~ however, that most department heads generally expressed a lack of 
close knowledge of Council affairs. As for the five media people who 
report on Council matters, three felt the present size was acceptable; 
two felt it was too large. 
The one question that emerges from the attitudes toward the issue 
of Council size is whether the number of councillors is really a root 
cause of poor decision-making, or whether the fault is a lack of leadership 
or organization to discipline councillors into cohesive alignments or 
coalitions on issues. A fifty person Council may only be a problem when 
there are not integrative structures to pull the individual members into 
blocs~ or when the structures that do exist are not able to meld the 
cleavages existing in Council so that there can be a consensus on decision-
making. 
Undoubtedly, a small Council can be more efficient, but as 
Charles Adrian points out~ you sacrifice representation and closer contact 
31 
with citizens once you reduce the size of Council. And~ seeing as one 
of the major objectives of the reform in local government was to improve 
the representativeness of the system~ it t..rould be a questionable step to 
31. Charles Adrian~ "The Politics"~ in Public Administration Review, 
Volume XXX, September/October 1970. 
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revise that part of the structure which provides it~ especially when it 
is not certain that it is the size of Council that is at fault. Perhaps 
a more useful step is to determine what is presently missing in the 
Winnipeg system which accounts for the problems in policy-making. 
Council Leader~ 
One of the major concerns of Councillors expressed in the interview 
is the lack of leadership. Twenty-two of the councillors or 44% felt 
that no-one provided leadership. Eighteen or 36% saw leadership coming 
from the chairmen of the committees, and two or 4% considered it to be 
coming from the mayor. It should be pointed out, though, that a 
significant number of councillors (23) believed that the Act does not 
give the mayor sufficient power to exercise leadership. 
There tvas an equally strong feeling that the Executive Policy 
Committee was not doing its job. When asked to make an assessment, 29 
councillors or 58% felt that E.P.C. was not acting as a central policy-
making unit, another 10 (20%) felt it was not decisive, and 9 (18%) 
felt it had a poor relationship with commissioners. 
The councillors also felt that the one organization that might 
have provided a basis for unity or cohesion, the ICEC caucus, didn't 
work that way~ and was not the place where leadership would derive from. 
Twenty councillors (40%) felt it was not working as a party, another 
4 (8%) thought it too parochialp and another 3 (6%) thought it a waste 
of time. Five councillors (10%) thought the caucus served as a good 
information centre, and another 6 (12%) that it saved Council some time. 
As Table 7 indic.ates~ there was no major difference in opinion 
between inner city and outer city councillors, nor between ICEC or ~TDP 
councillors. 
Respondents 
lnto Provides 
Leadership 
Chairman of 
Committee 
Certain 
Councillors 
Mayor 
No-one 
Depends on 
Issue 
Table 1 
~~uncillors' Perception of 
Provision of LeadershiE 
50 29 21 
Total Suburban Inner City 
18(36%) 11(38%) 7(33%) 
5(10%) 2(8%) 3(14%) 
2(4%) 3(10%) 3(14%) 
22(44%) 11(38%) 7(32%) 
3(6%) 2(4%) 1(7%) 
37 7 
ICEC NDP 
15(40%) 2(29%) 
4(12%) 1(14%) 
1(3%) 1(14%) 
15(40%) 2(29%) 
2(5%) 1(14%) 
The views o~ leadership expressed by councillors were echoed by 
the other participants in the system. The press generally see a lack of 
leadership. They see the mayor as a loner~ the Executive Policy Committee 
as being indecisive, and the ICEC caucus as of no significance in a 
policy sense. The administrators make close to the same judgement. They 
are split on the leadership of the mayor, unanimous in their feeling that 
the E.P.C. is not functioning. 
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\fuat is interesting is the various proposals for soluti.on. As our 
research indicates, the two favourite schemes are to introduce party 
politics and to add to the power of the mayor. But, somewhat paradoxically§ 
there is a feeling on the part of some councillors that the introduction 
of party politics would increase splits in Council, and result in poorer 
candidates. This feeling shovrs some basic underlying difference in 
value orientations of councillors. For example, as Table 8 shows~ there 
is a much stronger feeling on the part of inner city councillors that 
party politics is necessary~ as compared to ~uburban councillors. There 
is also an obvious split between NDP and ICEC councillors. And there is 
a significant cleavage in attitude towards party politics from those who 
were in favour of Unicity to those "1ho were opposed. lfuat this suggests 
is that the cleavage in Council is based on different value orientations 
and herein may lie the source of conflict and indecision~ as much as a 
weakness in structure. 
Table. 8 
Councillors' Views on 
Political Parties in Local Elections 
Respondents 50 29 21 37 7 25 
Favour Parties Total Suburban Inner ICEC NDP In In Local Elections City Favour 
Yes 10(20%) 2(7%) 8(38%) 6(16%) 5(72%) 7(28%) 
No 38(76%) 26(90%) 12(57%) 26(70%) 1(14%) 17(68%) 
N.A. 2(4%) 1(3%) 1(5%) 5(14%) 1(14%) 1(4%) 
17 
Not In 
Favour 
1(6%) 
16(94%) 
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From the general public the view of 31.6% is that there shouldn't 
be party politics$ as opposed to 19.3% who are in favour, with 49% not 
expressing an opinion. The media people interviewed were in favour four 
to one of having party politics, seeing it as the only way to make 
Council work. This view is also shared by provincial officials, but the 
opinion of civic civil servants is split. 
The view of administrators is more strongly focused on other 
aspects of malfunctioning on Council. They see the problem arising from 
the poor relations between the Executive Policy Committee and Council~ 
the propensity of councillors to worry about details and not become 
involved in policy discussion, the poor relationship and lack of rapport 
between Council and the Board of Commissioners. In other words, they 
view the poor operation of Council as stemming from an improper definition 
of political and administrative roles and the inability to develop a 
well defined process of policy-making between Council and administration. 
The office of mayor and the Executive Policy Committee w~re originally 
designed to fulfill those functions, but obviously are not perceived as 
doing so. One major reason for this can be traced to the provincial 
decision to provide for direct election of the mayor. Under the original 
design, the mayor would have been elected by Council and would have to 
maintain the confidence of a majority on Council -- in effect creating a 
form of Cabinet system, with the mayor performing a role analogous to 
the Prime Minister and the Executive Policy Committee being the Cabinet. 
However, once you have direct election of the mayor 9 you create in effect 
a presidential system, where the chief executive does not have to develop 
majority support. The difficul:ty with introducing such a. system in the 
,'): . 
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Winnipeg context ie that there is no accompanying party system to provide 
the discipline necessary for congressional-parliamentary style systems to 
operate. 
Is this an insurmountable problem and are the views of the 
councillors and administrators correct in stating that the decision-
making is difficult and at times inoperative? A case from the earliest 
period of Council offers some illumination on the way that Council makes 
decisions. 
Council Indemnities: The issue of Council raises began on January 4, 1972~ 
three days after Council officially took office. Throughout January, 
there was much discussion of this question with a decision to have no raise 
at the time, but to have a review of the situation in six months time. 
There was at this time much public and media opposition to the idea and 
the question was buried, but only for three months when the ICEC caucus 
apparently held secret meetings on the question. Some councillors have 
attested that at this time the ICEC approved the pay increase package, but 
the only formal announcement that was forthcoming was that a salary review 
board would be set up. 
On July 19, 1972, City Council voted themselves raise increases of 
up to 79%, retroactive to January 1~ 1972. 
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The Council had no problem dealing with this issue -~ their size 
did not seem to have had any effect on the ease with which they passed the 
motion. The ICEC caucus t11as able to agree on the issue and the Council 
accepted the recommendations of their Committee and of the Review Board. 
The mayor did not play any noticeable role~ but leadership on this question 
was forthcoming from within the Council itself. There was an ICEC-NDP 
split in the voting but that was to be expected and there was no real 
suburban-inner city split in the voting. Seven councillors were absent 
from this meeting and therefore did not vote on this question. 
There is no doubt but that this issue was a contreversial one 
among the public and one which most of the public was opposed to. Yet, 
the entire issue was resolved quickly~ in terms of actual Council time 
spent on it. The Committee that was set up to examine the question, did 
so efficiently and effectively. Council leadership emerged primarily 
from the Chairman of the Finance Committee. 
This was one of the first major issues dealt with by Council, and 
if one ignores the obvious vested interest of the councillors in passing 
this motion, and if one looks at the process which was gone through, it 
did at the time look as though Council could work efficiently and 
effectively and could make major decisions. 
It was an issue where there was an underlying consensus among 
Council and where there were no underlying political cleavages to impede 
decision-making. 
This suggests that the degree of conflict is the determining 
factor in whether decisions are made or not. All the varied interests 
and outlooks that are part of the local politics of Winnipeg must now 
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parlay within one Council Chamber~ ~<There before there were fourteen& 
Thus~ the probability of conflict is high and that of consensus is lm"'. 
Most of the councillors and administrators ~-Iho worked in the old 
municipalities have been used to systems where the probability of consensus 
was high and conflict l-las low. Their expressions of frustration are a 
consequence then of having to work within a new system which has not 
yet developed accepted ways of dealing with conflict laden decisions. 
The question is whether the mechanisms for resolving conflict are 
at hand. Without a strong executive centered system or without the 
discipline of party control~ conflict resolution is more difficult. 
requiring almost a form of diplomatic bargaining akin to a series of 
individual nation states trying to arrive at positions of mutual self 
• 32 J.nterest. 
Thus, one of the important areas of research analysis for this 
system is how the process of conflict resolution can be improved. If 
there is to be any change in structure it should be aimed at that problem~ 
as opposed to picking something like the size of Council and assuming 
that it is the cause. 
It is quite likely, though, that as the system matures it will 
evolve various procedures and informal processes of handling contentious 
issues. The concern in this case would be whether such procedures and 
processes would produce "good" decisions. As Harold Kaplan has shown in 
his study of the Metro structure in Toronto, the decision-making system 
32. For a description of this, see Cha.rles Lindbloom® The Intelligence 
of oomocrac)!_,, Free Press of Glencoe>. N.Y. ~ 1965. 
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that has evolved there is one that produced decisions on physical 
development issues but that ignores social issues~ because there is no 
33 integrative structures that can mold majorities around social problems. 
The same situation could well occur in the Winnipeg context. 
Civic ~!fiployees w Organization - The Case of the Urwic.k-Currie Report: 
Another area where the new city system ran into a conflict of 
differing points of view of Council~ and into major opposition from 
their own employees was in the case of the Urwick-Currie Report. 
In February, 1972, City Council decided to hire consultants to 
study the functions performed by the city departments. 
In November the consultants, Urwick, Currie and Partners, Ltd., 
and Underwood, McLellan and Associates, Ltde, submitted their report to 
City Council. 
Their report was in five sections: 
1. collection of information, 
2. recommendations on the contracting-out of public works 
operations~ 
3. general organizational structures, 
4. detailed organizational structure, and 
5. plan of implementation. 
¥1hen they submitted their report in November, it only contained 
the first three sections. Before they could complete the final sections 
they needed an indication of direction from Council on the question of 
33. See Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, Columbia University Press~ 
1967, Ch. 7. 
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contracting~out public works operations and they needed agreement in 
principle on the recommendations for administrative reorganization. 
Their first recommendation was to disband the various city 
departments 't>rhich duplicated '1-mrk done by the private sector. City 
departments should continue to provide only those services which are not 
practical to contract out or which the private sector was not interested 
in. According to the consultants, the private sector could do all of 
the city's stree~watermain and sewer construction at a lower cost than 
the city could continue to operate at. 
Their second major recommendation was that the city be divided~ 
for the purposes of public works administration, into six districts. 
This six district concept was well received by both Council and 
administration and in February 1973, Council adopted the proposal for 
the six districts but with the rider that it would not be implemented 
until Council resolved the question of whether the city will contract out 
its public works operations. 
There was throughout this period much debate and opposition to 
the report from city employees and their union representatives. The 
Commissioner of Works and Operations stated that a maximum of 500 permanent 
employees would be displaced but the union claimed that about 2,000 people 
34 
would be affected. Council immediately gave a moral, if not legal~ 
guarantee to all city jobs. 
Along with the unions, opposition came from the city's engineering 
department~ who began to question the accuracy and method of comparison 
between the city's department and the private sector. 
34. The Winnipeg Free Press~ March 7, 1973. 
The unions then began a fairly extensive publicity campaign to 
present their case and their objections to the recommendations. They 
took out full page newspaper ads and called upon the public to support 
their position. 
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City Council itself was divided on the question. The division 
was very clearly an inner city-suburban split with inner city councillors 
opposing contracti~g-out of public works. The mayor also came out 
publicly opposed to the idea of contracting-out. 
The Works and Operations Committee held a series of meetings to 
hear both sides of the contracting~out question. Besides the consultants, 
other groups which made presentations included the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, the Lord Selkirk Community Committee. the Chambers of Commerce, 
and individual citizens. 
Works and Operations Committee endorsed the consultants' 
recommendations by a vote of six to five and then Executive Policy 
Committee endorsed them by a vote of five to four. 
In March, 1973 9 the question went before City Council. Over 2,000 
people jammed the Council galleries and saw Council refer the questiont 
by a vote of 27 to 23, back to the Works and Operations Committee for 
further study and comparison of cost and efficiency between the two systems. 
The issue was stalled another two times before City Council in 
April asked Urwick, Currie, Ltd.~ to proceed with detailed plans for 
implementation of the contracting-out idea. 
As of September, 1973~ no further decision has been made on this 
question. 
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Th~ t~!!ble belcn.J shows how this issue is illustrative of the inner 
city-suburban split and the suburban control of the committees which 
endorsed the report. It also illustrates the ICEC-NDP split. 
Respondents 
Urwick-Currie 
Report 
Yes 
No 
D.K./'N .A. 
Table 9 
Councillors' Attitude on 
Urwick-Currie Report 
50 29 21 
Total Suburban Inner City 
14(28%) 13(45%) 1(5%} 
18(36%) 3(10%) 15(71%) 
18(367.) 13(45%) ~H~4%) 
37 
ICEC 
13(35%) 
11(30%) 
13(35%) 
The Urwick-Currie issue was important for a reason other than 
7 
NDP 
0(0%) 
6(86%) 
1(14%) 
the contracting-out of services concept. It also brought up and endorsed 
an idea which Unicity opponents found very useful. That was the six 
district idea. Originally t the six districts were proposed for purely 
administrative reasons and strictly for the administration of public 
works. But, many councillors saw the adoption of the six districts for 
public works as the first move to reduce the number of Community Committees 
and hence the number of councillors, a move which many of them favoured. 
In July-, 1973" Environment reccnmnended that the thirteen Community 
Committees be reduced to six to coincide with the ~ix public works districts. 
This recommendation has found favour and opposition among City councillors, 
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C, ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE 
The Administrative Structure 
The administrative structure of the new city was to consist of 
three administrative committees of Council, an Executive Policy Committee 
of Council and a Board of Commissioners. 
The administrative committees would act as the vehicles through 
which the three major administrative departments of Environment, Finance 
and Works and Operations, would report to the Council. 
The Executive Policy Committee was to have a coordinating function 
bringing together the information from the civil service, the recommendations 
of the other committees~ and the leadership of Council~ in order to arrive 
at appropriate legislative proposals. 
The Board of Commissioners~ consisting of a Chief Commissioner, 
a Commissioner of Finance~ a Commissioner of Works and Operations, a 
Commissioner of Environment and the mayor ex~offido was to provide the 
administrative leadership. There are a number of theoretical linkages 
built into this system. 
As mentioned, Executive Policy Committee would provide a linkage 
between the committees and Council; between Council and the Board of 
Commissioners. Also the Chief Commissioner would act as a liaison between 
the Executive Policy Committee and the Board of Commissionerss and the mayor 
would be a further link ben~een the Executive Policy Committee and Council, 
between Executive Policy Committee and the Commissioners and between the 
Board of Commissioners and Council. 
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Structurally, the framers of the new City Act provided what appear~ 
to be adequate linkages between the Council and the civil service. 
Uowever~ the original Act had intended the mayor to be chosen 
from Council and~ thereforej\> enjoying the support of the majority of 
Council members. When this was amended to allow for the area-wide election 
of a mayor, no corresponding changes were made in the linking structures. 
Also, the framers of the Act saw the Executive Policy Committee 
as the Cabinet of Council and, as such 9 it would be the body to coordinate 
the activities of the Board of Commissioners and the Council. But, in 
reality, the Executive Policy Committee has failed to provide this 
coordinating role. 
Although the Executive Policy Committee is representative of the 
Council, being composed entirely of ICEC members, many ICEC members of 
Council have expressed concern over the way in which the Committee has 
been funetioning and claimed that the Committee has taken a di~tatorial 
rather than a coordinating function. ICEC councillors claim that the 
best example of this behaviour occurred when EPC added $1.5 million to 
the dty's capital budget against the expressed wishes of the ICEC caucus. 
Executive Policy members in turn reply that they are disliked 
because they form the cabinet or status committee and other councillors 
are envious of this. However, even members of E.P.C~ strongly criticized 
the committee. One St. James councillor called EPC 11 a real flop ••• they 
have the pot\l'er but they fail to use it ••• they are not competent:". A 
St. Vital councillor critieb;ed it for "sending back issues to committees" 
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too often. Another t1idland councillor ~aid E P .C. had 
in the work of standing committees and deals with trivia •••• it is over-
loaded with municipal repres:entatives 11 • A Fort Rouge councillor i!iaid 
E.P.C. is "not accepted by Council because they don't trust the work of 
committees". While some were critieidng it for trivial discussions, 
some realized that E.P.C. "is fearful of tackling issues •••• it is afraid 
to make decisions because of a critical press 11 • 
Councillor George Munro echoed the above, saying "executive policy 
committee is afraid to make decisions •••• it's afraid of stepping on the 
toes of other study committees or the community committees •••• they only 
rehash what other committees have rehashed". Councillor Roy Parkhill was 
E.P.C. as 11politi«!ally oriented". 
Some councillors expressed hope for E.P.C. and see signs of 
improvement. Councillor Olga Fuga reports that E.P.C. "is slowly beginning 
to function, acting as a co-ordinating councillor. Prior to this it was 
wasting a lot of time on trivial issues", 
With E.P.C. not performing any coordinating or linkage function 
and with the mayor not providing his share of the linkage functions~ 
the linkage function between the administration and the Council had to be 
performed by the Council itself. The administration was not designed to 
be dealt with directly by the Council and in doing so Council created a 
great many problems for themselves and for the administrative departments. 
Too much of Council's time is spent on administrative details and the 
Council does not spend enough time on policy development~ leaving the 
administration without a framework in many areas within which to work. 
The criticism of the operation of council in its avoidance of 
policy discussion in favour of detailed discussion has been made by 
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many people =- councillors, commissioners and media people. This 
weakness of council is both a factor of and a result of other weaknes$es 
such as council's lack of linkage functions, lack of leadership, its 
indecisiveness and problems with the Commissioners. While several 
councillors were aware of the problem and mentioned it, it was the 
administrators and media personnel that raised the issue strongly and 
with criticism. The administrators and media agreed very closely 
on what they saw as a major reason for detail instead of issue discussion. 
The main factor responsible for the council's apparent avoidance 
of policy in favour of detail is the background of the councillors. Many 
of the councillors sat previously on municipal councils where their 
main responsibility was "small-time" administration and very close 
scrutiny of budgets. The municipal council worked very closely with the 
administration and rarely had to make policy decisions. These municipality-
oriented councillors, juxtaposed to a council trying to govern a city of 
more than half a million that requires decisions on large policy matters, 
just can't cope with their new responsibilities. 
A policy maker must be aware of city problems and issues and 
various approaches to these problems and issues. He must be able to 
conceive of a city government as an active solver of problems. Most 
councillors, however, lack the above ability. They contend that the 
role of government must be as small as possible, providing only for 
basic services. They just have not had experience with policy issues 
in development, transportation, recreation or administrative and service 
delivery. 
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According to the deputy minister of Urban Affair~, the problem 
as he sees it is due to a poor integration of politicians and city 
administration. Politicians want to make both policy and handle 
administrative details. The result is that they get hung up with 
administration and never make policy. The commissioner then makes policy 
recommendations and Council feels that their policy role is usurped. 
In the service instance, because councillors do not develop policies or 
guidelines for administration to follow, the administration then feels 
it must refer many administrative details to councillors for approval or 
decisions. This is still very true of the operation of community 
committees of the old municipalities where councillors dwelled on the 
most minute detail of water bills~ etc. 
The problems created by ineffectual linkages between the politicians 
and the administrators have been compounded by the antagonism that has 
developed between administrators and politicians. Some of these problems 
can be traced back to December 1971 when the first three commissioners 
t\fere a,ppointed. 
Mr. D. I. MacDonald, the former Executive Director of Metro~ was 
appointed Chief Commissioner; Mr. Robert McLean~ the former Finance 
Director of the City of Winnipeg~ was appointed Finance Commissioner; and 
Mr. w. D. Hurst, the former Chief Engineer for the City of Winnipeg~ was 
appointed Commissioner of Works and Operations. Because he was due to 
retire~ Mr. Hurst was appointed for only a six month period. 
There was~ however, a good deal of dissension on the appointments, 
both from Council and from the ICEC caucus. Some councillors wanted 
MacDonald for Commissioner of Environment, McLean for the Chief Commissioner, 
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and a suburban official for the post of Finance Commissioner. There 
was apparently even more dissension regarding the appointment of the 
fourth commissioner, the Commissioner of Environment. The question was 
not settled for over four monthsf and during the course of this time~ 
there was much debate and disagreement among Council members and among 
members of the ICEC caucus. The issue centered around questions of 
personalities~ political leanings and the question of the role that the 
Commissioner should perform. Some councillors wanted an administrator~ 
some l-tanted a planner and some wanted a combination of the t~:ro. The 
debate dragged on for months but finally, on April 19, 1972~ four months 
after Council took office and seven months after it had been elected, 
the decision was made and David G. Henderson became the Commissioner of 
the Environment. The other major contender for the position had been 
Earl Levin, the former Director of Planning for Hetro and a very popular 
planner with many councillors. The appointment of Henderson did not 
sit well with many councillors and this feeling is still causing some of 
the problems today. 
Councillors offer primarily negative responses regarding the 
commissioners and their role. Their comments ranged from "they run the 
city" to "they are qualified professional men". Several of the councillors 
made reference to the commissioners being 11politically appointed" and 
this appears to be partly responsible for the love/hate relationship 
that some councillors described. Many councillors feel that the 
commissioners a.re "too powerful and independent" of Council. These 
councillors apparently feel that they aren't in control of the commissioners. 
Some councillors feel that commissioners became powerful when they started 
offering the leadership that Council was lacking when attempting to make 
policy decisions. Several inner city councillors who previously sat on 
the City of Winnipeg Council and had a direct relationship with administrative 
department heads, feel that the old system was superior and would like to 
return to it by "scrapping the commissioner system". One inner city 
councillor alarmed with their exercise of power urged that "their role 
should be restricted and defined by amendments. They tend to interfere 
in certain areas and they are taking their authority of E.P.C. 11 • Another 
councillor found that the introduction of the Board of Commissioners merely 
added on another unnecessary step in the decision-making process causing 
further delays. 
Few councillors feel that the commissioner system was working l<Tell. 
Councillors are quite divided on their opinions of the commissioners and 
their role. Some feel that until Council and E.P.C. start to make 
decisions, the commissioners provide desirable leadership and guidelines. 
Other councillors really balk at this leadership, however, saying 
'
1councillors really rubber stamp commissioners 1 recommendations with 
little or no complaints". 
There seems to have been at times a definite Council/commissioner 
split in evidence at City Hall. This has been evidenced by councillors' 
lack of faith in the commissioners and by their distrust of them. The 
commissioners on their part~ feel that the present system of local government 
is virtually inoperative and almost paralyzed. The basic problem is that 
the decision-making function of Council is not being performed. Commissioners 
are divided on the reason for this-~ some say that it is just a phenomena 
of the transition period and that it will work itself out, while others 
claim that Councilis administratively inclined and that they refuse to 
delegate authority. One conwissioner advanced another theory-= that 
this failure to make decisions is due not to people or individuals in 
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the system, but to the different and dispersed decision-making structure. 
The Board of Commissioners in itself is an interesting aspect 
of the structure. Before the bill was passed the debate and discussion 
over the Board of Commissioners saw this body as a Super Board of 
'Five Bosses 1 • Many fears were expressed about the Board becoming "above 
city council" in power and influence. For their part the Provincial 
Government felt that these were needless fears as the Executive Policy 
Committee was designed to act as a check on the Board of Commissioners, 
as ttl'as the mayor who is also a member of the Board and of Executive 
Policy Committee. 
In a city where the structure has changed, but where most of the 
same people are doing the same jobs as before, it becomes very difficult 
to determine if the Board of Commissioners indeed has any overwhelming 
power and influence. 
If one of the criteria for the determination of this is the 
attitude of the majority of councillors~ then the Board of Commissioners 
does have a good deal of power and influence. Comments from councillors 
reflect mostly the concern that Commissioners are setting policy, but 
as explained above this is due more to the weak mayor and Executive 
Policy Committee than it is to the structure itself. 
"They are too powerful 9 their role should be defined and restricted 
by amendments. They tend to interfere in certain areas. Are taking 
authority of E. P. C. 11 ; 11The commissioners have great power and they have 
the policy power because councillors aren't bothering to make policy. 
It is always the commissioners' report that guides the decisions of 
standing committees"; "Board of Commissioners is the worst feature of the 
ACT - created another powerful level of government ~- everything has to 
go to the Board of Commissioners first"; "Not directing the city properly 
tend to interfere in trivial issues. Could be scrapped. Too tough and 
are running the city. Councillors rubber stamp their decisions with little 
or no complaints"; "Trying to run city due to weakness of E.P.C. Over-
lapping powers. They are setting policy while council rubber stamp. 
Should be abolished"; "Too powerful. No need for chief commissioner. 
The mayor should replace him. Commissioners are too independent". 
One major area of dissension between the commissioners and the 
~ouncillors has been in the area of budgets. There was great outcry 
from Community Committees when their budget estimates were cut by the 
Board of Commissioners. This could have been avoided if ongoing 
consultation and coordination between the two groups had been established 
during the period of budget preparation. 
through the vehicle of the Budget Bureau. 
This could have been accomplished 
The Act calls for the 
establishment of a Budget Bureau responsible to the Board of Commissioners 
for determining the form and manner of presentation of the annual estimates 
of revenues and expenditures of all departments, services, boards, commissions 
and the Community Committees. If the Budget Bureau working under guide-
lines from the Board of Commissioners, had worked with Community Committees 
while budget were being prepared then perhaps much antagonism against 
arbitrary appearing budget cuts may have been avoided. Also a rapport 
established between the Budget Bureau and the Community Committees 
would have been useful for general linkages between the Commissioners and 
the Community Committees. 
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In terms of the administrative centralization called for in the 
Act~ there ~<iere three major areas in which this was to oceur. These 
areas t.Yere the amalgamation of all administrative and public t.Yorks staff~ 
the unification of all police services and the unification of all fire 
services. 
The easiest and smoothest unification was that of all municipal 
personnel. Under the Unicity Act all municipal personnel whose positions 
either become redundant or are eliminated must be offered a job at an 
equal level and at equal pay in the new city administration. 
When unification took place there were some 1p200 employees of 
former municipalities and of Metro and all but five of these went to 
work for the new city. The former City of Winnipeg had some 4,600 
established positions and they had properly prepared establishment charts 
where every position was charted and identified. Metro also had these 
charts but the former small municipalities did not and therefore all of 
their employees had to be hired first and sorted out later. 
In January~ 1973, one year after unification had begun, the job 
still had not been completed. Charts t11ere being prepared department by 
department and in a number of cases t-tere being held up awaiting a Council 
decision on a question of policy. 
It is at this stage a virtually impossible task to attempt to 
determine where former employees now are, how many these are exactly, and 
how they are structured. This is something that is going to take time 
and the introduction of new techniques such as a centralized payroll. 
The personnel situation is still fluid and the accounting procedures are 
always behind the shifts in departments and between departments. 
However~ according to city officials, most employees are in the 
same place and are doing the same job and everything on the output side 
of the administration is happening the way it should. Externally the 
new civic service is functioning well and with almost no discernible 
change from the former operation but internally the period of transition 
for the civic service is not yet over. 
The Unicity Act called for the creation of a single police force 
for the new City of l.Jinnipeg. This 't'ms, however, to be treat.ed as the 
establishment of a new force rather than as an amalgamation of existing 
municipal police services. 
The Board of Commissioners took this matter under advisement and 
in April, 1972, produced a series of recommendations which were approved 
by the Executive Policy Committee and then by Council. They recommended 
the establishment of a four member citizen committee to begin a comprehensive 
study to determine the way in which the police forces of the city should 
be organized in order to provide the public with the most economical, 
efficient and affective system of police protection. They were also to 
look at the manner in which any reorganization should be carried out and 
the manner in which the new force should be administered. 
Hot..rever, the city had begun during this period from January to 
April to experience some problems with the policemen themselves. The 
Winnipeg Police Association became unified and asked the Provincial Depart~ 
ment of Labour for certification as a bargaining unit. Some councillors 
saw this as a move by the Police Association to force an early amalgamation. 
Council asked the Manitoba Labour Board for an extension of time on the 
deadline for objecting to the Association's application. Having gotten 
the extension, the matter was turned over to Executive Policy Committee~ 
who recommended that the city file a notice of intervention with the Manitoba 
Labour Board. The Manitoba Labour Board ruled that until such time as 
new agreements were negotiated the agreements between the various Police 
Associations and their respective municipalities would remain in force. 
This served to allay some of the fears of the Council as thi~ meant that 
there would not be a sudden coordinated demand for parity from all former 
municipalities. 
The special inquiry committee did not produce a report until 
February of 1973. The report recommended the creation of six police 
districts and a total force of 958 men. The six districts were essentially 
the same six districts as the Urwick-Currie report had recommended for 
Public Works the previous November. Even though these districts were 
created for administrative purposes as were those in Urwick-Currie, they 
also have been used as a rationale for having six political districts --
an argument which has no basis in reality. 
The report was presented to Executive Policy Committee and was then 
referred to the Community Committees for their opinions and comments. The 
report also went to Finance Committee which will present recommendations 
on the amalgamation procedure. 
The response from the Community Committees was primarily positive, 
with several suggested amendments aimed at more local control of the 
unified police force. Only the Community Committee of East Kildonan 
objected to the citizen~s police committee as the overseer of the police 
commission made up of citizens and councillors. The move toward 
amalgamation is now underway and, according .to Finance Committee Chairman 
Bernie Wolfe, the proposed amalgamation will be completed by July, 1974. 
The other amalgamation that the A~t calls for is that of the fire 
services. This amalgamation t>1as considered much earlier than any of the 
others. Six months before Unicity came into being, Winnipeg City Council 
asked the Winnipeg Fire Chief to make an informal study of how fire services 
could be amalgamated. However, this report was for aldermen's eyes only~ 
and has never been made public. 
Then, on February 2~ 1972, Council recommended that the 
Commissioner of Finance initiate an in depth study on the feasibility of 
amalgamating the various fire departments. A special committee was to 
be struck and the Community Committees would be reque~ted to submit their 
views on the matter to the Commissioner of Finance. 
This ten member committee consisted of the Fire Commissioner, 
the Chief Engineer of the Canadian Underwriter's Association? the President 
of the Manitoba Professional Fire Fighter~ Association~ the Chiefs of 
St. Boniface, St. James-Assiniboia, St. Vital and the Inner City Fire 
Departments, the Director of Personnel and the Deputy City Treasurer of 
the City of Winnipeg, plus the Administrative Assistant of the Inner City 
Community Fire Department. 
The first meeting of this committee was held on March 16, 1972~ 
and three sub-sommittees were established -- Fire Station Locations and 
Apparatus Distribution; Manning; and Communications. 
During the life of this Committee~ the Commis~ioner of Finance 
received only four submissions which were referred to the Committee for 
its information and ~onsideration. These were: 
- the West Kildonan Community Advisory Committee, 
- the West Kildonan Community Committee, 
-Mr. A. Phillippe Royp 
- the East Kildonan Community Committee. 
The fact that formal submissions came from only two Community 
Committees is surprising in light of the fears of amalg~ation which had 
been expressed ~p to this time. It is also somewhat indicative of the 
paroChialism of Community Committee~ evident in their attitudes towards 
city-wide questions. 
In spite of limited input from the Community Committees, the 
Committee in June of 1972 presented its recommendations to the Commissioner 
of Finance. 
Their basic conclusion was that it is feasible to amalgamate the 
Fire Departments within the City of Winnipeg. If their recommendations 
were implemented, they maintained that they would provide a higher level 
of fire service than at present to the majority of communities in the 
City of Winnipeg, without immediate additional cost to the taxpayer. 
Their report recommended the establishment of five firefighting 
district~ each with a number of stations under the direction of a district 
chief. These districts do not correspond to those selected for Public 
Works or for Police services, and indeed, there is no rational reason why 
they should. Fire services are different from the other two services and 
therefore should be organized in the manner best suited to the delivery 
of fire service~. However, City Council's reluctance to deal with this 
question may stem in part from the desire of a number of co~ncillors to 
see a six district fire department organization coincident with that of 
Works and Operations and Police, thereby strengthening the push for the 
establishment of only six Community Committees. 
On July 19, 1972, City Council received the report of the 
Special Committee on the In-Depth Study of the Feasibility of Amalgamating 
the Fire Department and referred it to the Committee on Finance and to 
the various Community Committees. 
Finance Committee, on October 14~ 1972, refused to recommend the 
adoption of the report. Many councillors were against the closing down of 
seven fire stations and against the idea of fire-rescue units no longer 
being used for ambulance service. However~ Finance Committee on November 28, 
1972, finally passed the recommendations and sent it to Executive Policy 
Committee who were to arrange an information session on the report for 
the benefit of councillors before they had to deal with it in Council as 
a whole. 
In February of 1972, Council approved the merger and passed an 
amendment that Finance Committee be delegated the authority to implement 
the plan. At that time it was thought that amalgamation of fire services 
would take place by July 1~ 1973. 
On May 17, 1973~ at a meeting of the Finance Committee, problems 
regarding the unification began to appear. The Committee began to have 
difficulty resolving the guidelines passed by Council as the basis of the 
plan for amalgamation. 
The holdup in the Finance Committee continued throughout the 
summer and when agreement finally was l'@lached, the question went to C:tty 
Council in September of 1913. At this time Council attempted to pass a 
motion in favour of waiving a statutocy ninety day waiting period for new 
bylaws as set out in the Act. The motion was defeated and nothing further 
occurred until November when Council finally approved the amalgamation. 
However 5 another problem had risen and at this time still has not been 
resolved. A St. James-Assiniboia firefighter had brought a court action 
against the City. Even though this has not been resolved, Fire Department 
unification was to go ahead on January 7, 1974. 35 
The length of time required to pass this amalgamation was due to 
the nature of the subject matter, not to any ICEC-NDP split or to any 
suburban-urban split, as the following table shows. In fact~ Council 
wanted it; the people wanted it; and most of the firemen wanted it. 
Respondents 
Amalgamation 
Table JO 
Councillors' Attitudes Towards 
Amalgamation of Fire Service 
50 29 21 
of Fire Service Total Suburban Inner City 
Yes 42( 84%) 24(83%) 18(85%) 
No 3(6%) 2(7%) 1(5%) 
D.K./N .A. 5(10%) 3(15%) 2(10%) 
37 
ICEC 
32(86%) 
3(8%) 
2(6%) 
7 
NDP 
5(12%) 
1(14%) 
1(14%) 
35. At the time of publication, fire services were finally and officially 
amalgamated. 
One of the strongest arguments advanced in favour of area wide 
unification was that it would create fiscal equity -- no longer would 
Tuxedo residents be able to enjoy the advantages of the central city while 
not paying for its problems. The new system is undoubtedly fairer than 
the old. 
But what about the expenditure side of the ledger? The priorities 
and allocations of the municipal budget should be a fundamental target of 
analysis in an attempt to give even preliminary answers to the question--
has Unicity made a difference? Expenditure analysis is now one of the 
main areas of inquiry for social scientists interested in evaluating the 
36 impact of structural change. This is so because budgets, whatever their 
particular goals, are concerned with the translation of financial resources 
into human purposes. As Aron Wildavsky has put it, budgets are a series 
37 
of goals with the price tags attached. And it is the attaching of the 
price tag which is important. Any politician can give lip service to a 
variety of competing goals, but it is the allocation of resources "t-1hich 
shows how serious he is. A budget, then, is a mechanism for making choices 
among alternative expenditures. Herbert Balls~ a former comptroller of the 
36. See, for example, the work of Michael Aiken and Robert Alford, 
"Community Structure and Innovation"~ American Political Science Review 
64, September 1970, pp. 843-865; Robert Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, 
"Reformation and Public Policies in American Cities"~ American Political 
Science Review 61, September 1967, pp. 701-717; and the numerous books 
and articles of Thomas Page and Ara Sharkansky. 
37. Aron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Borten, Little, 
Brown and Co.~ 1962, p. 1. 
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Federal Treasury Board, writes that a budget "is essentially a method of 
assigning priorities to competing demands, of complementing programs with 
38 
resources, a device for matching ends with means". Changes in 
expenditure patterns offer the most concrete demonstration that something 
different is occurring. 
Budget figures can, however, be as misleading as they are 
informative. First, the money allocated may not be spent (a la Richard 
Nixon impounding funds) or may not be spent wisely. Throwing money at a 
problem does not in itself ensure a solution. What it does demonstrate 
is a real change in attitude. Second, budgets may hide as much as they 
reveal. In the budget figures presented below, for example, in order to 
arrive at an area-wide figure prior to Unicity, the expenditures of the 
thirteen separate local governments had to be combined and classified and 
some municipalities used different forms of accounting. Personnel costs 
would be lumped under administration in one municipality but divided 
beoween various departments in another. There is an unusually large 
margin of error in an expenditure analysis. Third, only current account 
figures are presented and municipalities often finance much of their 
program by capital account. In evaluating the impact of the Metropolitan 
Corporation, for instance, an analysis of current figures would show little 
change from the pre-metro situation, but capital expenditures were very 
large and financed a score of bridges, sewage treatment plants, etc. 
Lastly, in examining a lower tier government, the actions of the senior 
levels must always be taken into account. A large drop in welfare 
38. Herbert Balls, "Key Steps in Preparing the Budget", The Canadian 
Chartered Accountant, Vol. 69, 1956, p. 509. 
expenditure may be a result of a deliberate shift in Council policy, but 
it may also reflect a simple shift of function upwards. 
Expenditure analysis, then, is hazardous, but if the above 
difficulties are noted it still offers a useful source of concrete data. 
Among the various objectives proposed for the new structure of 
the provincial government, three can be measured by expenditure analysis. 
It is, of course, too early to authoritatively give a value pronouncement 
about any aspect of the system. Only one full budget for 1972 has been 
passed and the estimates for 1973 prepared -- two budgets do not a system 
make! But, as in other areas discussed in this paper~ some trends are nm..r 
appearing. 
Implicit in the objective of unification was the desire for 
uniformity of key services. Transcona should have the same high level of 
police protection as l<1innipeg or St. James. The improved quality of 
service rather than cost was a favourite theme of the provincial government. 
Opponents of Unidty believed that equal services (particularly fire and 
police protection) would force a major increase in expenditure. Second~ 
in the government's 'White Paper much eloquence was devoted to the plight 
of the inner city and particularly the condition of Winnipegrs native 
peoples. There was a hope that, given increased resources~ more effort 
might be expanded in this direction. Third, the government proposed the 
municipal innovation of a budget bureau. Section 57 established the 
bureau, whose duties included "the budget bureau shall provide the Board 
of Commissioners with an analysis and evaluation in relation to city policies, 
programs and management of the annual capital and current budgets" 
(Section 57(51)). Ultimately it rfl'a.s hoped that the budget bureau l<muld 
establish a PPBS system of municipal budgeting. 
Data which could illuminate tvhether these objectives are being 
achieved includes the following: 
The overall similarity between the progress and general allocations of 
the present and past Unicity budgets can reveal how incremental Winnipeg's 
budget practices have been and thus the potential of PPBS system. 
The amount of increase in present and past Unicity budgets can reveal 
whether the new system has been responsible for drastic budget increases. 
Changes in percentage of budget allocation from present and past 
Unicity budgets can give some indication whether services are being 
equalized and if more is being spent on the inner core~ or anywhere else. 
T\<ro sets of figures have been provided. 39 Table 11 compares the 
five year average from 1966 to 1970 l-dth the two Unidty budgets and 
Table 12 shows the corresponding figures from 1970 to 1973. 
39. The IUS is indebted to Tom Axworthy for providing the above fig\Ires. 
They form part of a larger study of Winnipeg's municipal finances from 
1955 to 1973 which makes up a section of the author's forthcoming 
Ph.D. thesis. 
Total Budget 
Education 
Functions 
Charges 
Public l<lorks 
Protection of Persons 
and Property 
Health and Social Development 
Sanitation 
Health 
Welfare 
Recreation and Community 
Service 
General Government 
Administration 
Planning 
Transit Subsidy 
Table 11 
1966-70 
100.0% 
9.4% 
7.0% 
13.5% 
N/A 
5. 7% 
7.6% 
3. 3% 
1972 
100.0% 
37.8% 
10.1% 
7.1% 
15.7% 
6.9% 
2.5% 
1.0% 
3.3% 
7.2% 
N/A 
4.3% 
1ill. 
100.0% 
36.3% 
10.2% 
7.8% 
15.8% 
6.8% 
2.6% 
.9% 
2.9% 
7.6% 
N/A 
3.8% 
N.B.: Percentages do not total 100.0%, as all functions are not listed. 
~le 12 
E_xE:en.ditures -- Greater WinniP.eg Area 
1966 - 1973 
1970 % 
.!21.!. % 1972 % 1973 ! 
Total Budget 130,288,570 140,299~249 153,078,775 164,786~803 
Education 36.91 50,044,509 35.67 57,939' 312 37.85 59~830,455 36.31 
Municipal Spen.ding 82,203,628 . 63.09 90,254,746 64.33 93,334,845 60.97 104,956~348 63.69 
Functions 
Debt Charges 13,960~799 10.72 15,269~269 10.88 15,556,713 10.16 16~904~519 10.26 
Public Works 10,766,312 8.26 10,530,627 7.51 10,895t097 7.12 12 ~ 861' 381 7.80 
Protection of Persons 
and Property 18,128,249 13.91 20~145,475 14.36 24,077 s167 1.5.73 26~151~432 15.87 
Health and Social 
Development 11~210,403 7.99 10,653,475 6.96 11~250,894 6.85 
i. Sanitation N/A 2,938,543 2o09 3,925,456 2.56 4,313~54.5 2. 
ii. Health 3,051,166 2.34 3,062,440 2.18 1~547,454 1.01 1~629~669 . 
iii. Welfare 5~595,454 4.29 5,209,420 3. 71 5,180 9 565 3.38 4,852~320 2. 
Recreation and 
Community Service 8~674,513 6.66 9~330,067 6.65 11,0~22~809 7.20 12,613,~H8 7.65 
General Government 8!)323,018 6. 39 9~711,747 6.92 8,054,675 5.26 9~613,834 5.47 
i. Administration 5,7801>781 4.44 6,9111'1366 4.93 5~955,893 3.89 6.718,939 4oll 
ii. Planning 2,542,237 1.95 2,800,381 2.00 2,098,782 1.37 2,234~895 L36 
Transit Subsidy 5,927,000 4.55 6,856,416 4.89 6~580,532 4.30 6,364,172 3. 
Table 12 shows that the increase in budget expenditure under Unicity 
has been slightly higher than in preceding years. In 1972 the budget rose 
13 million, the second highest increase in a decad~ (in 1968 spending 
jumped 17 million). This reflected the inevitable transition costs. The 
projected 11 million dollar increase for 1973 is similar to the budget 
increases that have occurred since 1969 and is not an unusually high figure. 
The rapid rate of inflation in the last two years may have had more to do 
with the increase under Unicity than any factor of policy. The issue is 
still in doubt ,;.rhether the new structure has been a large factor in 
increased municipal expenditure. 
There have been few changes in budget allocation. As the discussion 
below illustrates, budget making at the local level has largely been an 
incremental exercise. As Table 12 indicates, the percentages of the budget 
allocated to education, debit charges, public works, sanitation, and the 
transit subsidy have held steady. General government has also received 
the same percentage of money~ although different classification procedures 
40 
under the new system makes this difficult to quantify. In general, these 
functions have also received the same percentage on a five year average 
since 1966. Two expenditure categories have r:i.s:en noticeably. Protection 
of persons and property from 1966-1970 received 13.5% of the budget; under 
Unicity this has increased to 15.7 and 15.8 respectively. This has been due 
to an area~ide wage agreement with the police which may be the forerunner 
of service unification. Recreation and Community Service has taken a 
40. In the pre-Unicity figures, the administration costs of metro t4'ere 
grouped under a. single category~ now under Unicity personnel costs for 
departments like engineering are grouped under Works and Operations, 
thus showing an artificial decline. 
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corresponding jump from 5.7 in the five year average to 7.2 in 1972 and 
7.6 in 1973. The tendency of councillors to support each others requests 
for new skating rinks, etc.~ has been noted elsewhere in this paper. This 
"log-rolling" aspect of the new Council was not foreseen by the ru!tq structure's 
creators. Contrary to hopes~ spending on Health and Social Development 
has actually declined from 1971 levels. This may be due to the provincial 
policy of erasing medical premiums (formerly the city paid for indigents) 
but certainly the Council has not been as inclined to spend money on the 
inner city as they have on arenas. 
Some priorities then~ may be changing but the overall impression 
is one of ingrained incrementalism. Budgets reveal the inate conservatism 
of government better than any other function. "Once enacted, a budget 
becomes a precedent. Often the fact that something has been done once 
vastly increases the chances that it will be done again. Since only 
substantial departures from the previous year's budget are normally given 
intensive $crutiny, any item that remains unchanged will probably be 
continued the following year as a matter of course."41 The largest 
determining factor of the size and content of this yearws estimates is 
last year 1 s estimates. Municipal budgets may change, but the dominant 
impression is that this only occurs after a senior government has lifted 
a function or increased a grant. In general, Winnipeg under Unicity appears 
to be undertaking the same functions -- often with the same programs 
that it was even before Metro. If the budget bureau is to have any hope of 
introducing a PPBS system to Winnipeg, it must consciously make a departure 
from twenty years of incrementalism. 
41. Aron Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1964, p. 3. 
The impact of Unicity on spending patterns at this early date is 
not nearly as marked as its effect on tax equity. But certain trends which 
are beginning to develop should be closely monitored in the future. If 
the city unifies the police and fire service, will that budget allocation 
continue to rise? Will "hardware" items like arenas and rinks continue 
to be favoured while "software" items like welfare languish? (If so~ 
Winnipeg will be repeating a pattern set by Metro Toronto in its first years.) 
Will the new structure be a forerunner of sharply rising costs? Lastly, 
and most importantly, in its management of the 100 million dollar civic 
current budget, will the administration continue its incremental tradition 
or will imagination and new budgeting techniques take hold? As the 
government's White Paper recognized, Winnipeg is no longer a frontier 
town. City government must administer 100 million dolla~s in current 
account and over 50 million in capital. The imaginative spending of even 
a fraction of that figure could have major results on the lives of 
Winnipeggers. 
PPBS In ~Vinnipeg 
As noted in the previous section, Winnipeg has traditionally 
used an incrementalist approach to budgeting, where the largest determining 
factor of the size and content of each year's budget has been the previous 
year's budget. 42 But along with the side sweeping boundary reforms of the 
1971 "Unidty" Act!> came reforms for the city's budgeting activities. 43 
42. This section is based on the work of Robert Bamburak in an unpublished 
paper titled, "Winnipeg's Budgetary Process". 
43. Manitoba, ~ianitoba Statutes: The Cit,L of l<Yinnipeg Act (1971). The 
pertinent section and subsection has been noted (i.e., S57(3)) where 
this information has been supplied from the Act. 
Under the pr~vious urban organization of twelve 
governments and a metropolitan government~ a line-item budget format was 
used. As a consequence, such items as personnel cost would be lumped 
under administration costs in one municipality, but divided between various 
departments in another. The highly centralized administrative structure~ 
provided by the Act, necessitated a more organized and efficient way of 
preparing a budget for the entire metropolitan area. Basically the Act 
provides for a PPB system approach to budgeting. 
The following outlines the basic civic structure and administrative 
organization involved in preparing Winnipeg's budget. 
Board of Commissioners: The Board of Commissioners (BofC) is at the top of 
the administrative hierarchy. Its member8 ~re the Chief Commissioner~ 
Commissioner of the Environm~t, Commissioner of Finance, Commissioner of 
Works and Operations, and the Mayor, ex officio S43. The Board is 
responsible for the supervision of all departments and services and for 
the implementation of Council's policies and programs S49. 
As well, the Board is to cause the annual current and capital 
budgets to be prepared and to review and present these estimates to the 
Executive Policy Committee 850(1). In addftion, to aid in the preparation 
of the budget, the Chief Commissioner is to direct and supervise the 
Budget Bureau S54(3). 
Budget Bureau: The Unicity Act provided for the establishment of a 
Budget Bureau (BB) under the BofC. Together, the Bureau and the Board act 
much like the Treasury Board at the Canadian Federal Government level in 
the preparation of the budget. 
A quick review of the major respOn$ibilities of the Bureau 
that the provincial advisors who drew up the Act, must have had the PPB 
approach to budgeting in mind. The BB is responsible for determining the 
form and presentation of the annual estimates of revenues and expenditures 
of all departments~ services~ boards and commissions, and the community 
committees S57(2). The BB is to provide the BofC with an analysis and 
evaluation in relation to city policies, programs, and management of the 
annual estimates S57(3). The BB is to advise the BofC on the format and 
manner of presentation of the annual capital and current budgets and long 
term capital works forecasts S57(4). Finally, the BB is to provide the 
BofC with an analysis and evaluation, in relation to city policies, and 
management~ of the annual capital and current budgets S57(5). 
These responsibilities of the Bureau provide the basis for a PPB 
system in Winnipeg. The Bureau has control over how a department prepares 
its budget in terms of a statement of objectives, a postulation of 
alternatives, and a program structure. The BB is also responsible for 
analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
proposed and completed budgets. The provision for a multi-year plan is 
also made, but only in terms of capital projects. 
Departments: The majority of Winnipegws budget estimates come from its 
departments, which range in activity from parks and recreation to finance 
and from streets and traffic to library. Beginning in August, departments 
and other civic agencies are notified by the BB as directed by the BofC 
to begin preparation of their budget estimates. 
The format and preparation of their current estimates, which forms 
over two-thirds of the annual expenditures~ has now been carefully outlined 
for all departmenta~ 
An interesting point is to be noted about this new standard 
procedure for the preparation of departmental estimates. Unlike the 
previous budgetary system, where departments just added increments without 
any real forethought, this new system has the departments estimate the 
costs of maintaining operations as they were the previous year. Any 
increase in estimates above this must be specified as service improvements, 
the costs of upgrading a service~ costs of a capital nature, or changes 
due to re-organization. As well, the supporting information to justify 
both existing operations and service improvements must be stated. 
A priority rating system has been developed for capital expenditures, 
such as street pavement, sewage treatment facilities, and water reservoirs. 
The higher the judged priority of a project. the larger its nmnber. A 
capital expenditure rated "S" is coneidered a vital service; 11 311 , essential 
service; "2", standard service; "1", desirable service. Besides the main 
number rating is a sub-group rating of 1 to 4Sl with "4 11 indicating the 
greatest necessity; could cause a serious disruption of service if not 
implemented without undue delay. 
Community Committees: Early in November, the preliminary estimates are 
to be sent to the Budget Bureau for pre-audit and assembly. From there, 
the culture and recreation estimates are to be reviewed by the Community 
Committees (CC). Originally the CC were to revi~t the estimates of public 
works and operations, protection of persons and property~ and health and 
social development~ for their respective areas S27(1). But City Council, 
in an attempt to improve the delivery of services, has decided to rationalize 
these services into six area districts. 
The complete budget i~ now completely reviewed by the Board of 
Commis~ioner~~ who make recommendations for change~ in the estimates. About 
the middle of December, the budget goes from the Commissioners to the 
Standing Committees for their review. 
!h! Standing Committees: Winnipeg's three Standing Committees (SC), composed 
of councillors~ are Environment, Finance, and Works and Operations. The 
SC are to ensure the implementation of city policies and programs S336. The 
duties of the Environment Committee include planning (transportation, open 
space and park~) housing, urban renewal, pollution regulation a.nd control, 
and health and social development S38(2). The duties of the Finance Committee 
are assessment, financet personnel, purchas:ingp and. protection of person!ll 
and property S39(2). Meanwhile~ the duties of Works and Operations include 
transit, streets, traffic control, utilities, waste collection and disposal, 
engineering and design, parks and recreation~ and cultural facilities S40(2). 
Understandably, some duplication or overlap of policy jurisdiction 
occurs among the Standing Committees, as is required by certain services. 
Each SC is to review those annual estimates which fall into their sphere 
of duties. After making their recommendations~ near the end of January, 
the estimates proceed to the Executive Policy Committee. 
Executive Policy Committee: The Executive Policy Committee (EPC)t also 
composed of City Councillors, serves to formulate policies for recommendation 
by Council and to co-ordinate the implementation of city policies S30. The 
EPC reviews the current and capital budget estimates, makes recommendations 
and will probably send them back to the Board of Commissioners. Sending 
the estimates to the Board allows the civic servants one final chance at 
making an input into the proposed budget. 
The EPC once again considers the estimates, .md then about the 
middle of ~~rch, will pass the estimates on to City Council~ with its final 
recommendations and those of the Board of Commi~sioners~ as well. 
City Council: Winnipeg's City Council~ generally makes short work of 
adopting the budget as much councillor input into the estimates are made at 
Standing Committees and the Executive Policy Committee levels. The large 
input by councillors in Winnipeg's budgetary process may prove to be 
determined to efforts of PPB. 
General Comments About Winnipeg v s_ Budget~ocess: Winnipeg b definitely 
implementing a PPB system, although its timetable for completion is at 
least two years away. 
People involved in the Budget Bureau feel that it will take time 
for this new budgetary system to really become effective. It is especially 
hard for people, who have been preparing the budget in the same way for the 
last twenty years~ to be suddenly faced with a new set of rules and 
regulations. Hopefully too, councillors will give PPBS a chance and not 
expect immediate results in the way of improved services and tax savings. 
Analysis of present and future programs appears to be one of the 
largest and most difficult tasks standing in the way of Winnipegws successful 
implementation of PPBS. The Budget Bureau is in the process of hiring two 
analysts to begin evaluating expenditure. Although these men (or women) 
may have the requisite intelligence of wisdom, immagination, ability, and 
judgement for the job~ two men will provide a token analytical effort at 
cost. 
Finally, the effect of both the federal and provin~ial governments 
on the urban scene should not be underplayed. Unfortunately for cities~ the 
financial support from these two levels of government have generally been 
in~ufficient for the needs of city services. Furthermore~ programs such as 
urban renewal~ low rental housing, and mortgage financing by CMHC, have almost 
no rational criteria for allocating funds to cities. 
If '!Plinnipeg is to solve its financial problems, PPBS alone cannot 
be relied upon. At best, Winnipeg may be able to make better use of what 
little is 1available to the city. 
If Winnipeg is to make the most out of the PPB syst~rn, it will 
have to put a more concentrated effort into PPB. Presently the plans for 
an analytical staff of two, do not indicate a high priority being given 
to the introduction of a new budgeting system, which is unfortunate, as 
this was an area of innovation that could be of major importance to the 
city. 
D. COJ:OOJNITY COMNITTEE PERJ'ORN..ANCE 
Throughout the provincial government's white paper on Local 
Government Reorganization, there was a good deal of emphasis on, and 
concern with, the concept of citizens' involvement and the importance 
of ensuring that it would not suffer as a result of the administrative 
and political consolidation. It wanted to decentralize government and 
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"bring it as close as possible to the people" and to provide "a 
structure and climate which citizens could communicate and interact 
with their councillors".45 
The vehicles by which this was intended to be done was the 
Community Committee, made up of: 
- 3 to 6 wards each containing approximately 10,000 people, 
and each represented by one councillor; 
- A Residents Advisory Group which would work on its own and 
with the Community Committee. 
The Community Committees, according to the government's white 
paper, were designed to "overcome public apathy. and to overcome the 
new prevalent 'leave-politics-to-the-politicians' attitude of ordinary 
citizens. The Community Committee is "to provide ready access by the 
people to the local system". 
Along with the purpose of decentralizing the decision-making 
process, the Community Committees were also to be a guarantee of the 
retention of local autonomy and identity for the previously separate 
municipalities. In this regard~ the Act gave them the responsibility of 
supervising the delivery of local services. However, the meaning of the 
word 'supervise' soon requried qualification in the summer of 1972. 
44. Government of Manitoba~ Pro2osals for Urban Reorganization in the 
Greater Winnipe~ream ~~ 
45. Ibid. 
Up until that time, some suburban Community Committees had continued 
to operate their administration in the same style as when they were 
municipalities exercising hiring and firing responsibility. The 
qualification made it clear that the intentions of the Manitoba Govern-
ment were for the central council and administration to have this 
power and not Community Committees. The redefinition of 'supervise' 
became 19 to watch, observe, and make qualitative assessment". This 
made it clear that Community Committees have no real power and that the 
system is to centralize as intended. 
The following diagram gives an illustration of the structural 
relationship between the Council, the Committees and the Community 
Committees. 46 
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46. Manitoba Provincial Government, Proposals for Urban Reorganization in 
the Greater Winnipeg Area, 1970. 
The Act which ~et up the new ~ystem did not specify a particular 
structure for the Community Committees. As a result~ the operational 
structures are as v·aried as the areas in which they exist. 
The Community Committees which correspond to the former independent 
municipalities are in some ways fortunate~ and in some ways restrained, 
by having access to the former municipal facilities~ Having taken over a 
former City Hall tends to give them immediate legitimacy, easy public 
recognition and a sense of local autonomy and identity~ as well as a 
comfortable, spacious and fitting facility in wh~ch to conduct their business. 
However, this same facility also has the tendancy to encourage traditional 
patterns of work and of thought~ and the retention of former city staff 
leads to traditional administrative functions with very little desire for 
innovation to suit the changed situation. It must be remembered, however, 
that the physical surroundings are only one factor and indeed a small factor 
in the explanation of Community Committee behaviour. A much larger and 
more important factor is the councillor himself, his background, his attitude 
toward the entire Unicity concept~ and his influence on Council. 
There are as many Community Committee organizational structures as 
there are Community Committees. However, these structures can be classified 
into: 
1. Community Committees with traditional subcommittees such as Public 
Works, Culture and Recreation, Health and Social Development~ Protection 
of Persons and Property~ Planning. These committees involve only the 
councillors and meetings are held at the call of the chair. This category 
would include the Community Committees of St. James-Assiniboia, West 
Kildonan, and Lord Selkirk. 
2. This ~eeond category is the same as above but with subcommittees 
having a standing committee a~pect with regularly scheduled and 
advertised meetings. Community Committees in this category include 
Midland$ St. John's~ St. Vital. 
3. The third category is Community Committees which have traditional 
subcommittees such as Ill and lf'l, but which have included new subeommittee8 
designed to deal with the new functions and responsibilities of 
Community Committees. These new subcommittees include ones such as 
Pollution and Environment, Communications 5 Information and Zoning. 
These Community Committees are Transcona~ Fort Rouge 9 Assiniboine Park, 
Centennial. 
4. The fourth category is the same as #3 but with subcommittees having 
standing committee status with regularly scheduled and advertised 
meetings. Fort Garry is the only Community Committee which fits this 
category. 
5. This final catego1~ is the same as #4 but with citizen involvement on 
the same committees as councillors. Councillors head the committee, 
but membership includes citizens. There are two Community Committees 
in this category =- St. Boniface and East Kildonan. 
Table 13 
Community Clt)mmi t tee OlrgSJni~a.tional S true ture 
Inner City 
Meetings per Resources and Joint Community 
l-tonth Facilities Committee 
Assiniboine Park 1 former municipal Yes 
offices and staff. 
Centennial 1 new office, basic Yes 
staff. reliance 
on City Hall. 
East Kildonan 1 and special fo1rmer municipal 
meetings. offices and staff. 
Fort Garey 1 former municipal 
offices and staff 
Fort Rouge 1 new office, basic Yes 
staff. Reliance on 
City Hall. 
Lord Selkirk 1 new office~ basic Yes 
staff. reliance on 
City Hall. 
Midland 1 new office, basic Yes 
staff, reliance on 
City Hall. 
St. Bon if ace 2 and special former municipal 
meetings. offices and staff. 
St. John'~ 1 new office, basic Yes 
staff, reliance on 
City Hall. 
St. James- 2 former municipal 
Assiniboia offices and staff. 
St. Vital 2 former municipal 
offices and staff. 
Transcona 2 former municipal 
offices and staff. 
West Kildonan 1 former municipal 
offices and staff. 
Table 14 
Community Committee/Committee Structure 
Information and/or 
Communication Centres Regularly 
No. of Traditional Innovative to Fulfill Basic Functions Scheduled At Call of 
Committees f2.m!nitteel!_ _Comm~ ~m.muni~Committees __ Meeting!!_ Chair 
Assiniboine Park 4 Yes No No No Yes 
Centennial 3 No Yes Yes Yes No 
East Kildonan 4 Yes I~o No Yes No 
Fort Garry 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Fort Rouge 
Lord Selkirk 
Midland 2 Yes No No Yes No 
St. Boniface 4 
16 subcommittees Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
St. John's 4 Yes No No Yes No 
St. James Assiniboia 5 Yes No No No Yes 
St. Vital 4 Yes No Added to Health and Social No Yes 
Development Committee 
Transcona 5 Yes Yes No No Yes 
West Kildonan 5 Yes No No No Yes 
95 
Table 15 
Community Comm.ittee Statistics 
No. With No. With 
No. of Previous No Previous Innovative 
~ }!:,:tpe~!_eps:~ E~pedence .Q!_ganization 
Assiniboine Park 3 2 l 
Centennial 4 1 3 Yes 
East Kildonan 4 4 0 
Fort Garry 3 1 2 Yes 
Fort Rouge 5 3 2 
Lord Selkirk 4 3 1 
Midland 4 2 2 
St. Boniface 4 4 0 
St. John's 4 2 2 
St. James-Assiniboia 6 4 2 
St. Vital 3 3 0 
Transcona 3 2 1 Yes 
West Kildonan 3 3 0 
I 
I 
I Assiniboine Park 
Centennial 
East Kildonan 
Fort Garry 
Fort Rouge 
Lord Selkirk 
Midland 
I 
St. Boniface I 
I 
I St. John s 
I 
St. James-Assiniboia 
St. Vital 
I Transcona 
Il-lest Kildonan 
Table 16 
Community Committee Procedure 
-
-"'"""' -
Most Time Consuming Matters Committees To Deal 
On Community Committees With These Matters 
1 
~ 
---
Receiving Communications 
Zoning Communications Zoning Commi~tee Committee Executive Committee 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
Yes I Yes II 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes No No No 
Yes Yes No No No 
I Yes Yes Yes No 
'-· --~-----~-----
_l No J 
""' 0\ 
Table 11 
---·-
Community Committee Linkages 
Close Relations Some Former Working Out Of Former 
With Administration Councillors Municipal Offices 
Assiniboine Park Yes 2/3 Yes 
Centennial No 1/4 No 
East Kildonan Yes All Yes 
Fort Garry Yes 1/3 Yes 
Fort Rouge No 3/5 No 
Lord Selkirk No 3/4 No 
Midland No 2/4 No 
St. Boniface Yes All Yes 
St. John's No 2/4 No 
St. James-Assiniboia Yes 4/6 Yes 
St. Vital Yes All Yes 
Transcona Yes 2/3 Yes 
West Kildonan Yes All Yes 
The functions of the Community Committee~ are to watch, observe 
and make qualitative assessment of employees in the delivery of all 
services previously supplied by the individual municipalities. For 
purposes of the administration of these services, the Inner City area 
would be the responsibility of the Inner City Joint Community Committee 
which is made up of the six Community Committees which comprise the 
former City of Winnipeg. For supervision of services and for purposes 
of preparing the annual capital and current budget estimates, the six 
inner city Community Committees would function as one. 
Recently there has been a move to the ICJCC disbanded. It is 
felt that this structure is cumbersome and inefficient. It has also 
come about because of a growing feeling of local area identification. 
The people in these six Community Committees are now developing a 
feeling of community and with it a desire to achieve and maintain 
local autonomy and identity. This development of local autonomy and 
identity by communities which did not formally exist before 1972 
is in contrast to the fear expressed prior to 1972 by the suburbs 
who felt that they would lose their local autonomy and identity. 
The Community Committees basically look after five major areas: 
Culture and Recreation 
Public Works and Operations 
Police and Fire Services 
Health and Social Development 
Planning 
Of these five~ the one which Community Committee~ spend the greatest 
deal of time on is the area of planning. But only a small aspect of the 
planning function has to date been performed by any Community Committee, 
and that is the zoning function. This has in the first years of transition 
shown itself to be the prime function of nearly all Community Committees~ 
and certainly of all suburban Community Committees. 
There have been many cries of anguish over the zoning procedures 
that must be followed and the length of time that they require. However, 
this problem was recognized even before Unicity became a reality and again 
several times during the first few months of operation. 
The framers of the Act recognized the problems inherent in their 
zoning procedures as laid dm~ in the Act and they provided an answer --
in the District Area and Action Area Plan Concept. To date only a handful 
of Community Committees have begun work on these plans and none have been 
completed. So zonings must receive individual attention on their merits; 
on the persuasiveness of developers; and on the succeas of citizen 
opposition. Citizens have no idea what the vacant land ne~t to them is 
slated to be used for~ developers who own the land are not certain as to 
what uses it can be put and councillors do not seem to be concerned until 
the individual question comes before them. 
The present zoning rules are nothing short of ridiculous -- there 
are more exceptions than there are rules. Ha.ving a completed District Area 
Plan would update all zoning rules in that area and these rules could be 
adhered to in the majority of cases with variations occurring only in very 
special circumstances. In this way developers would be cognizant of what 
the residents of an area wanted their area to look like; the residents would 
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feel secure in their knowledge of the way in which their community would 
develop; and councillors would not have to contend with a deluge of 
requests for zoning changes and variations. 
Most of any Community Committee's time is taken up with matters 
of zoning and yet only 3 of 13 Community Committees have established 
subcommittees to deal exclusively with matters of zoning. 
In terms of actual operation, the Community Committee is the first 
step a developer must take in seeking a re-zoning. When a developer makes 
application for a zoning variation, a public meeting must be held by the 
Community Committee to hear the developer, see his plans and get the 
opinions of the City Engineering Staff and of residents. These public 
meetings are, except in the case of East Kildonan, merely segments of a 
regular Community Committee meeting. 
Developers, frustrated by the procedure and by resident opposition, 
have in some cases begun to deal privately with councillors before a public 
meeting is called. This type of activity has in at least one case, in 
St. James-Assiniboia, resulted in a court action being initiated to have 
the zoning decision quashed. 
In some Community Committees 5 Resident Advisory Groups have the 
opportunity to discuss the proposals before the public hearing and to 
offer their opinions at the public hearing. In other cases Resident 
Advisory Groups hear the proposal at the public meeting and have the 
opportunity to comment upon it at that time. 
Notices of public hearings must be advertised and citizens invited 
to attend and register their support or opposition to the proposals. 
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The Community Committee reaches a decision and the matter is then 
forwarded to Environment Committee ~here citizens and/or councillors 
may appear either in favour or in opposition to the Community Committee 
decision. 
After the Environment Committee has reached a decision, the matter 
is forwarded to City Council where the decision is ratified or reversed. 
There are no delegations allowed to speak at the Council level. However~ 
a decision of Council can be appealed to the Manitoba Municipal Board and 
a decision from there can be appealed directly to the Minister of Urban 
Affairs. 
However, citizens can also very effectively halt developments at a 
much earlier stage~ ~imply by filing a court action against a zoning 
decision@ This has been done in a number of cases, notably against Safeway 
in Fort Rouge, and against Unicity Mall in St. James-Assiniboia. 
With zoning being the major function of the Community Committee and 
the unusual amount of citizen involvement in zoning matters (and in all 
types of zoning matters-- signs, parking lots~ etc., as well as large 
developments and subdividison, and these activities have occurred in all 
types of Community Committees) the function of the Community Committee to 
decentralize decision-making and to involve area residents seems to have 
been a success. According to this experience, legislated citizen participation 
can be a reality. 
Aside from the responsibility to supervise local planning and 
development$ the Community Committees were assigned other purposes. According 
to the Actt Community Committees should: 
(1) Develop and implement techniques to maintain the 
closest possible communication with local citizens 
of the area in order to provide them with access to 
the regional government to express ideas, suggestions, 
problems, grievances, etc.; 
(2) Develop and implement techniques to provide residents 
with information concerning existing and potential 
policies, programs and budgets so as to facilitate 
residents in discussing and developing views concerning 
these matters. 
As for the first function, that of developing techniques for 
communication between the city and the residents of a community, it is 
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unclear whether or not this has been done. Certainly there have been no 
innovative and exciting new communication techniques established vis-a-vis 
this problem. One thing is obvious though~ in the absence of a local 
autonomous municipal authority, the Community Committee is the link 
between the regional council and the average citizen. 
To the area resident, dealing with his local authority, nothing 
has changed. Nothing~ however, until the resident tdshes to oppose some 
policy or decision that is coming from his local representatives -- then 
in that case he does indeed have a greater degree of access to the decision-
making authority than before. He can state his views at the lower 
Community Committee level~ i.e., the RAG grou~ who will hopefully back him 
up when he makes his view known to the Community Committee level. That 
resident can then follow the decision through to one of the standing 
committees and then to Council itself. 
It is not the access per se which is the important factor for the 
resident, but rather the kind of access which allows a resident to influence 
the decision-maker. In this system, the potential for influencing a decision 
at each stage of its development is an important one for the concept of 
participation. 
It would appear then that in this instance, the system itself~ 
even though councillors did not follow through with its spirit, was such 
that structural change alone made the difference and achieved its 
objective. 
To say that citizen participation is not working is wrong, because 
it is working and it was stimulated and is presently being maintained by 
the structure alone. 
This leads into the second function of the Community Committee --
the development and implementation of techniques to provide residents with 
information about city matters that might concern them. Only 3 Community 
Committees have committees specially set up to deal with the problems of 
information. 
This would definitely appear to have been a failure. The failure 
in this case cannot be blamed on the structure because as has been stated, 
the structure seems to have worked in spite of the councillors inability 
to carry out any functions related to citizen participation. This failure 
on the councillors part is due, in the main~ to their overall attitudes 
towards citizen involvement. 
Only slightly over half of councillors ~elieve that citizen 
participation is necessary and of the ones that do believe this 9 most feel 
that participation means attending Community Committee meetings and turning 
out on election day. 
This reluetance to develop any new channels of communication between 
himself and the citizen regarding city policies and indeed the reluctance 
to give any information if those channels of communication exist, leads to 
the conclusion that councillors once elected find no further usefulness in 
the concept of citizen participation. 
This is supported by some recent research done in Thunder Bay 
where "No alderman felt that it was necessary to establish any formal 
communication link with his constituents between elections and none 
seemed to go further in the assessment of public opinion on important 
(important, that is~ in the perception of the alderman himself) issues 
than informal and chance contact with individuals in his own professional 
47 
and social group0 • This study also found "that councillors were over-
whelmingly anti-pathetic to the introduction of any devices into the 
municipal arena which would interfere with their freedom to decide upon 
issues in light of their individual view of what was best for the community 
and of what the electorate wanted.1148 This will become veey much more 
evident during the later discussion of the Resident Advisory Group system. 
The whole question of development of techniques for two~ay 
information flow is a very important one. In most areas the Community 
Committees have done nothing about this question. Only one area attempted 
anything innovative -- the Centennial Community Committee started putting 
out an eight page newspaper explaining vtho the resident advisors r,.1ere, and 
what they were doing -- community conferences, district plans, important 
meetings. Councillors explained eity plans and programs and asked for 
citizen views on what was happening in their area. 
4 7. Alan Alexander, "The In~titutional and Role Perceptions of Local 
Aldermen"~ in Marron and Anderson, _Emergina,J>a.rty Politics in Urban 
Canad~, McClelland and Ste"Jart, Toronto 1972. 
48. Ibid.~ P• 927. 
Councillors who have no faith in the concept of citizen participation 
are working to have the Community Committee system disbanded as soon as 
possible. They realize that it takes much longer than two years to 
generate in the overall citizenry the realization of the potential for 
citizen involvement and for the structure provided for it and therefore 
are moving now to have the structure disbanded. 
Whatever the facts are, and they are clouded, it is apparent that 
there are serious doubts about the performance of the Community Committees. 
A majority of councillors expressed dissatisfaction with the Community 
Committees. This feeling was especially strong among suburban councillors 
who felt that the Community Committees did not have enough power. They 
were opposed in this opinion by inner city councillors who in fact thought 
that the Community Committees were too parochial. 
Table 18 
Councillors view of Role of Community Committees 
Respondents 50 29 21 
Satisfied With the Role 
of Community Committees? Aggregate Suburban Inner City 
Yes 15 (30%) 6 (21%) 9 (43%) 
No 25 (50%) 17 (58%) 8 (38%) 
N.A. 10 (20%) 6 (21%) 4 (19%) 
lfuy? 
Not enough power 14 (28%) 11 (38%) 3 (14%) 
Need more local control 12 (24%) 7 (24%) 5 (24%) 
Present supervisor role 
is enough 18 (36%) 11 (38%) 7 (33%) 
NA/DK 6 (12%) 0 6 (29%) 
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Table 19 
Councillors Views on Unification 
Respondent 50 29 21 
Has Unification Resulted 
In A More 
Efficient Administration? Aggregate Suburban Inner City 
Yes 16 (32%) 5 (18%) 11 (52%) 
No 16 (32%) 12 (41%) 4 (19%) 
DK 18 (36%) 12 (41%) 6 (29%) 
The attitude of city officials towards community committees is a 
natural one -- they don't really like them and would be very much against 
giving them any more authority or power. As administrators, they can be 
expected to support the principle of centralized administration, and to 
view with suspicion any effort to decentralize the administrative structure. 
The view of the media people is that the community committees are not of 
much use. But, again these views are to be expected, from those whose 
beat is city hall and who reflect the orientation of the central organization. 
E. RESIDENT ADVISORY GROUP PERFOID1ANCE 
The Resident Advisory Group System built into the new local 
government structure was perhaps the most innovative aspect of the 
entire reorganization. It was an attempt to provide a legislated 
framework for citizen involvement. Interestingly enough, this concept 
which has been one of the most controversial and most discussed aspects 
of the entire legislation is presented in one small section of the 
Act. 
Residents' advisory group. 
21 (1) A residents' advisory group may be elected at any communtiy 
conference referred to in subsection (1) of section 24~ by the residents 
of the community who are present, from their number. 
Manner of election etc. 
21 (2) The number of members of the residents' advisory group, the 
manner of their election and the period for which they are to serve, 
may be determined by the residents present at the community conference 
during which the group is elected. 
Recall of member. 
21 (3) Any member of a residents' advisory group may be recalled by 
the residents present at a community conference for the community 
at any time. 
Role of residents' advisory group. 
21 (4) The role of a residents' advisory group is to advise and assist 
the members of the community committee for the community at whose 
conference they were elected, as to the performance of their functions 
under this Act. 
Another interesting note is that at the time of the introduction 
of the legislation, most public discussion centered on the regional 
council administrative structures and the community committee structure, 
but there was very little mention of Resident Advisory Groups as such 
and very little elaboration of them and their role even in the Government's 
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White Paper~. It was almost as though there was a very low level of 
expectation for these groups. All references to citizen participation 
are more within the concept of the community committees and not the 
Resident Advisory Groups. There is in fact only a passing reference 
to Resident Advisory Groups: 
"There is provision also for residents of a community 
to have a group of local citizens whose task it would 
be to assist, advise and keep in close touch with the 
Community Committee •••• It was felt that these advisory 
groups could be another means of getting the community's 
message across strong and clear to the regional govern~ 
ment. ,.49J 
Since that time, however, there has been much discussion of 
RAGs and much criticism of them. They have been referred to as 
'ineffectual', as a 'failure', as 'meaninglessw and press reports 
so have tended to emphasize their problems. But if one looks at the 
number of volunteers organized on a constant and concerted basis 
and if one compares that with the rather low level of expectation 
held for these groups it becomes obvious that a number of citizens 
of Winnipeg are responding to the opportunity for particiaption 
opened by the Resident Advisory system. There are approximatley 
410 citizens who are registered as resident advisors in the various 
49G Community Committees -The Citizens' Voice on Council, published 
by the Manitoba Government's Community Committee Task Force~ 1970. 
50. See Bob Lisoway, "Confused, Frustrated and Alienated11 , ~Unnipeg 
Free Press, November 18, 1972. 
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community committees in the city. The average rate of participation 
is approximately two-thirds or about 220 citizens (see Table20). 
On the other hand 9 if one is to measure the effectiveness of 
the RAG's by the number of people they reach then the picture is 
different. In 1971, 300 households were interviewed regarding their 
awareness of and their contact with their local RAG group and Community 
Committee. In 1973, 300 households again were interviewed regarding 
these questions. Of those 300 households, 190 were the same ones 
which had been interviewed in 1911. A comparison of these 190 
households indicates that in 1971, 11% of the respondants had had 
contact with their alderman under the old system and in 1973, 12% 
had had contact with councillors under the new system. Taking the 
full sample of 300 households interviewed in the summer of 1973, 
10.6% had some contact with a councillor, and only 5.6% knew a resident 
advisor from their area. 
The absence of guidelines has also meant that the advisors 
have had to develop their own style of work and develop their own 
role and structure. In the first year of operation and the above 
mentioned qualification to the City of Winnipeg Act tended to limit the 
role of community committees to supervision of local services and 
Resident Advisory Groups to an advisory capacity. But within that 
definition, the various Resident Advisory Groups have taken the 
initiative in defining a role for private citizens to play in the 
structure of government on the neighbourhood level. So, there is 
both variety and experimentation in the present activity of the 
51. Community Welfare Planning Council~ Residents Advisory Groups, 
a compilation of Resident Advisors. meeting dates, etc. 
Table 20 
Resident Advisory Group Structure 
~ ~ 
No. of Wards Advisors Total Advisors Per Ward Per Ward 
Assiniboine Park 3 8 24 
Centennial 4 8 32 
East Kildonan 4 Open 47 
Fort Garry 3 Open 45 
Fort Rouge 4 Open 42 
Lord Selkirk 4 11 44 
Midland 4 8 32 
St. Boniface 4 Open 200 
St. James 6 5 30 
St. John's 4 8 32 
St. Vital 3 4 12 
Transcona 3 8 24 
l~est Kildonan 3 5 12 
TOTAL 49 579 
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Resident Advisory groups; one that would establish a closer relationship 
between citi~ens and their elected representatives and also place 
in the hands of the people the opportunity to take a more active part 
in urban affairs. 
When the framework was provided there were very good indications 
that the citizens would want to, and would in fact, become involved 
in the new institutions. These indications are based on the Winnipeg 
tradition of volunteerism and private citizen activism and in the 
recent and forceful activity of citizen groups in the lower income 
areas. 
But the difference between becoming involved in your community 
and remaining involved in your community is a major one. The attitudes 
of the local councillors, the local administration and indeed, the 
local community per se, play a large role in the determination of the 
continuance of involvement. People will contribute only if they feel 
that their contribution is important, is being listened to, and is 
being considered in the act of decision-making. 
The concept of participation appears to have been taken seriously 
only by the resident advisors and some senior provincial government 
Ministers and civil servants. By and large the administration, press 
and councillors were skeptical if not amused by the whole business 
of citizen participation. Saul Cherniack, the Minister responsible 
for the City of Winnipeg Act while it was being piloted through the 
legislature, said that the key to making Unicity work is an 11aware 
and involved citizenry". For participation to work, several pre-
requisites must be present, one of the most important being a climate 
for participation. 
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The climate for participation that the White Paper emphasized 
does not appear to be present. Most of the key participants such as 
councillors and senior administrators and even the press just do not 
believe in the concept. They see little value in citizen involvement. 
It becomes a "waste of time". One commissioner called citizen involve-
ment "pious god-damned theory in the extreme". Councillors who have 
had to live with resident advisory groups for almost two years had 
more tolerant views. ~lliile the majority of councillors appear to 
believe that citizen participation is necessary to the functioning 
of local government, the reasons for their beliefs are varied. 
There seem to be various theories of participation amongst 
the councillors, One councillor said that "educated and affluent 
people aren't interested in participation •••• only the people with lots 
of time to do nothing •••• and the radicals. 11 Another councillor complained 
about ''bickering at meetings .••• Resident Advisors are there for 
personal interest. They try to push the councillors around." Other 
councillors, such as Morris Kauffman, expressed a respect for 
participation, saying~ 11it~s the spirit of local government •••• you 
need it •11 
Councillor Zuken remarked that "participation is curtailed 
by a negative approach by councillors. Advisors should raise questions 
and challenge councillors ••••• they can provide some leadership". 
Councillor George Munro continued in the same theme saying that citizens 
and advisors "should light fires under their councillors ••••• grill them 
on their activities and accomplishments and express the needs of the area''. 
lfuile citizens turned out in large numbers in the initial rounds of 
electing resident advisory groups~ interest seems to be diminishing now. 
Its at the level that it always was according to some suburban councillors. 
91 Citizens have always participated :tn politics when there was something to 
talk about~ to protest or to complain11 • Interestinglyj councillors l.Yankling 
and Hallonquist noted that "participation is more successful in poorer 
areas and not affluent ones •11 This serves to support their theory of 
involvement being hinged upon the need to protest. (See Table 21.) 
Another element that contributes to the climate of involvement is 
the work that citizens and advi$1.ns are offered in their attempts to 
participate. 
If they were provided with intereil!ting work then they ~~7«.JUld become 
involved. But many advisors complained about being given "a lot of detail 
and not policies" to discuss. The councillors reply that the problem is that 
"the role of advisors should be clarified" and that local politics often 
involves a lot of administrative drudgery and if they want to be involved 
they must be involved in everything. 
Many resident advisors have taken the opportunity to be involved 
in local affairs very seriously and they have tested the limits of involvement. 
Some RAGs have been fGrt~nate to get assistance and support either from 
professional members on the group or from various service ag®neies, and 
community development and research organizations. Fort Rouge and St. John's 
are two community committees that have had this support. There has been a 
movement lately by many of the groups to secure funding to begin to play a 
better role in their community. Meetings have been held by delegates cif the 
various RAGs to form a central association of RAGe that could get funding 
and offer assistance in research and communication. 
Table 21 
Level of Communication with Community 
and Participation by Residents in Resident Advisory Groups 
Attendance By Level of Communication 
Residents with Community 
Assiniboine Park poor poor 
Centennial poor poor 
(depends on issue) 
East Kildonan poor poor 
Fort Garry poor poor 
(depends on issue) 
Fort Rouge fair poor 
Lord Selkirk fair fair 
(because of ward 
structure) 
Midland poor poor 
St. Bonifice poor poor 
Ste James poor poor 
St. John's poor poor 
St. Vital poor poor 
Transcona poor poor 
West Kildonan poor poor 
The diff~r~nee b~tween the councillors' views of the Fd\G~ problems 
and th~ Resident Advisors' views illu~trate a major problem between the 
two groups -- a communication problem. The problems of RAGs as seen by 
the councillors are difficulty in relating to the entir~ system and the 
lack of any clearly defined role for RAGs. These problems are beyond the 
scope of the councillors and therefore the blame can be attached to the 
provincial government rather than the Council. 
However, the Resident Advisors say that their problems are due to 
their lack of power and lack of information. If blame were to be attached 
to these problems~ it would fall upon the City Council and the respective 
Community Committees. 
However~ if the role of the RAGs is accepted as an advisory one~ 
based on community outreach and feedback techniques, and if it is accepted 
that they h~e not been overwhelmingly successful, as indicated by Resident 
Advisory Group surveys and our second Public Opinion Survey~ then the blame~ 
if such is to be attached, must be attached to all parties -- the provincial 
government§ the City Council~ the Community Committees and the Resident 
Advisory Groups themselves. 
The provincial government created the Community Committee and the 
Resident Advisory Group system and they prognosticated great things for 
them, but they provided for none of the back-up services which have proven 
so necessary. However, the hands-off stance of the provincial government~ 
at least during the transition period~ would probably be the most correct 
one. However, the provincial government would have been correct in providing 
some form of incentive and encouragement, such as plans which would have 
provided provincial financial assistance only if the Community Committees 
and Resident Advisory Groups were included in the planning and 
implementation of these programs. 
City Council has not proven itself dedicated to the concept 
of citizen participation. The first attempt by councillors to provide 
resources to RAGs was 'nshelved", according to one of the daily neloi:S-
papers. The proposal by Councillor liorris Kaufman was to establish 
an information service for citizens and resident advisors to assist 
them in obtaining technical information. The Deputy Mayor in Executive 
Policy Committee said to the proposal, "I would like to see it put 
52 back in the trash can where it belongs. 11 Other executive policy 
councillors feared that giving the RAGs support could result in a 
two-tier system of government that amalgamation was designed to overcome. 
In addition~ they feared that it could encourage political activism 
amongst Resident Advisory Groups who are expected to advise and not 
agitate. 
As the accompanying table indicates, the Councillors generally 
think that the RAGs have had limited success in their first year of 
operation. But, when asked if they think RAGs require additional 
support - a request made by many citizen members of the Resident 
Advisory Groups - nearly half the councillors are against such a move. 
However, of these councillors, most of them came from the suburban 
area, and also come from those who were against Unicity. 
Respondents 
Table 22 
Councillors' Views on 
Resident Advisory Groups 
50 
117 
29 21 
Have Resident Advisory Total Suburban Inner City Groups Been Successful? 
Yes 25(50%) 14(48%) 11(53%) 
No 11(22%) 5(17%) 6 (29%) 
D.K. 7 (28%) 10(35%) 4(18%) 
Do Resident Advisory Groups 
Require Additional Support? 
Yes 17(34%) 8(28%) 9 (43%) 
No 24(48%) 16 (55%) 8(38%) 
D.K. 9(18%) 5(17%) 4(19%) 
From this discussion, it appears that many councillors feel that 
the role of the citizen in decision-making is through the "partial 
partidpation1' approach. However, one can question the validity of applying 
this term to the present situation, as RAGs often do not have sufficient 
information to make an effective suggestion. If Council is not releasing 
information on issues until it has made a decision, regardless of whether 
it was made in one of the Council Committees or by one of the City 
commissioners~ the role of the citizen is then reduced to "pseudo-
participation". 
Assiniboin~ Park 
Centennial 
East Kildonan 
Fort Garey 
Fort Rouge 
Lord Selkirk 
Midland 
St. Boniface 
St. James 
St. John's 
St. Vital 
Transcona 
West Kildonan 
Table 23 
~esident Advisory Groups 
Office and Staff Arrangements 
Type of Office Support Staff 
old civic office previous civic staff 
separate office some from OFY projects 
old civic office previous civic staff 
old civic office previous civic staff 
new office LIP and STEP, CYC 
new office project unicity, 
Robertson House 
new office hired secretary 
old civic office previous civic staff 
old civic office previous civic staff 
new office project unicity, 
Robertson House 
old civic office previous civic staff 
old civic office previous civic staff 
old civic office previous civic staff 
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At present there is a great deal of ambivalence and indetermination 
in the attitudes of city councillors towards the concepts of citizen 
participation and involvement. 'flhat is needed is a demonstration of the 
ability and capacity of RAGs to aid the councillors in the formulation of 
their ideas. It can also be seen that RAGs are somewhat weak in this area 
and that a central resource group could greatly aid them in the achievement 
of their objectives. 
It is also important to note that the apparent lack of attention 
given by councillors to the role of the Resident Advisory Group is also 
due to the pressure of other pressing city problems. When one looks at 
many minor squabbles and the plethora of details 'l:Jhich councillors find 
themselves immersed in, the present difficulties faced in council-
administration relationships, one can understand the limited concern about 
Resident Advisory Groups. 
The Community Committees, for their part, have tended to relegate 
many of their functions such as communication with and involvement of 
the general citizenry to the RAGs but they have not given them any resources 
or direction. They have also in many cases enveloped the RAGs into very 
formal and procedural situations with parliamentary rules, which has seemed 
to stifle some degree of involvement and interest. 
Indeed, even the physical surroundings have an effect on the 
behaviour and attitude of citizens wishing to become involved. (See Table 23). 
It has been observed that citizen participation operating out of former 
municipal council chambers tends to be much more restrained and sparse 
than citizen participation operating out of less formal and foreboding 
environments. Then these councillors hold at the local level the same 
beliefs which they express only at the Council level. 
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The RAGs themselves must accept a good deal of the fault of 
not fostering citizen involvement. Because of the formality of RAG 
elections and meetings and because of the closed-group atmosphere 
of many of them, the advisors in many cases tend to view themselves 
as an elite group elected to :represent the people and not to work with 
them. The chairman of the St. James-Assiniboia RAG remarked "the 
people elected me to act for them and if they don't like what I do they 
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can elect someone else next year". This attitude does not exactly 
foster citizen participation. 
RAGs also tend to become involved in many trivial administrative 
details and thus frustrate and alienate many people who wish to 
contribute to the larger policy discussions which face any urban center. 
Operation of RAGs 
The following observations can be made concerning the present 
Resident Advisory Group operation: 
1) Most people who are working actively on the groups are people who 
care about their community and who have particular interests either 
in recreation, planning or even business interests. Our research 
indicates that approximately 80% of all advisors had been previously 
54 involved in community affairs. The types of community involvement 
53. Interviews. 
54. In this :respect, Resident Advisors conform very closely to the 
description of 11 community actors" used by Scott Greer. See Scott 
Greer, The Urbane View, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 
Chapter 9. 
indicated range from political involvement~ to community clubs, school 
boards and church groups. (For a further elaboration, see Table 24 ) 
This is in keeping with the study of Verba and Nie, who found that 
ti i t; t d d f 1 i . i 55 ac v ~ s en e to ee very c v1c m nded, 
2) The ways that the advisors have structured themselves show much 
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diversity. There are varying numbers of advisors per group: ranging 
from twelve in St. Vital (4 for each of 3 wards) to about fifty in 
St. Boniface. The forms of election vary with some groups electing a 
fixed limited number of representatives while other groups elect all 
interested people regardless of numbers. The total number of advisors 
per community committee ranges from 200 in St. Boniface to 15 in 
West Kildonan and the manner of elections varies from Fort Rouge where 
all interested and concerned residents present at a Community Conference 
may become members of the Resident Advisory Group; to St. James-
Assiniboia where the number of advisors allowed per ward is fixed 
and where each ward under the leadership of a councillor chooses a 
slate of candidates to be endorsed at the Community Conference. (For 
a further explanation, see Table 20~ 
In the first year, some groups, like Fort Garry, were organized 
in committees on planning, public works, recreation, only and never met 
as a whole, while others, such as Lord Selkirk, were organized on the 
ward level in committees and also met as a whole. After the first year, 
the groups have restructured themselves to include co-ordinating committees 
55. Sydney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in Ameri£!5 New York, 
Harp~r & Row, 1912. 
ASSINIBOINE PARK 
CENTENNIAL 
--
EAST KILDONAN 
FORT GARRY 
FORT ROUGE 
LORD SELKIRK 
MIDLAND 
ST. BONIFACE 
ST. JAMES 
ST. JOHN'S 
ST. VITAL 
TRANSCONA 
l<ffiST KILDONAN 
Table 24 
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Leadership Sear~ RAG S~!,fi£le 
of Three Active Indigenous Leaders 
Been Involved in 
Community Before 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
ao 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Type of Involvement 
Community Club~ Civic Organizations 
politically active 
politically active 
self-help groups 
Parks and Library Boards 
Church 
Recreation 
Private Clubs 
School Board 
social groups 
Community Planning Association 
School Board, politically active 
politically active 
Councillor 
politically active 
politically active 
Union~ politically involved 
ran as Councillor 
recreation 
politically active 
Community Club 
recreation 
YMCA 
Chamber of Commerce 
politically active 
Tenants Association 
School Assoc./ Homeowners Assoc. 
Community Club 
Community Club, Community Centre 
School Board 
School Board, home and school 
civic organization - Jaycees 
Church, community volunteer work 
Church, Community Club, School Trusteet 
Councillor 
Civic Groups 
Civic Groups 
politically active 
and executives to handle detail work and improve the operation of the 
regular committees. Some groups have only two committees, as in 
Midland, while others in St. Vital and St. Boniface~ have upwards of 
ten committees. Some Community Committees~ like East Kildonan, have 
the RAG group organized in committees which are chaired by councillors. 
These committees are specific standing-type committees which very 
rarely get together to meet with all other committees. 
Both Lord Selkirk and St. Boniface have executive committees 
which deal with much of the administrative detail before it reaches the 
level of the entire RAG group or the appropriate committee, whichever 
may be the case. Eleven out of the thirteen RAGs meet as a whole and 
all of them have some type of committee structure although four have 
primarily ad-hoc committees. (See Table 25). 
3) There is also much diversity in their agenda and discussion areas. 
Some, like St. Boniface, consider a lot of administrative details 
and have over ten committees working in various areas. Others have only 
two or three standing committees as in Midland, while others establish ad 
hoc committees struck off for a special purpose such as Lord Selkirk. 
Some concern themselves with the most minute details and operate in 
a very Parliamentary, formal style while others are more informal 
an di~cuss planning and policies and longer range issues. 
St. James seems to be the only RAG whose style of operation has 
become more formal than before. In the other twelve there has been a 
ASSINIBOINE PARK 
CENTENNIAL 
EAST KILDON.AN 
FORT GARRY 
FORT ROUGE 
LORD SELKIRK 
MIDLAND 
ST. BONIFACE 
ST. JAMES 
ST. JOHN'S 
ST. VITAL 
TRANS CON A 
\-lEST KILDONAN 
Table 25 
Resident AdvisgJX Gr~~p Structure 
Meets As 
A Whole 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Meet In 
Wards 
X 
X 
Committee 
Structure 
X 
X 
Chaired by 
X 
Councillors 
X 
X 
Executive 
X 
Committee 
X 
Executive 
X 
Committee 
X 
X 
Committees 
X 
May Involve 
Ordinary Residents 
X 
X 
No. of 
Committees 
4 
ad hoc 
committees 
8 
9 
ad hoc 
committees 
ad hoc 
committees 
2 
16 
5 
4 
10 
7 
ad hoc 
committees 
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tendency to move towards a more open casual style. (See 26)~ 
Some of the suburban areas, like Assiniboine Park, St. James and 
Fort Garry are flooded with zoning variations and zoning changes while 
other inner city resident advisory groups, like Centennial, Midland 
and Lord Selkirk~ deal more with broader issues such as District 
Area Planning. 
From our research, it seems evident that those RAGs which 
represent old suburban municipalities are for the most part more concerned 
with administrative details, while those in the inner-city are more 
concerned with the larger, more policy oriented issues. This fact is 
explained primarily in terms of areas where previous councils performed 
basically caretaker functions and where this mentality has been propogated. 
Resident Advisors who spend a great deal of time discussing curb cuts, 
placement of stop signs and snow removal would seem in many cases to 
be doing so because that is all they are given to discuss. A matter 
of initiative then becomes the major difference between those RAGs 
immersed in administrative detail and those actually working on issues 
which may shape the future face of the city. (See Table 27}. 
These suburban activists do not fit completely into Verba and 
Nie 1s classification of Complete Activists56 but fit more in some cases 
into their classification of 'Parochial Participants' to some degree 
mainly with their narrow vision and low degree of issue extremity. 
They are also to a degree what Verba calls 'Communalists' a term most 
of them would violently object to. But according to Verba and Nie 
'Communalists' 11engage in activity requiring a high degree of initiative -
56. Sydney Verba and Noman Nie, Ibid.~ p. 87. 
See accompanying table. 
Type of 
Participator 
Inactives 
Voting 
specialists 
Parochial 
participants 
Communalists 
Partisan 
activists 
Complete 
activists 
Table 26 
The Six Types of Participants: 
The Main Characteristics of Their Activity 
Pattern and Some Expected Orientations 
Some Expected Orientations 
Skill and 
Competence Involvement in Conflict and Cleavage 
Main Characteristics of 
Activity Pattern 
No activity. 
Act requiring little 
initiative but performed 
against counterparticipants. 
Act requiring initiative 
but with a narrow, personal 
outcomee Probably little 
conflict involved. 
Act requiring initiative, 
and with a broad social 
outcome, but relatively 
nonconflictua.l. 
Act requiring moderate 
initiative; broad social 
outcome; relatively 
conflictual. 
All activities. 
Efficacy 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Medium/ 
High 
High 
Infor-
mation 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Medium/ 
High 
High 
Partisan-
ship 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Take Sides 
in Conflict 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Issue 
Extremity 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Civic 
Mindedness 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
Lmr/ 
Medium 
High 
,_, 
N 
c-. 
Table 127 
Formal, Informal~ Attendance Frequency 
Parliamentary More Casual by of 
Style Style Councillors Meetings 
ASSINIBOINE PARK X Yes Monthly 
CENTENNIAL X Yes Monthly 
-
·-~ 
EAST KILDONAN X Yes Monthly 
FORT GARRY X Yes Monthly 
FORT ROUGE X Yes Monthly 
LORD SELKIRK X Yes Ivionthly 
MIDLAND X Yes Honthly 
ST. BONIFACE X Yes Monthly 
ST. JAMES X Sometimes Monthly 
ST. JOHN'S X Yes Monthly 
ST. VITAL X Yes Twice a Month 
TRANS CON A X Yes T\.1iee a Month 
i<.'IEST KILDONAN X No Monthly 
---~~~ 
Details 
ASSINIBOINE PARK X. 
-
CENTE:NNIAL 
EAST KILDONAN 
___ , 
FORT GARRY X 
FORT ROUGE X 
LORD SELKIRK 
MIDLAND 
ST. BONIFACE X 
ST. JAMES X 
ST. JOHN'S X 
ST. VITAl. 
TRANS CON A 
HEST KILDONAN 
Table 28 
Issues 
X 
X 
X. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Kinds of Issues 
zoning, storm s~vers, parking 
planning 
police and fire amalgamation~ 
public works, recreation. 
zoning, budget 
zoning, welfare~ development 
planning 
Irwick-Currie, Downtown 
Development, WATS. 
zoning, signs 
zoning, recreation, public 
housing. 
planning~ rail study 
planning, policy decisions 
zoning, public housing, overpass 
activity that seems to involve general communal goals rather than 
overt conflict among contending parties. Thus we expect them to be 
high in their psychological involvement in politics, in their skill 
and competence, and in their sense of community contribution. They 
ought to be particularly low in their involvement in conflict, 
51 cleavage, and issue orientation". 
There are of course many major differences between thi~ ~tudy, 
and the one done by Verba and Nie but there are also many parallels 
which can be drawn and done so with a good deal of validity. 
4) Many groups have good relationships with their councillors where 
councillors listen to the views of advisors, give them support and 
assistance and have a healthy respect and appreciation for citizen 
participation. Other groups, however, have poorer relationships where 
the councillors are still unconvinced about the value of citizen advisors. 
The result is an inattentive ear by councillors and a sense of frustration 
on the part of advisors. There have been some disappointments on 
zoning questions where citizens and advisors were against proposals 
but they went through anyway, such as in Ft. Rouge over the Safeway 
Development proposa1. 58 
57. Verba and Nie, Ibid.,!) p. 86. 
58. This was an application for rezoning by Safeway Limited for a new 
shopping center which would have resulted in the tearing down of 
several units of older housing. Petitions were signed by upwards 
of 800 residents, but the community was itself divided on the 
nature of the project. 
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5) There are also differences in the resources and assistance available 
to advisory groups. Some inner city groups were a long time in 
finding a community committee office and in receiving secretarial 
assistance. All of the suburban community committees, which correspond 
to the older suburban municipalities, have technical assistance from the 
various departments and these experts, like the city engineers and 
planners,attend meetings of the Resident Advisory Groups and sub-
committee meetings while inner city Resident Advisory Groups and even 
their community committees have difficulty in getting planning help 
form the administration except for zoning matters. But this inequality 
is being eroded through amalgamation as staff are being transferred 
from the old municipal offices into central administrative positions. 
6) Some groups show initiative in doing their own research, meeting 
frequently~ debating large issues, trying to reach out intp the 
general community, while others play a more passive role 9 merely 
responding to matters referred to them by central council and the 
community committee and concerning themselves with the administrative 
work of the old municipal councils. 
This is a consequence of some resident advisors interpreting 
the role of RAGs to be limited to consultation, while others see a more 
expansive role. 
Some groups have been left to work on their m~ with the support 
of their councillors While others have had research and resource people 
helping them in their work. The result has been better communication, 
more discussion of issues and larger participation by the ordinary 
residents in the areas like Fort Rouge, Lord Selkirk and St. Johns. 
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Recently there have been efforts to extend resources to all the resident 
advisors who need them. The minimum needs for all groups are clerical 
assistance in typing, taking minutes~ filing, copying and preparing 
mailings. Each group needs this as a minimum and at the date of this 
writing~ these minimum services are being supplied by every community 
committee with varying degrees of satisfaction to advisors. 
Act and the Future of RAGs 
As a result of discussions held by certain Resident Advisors 
in various groups~ it was decided to call a conference of all RAGs. 
A meeting of the RAGs occurred~ June 15, 1972, to share and discuss 
progress and problems. At that meeting a steering committee was struck 
off composed of those Resident Advisors present as well as resource 
people from the Community Welfare Planning Council, YMCA, CYC, Neighbour-
hood Service Centres, Robertson House, etc. The steering committee 
met October 2~ 1972 to discuss alternative ways of improving RAGs. 
The feeling at this meeting was that some action should be taken to 
pull together a resource group. It was decided to develop a proposal 
for an organization and to approach each individual RAG with it. 
The expectation was that each RAG would respond to the proposal by 
accepting the idea of an association and appointing a delegate to 
a steering committee to plan the association. 
By the winter of 1972-73s the delegates began to meet to work 
out the nature of the association. The first meeting of ACT delegates 
involved representatives from ten of the thirteen Resident Advisory 
Groups. The meetings continued through the winter in 1973 when it 
was decided to approach the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs for 
funding for an association. 
ACT was composed of ten official delegates from the Resident 
Advisory Groups but the other three RAGs have been represented by an 
advisor at the meetings and they continue to observe~ report back to 
their groups and participate in the discussions and planning. 
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Stated very simply, the basic objective of the proposed organization 
was to provide a needed resource base for all Resident Advisory Groups. 
In more specific terms, the ACT delegates were able to agree upon the 
following objectives for an organization: 
1) collect and co-ordinate information presently unavailable in the 
community; 
2) devise ways of getting needed information which is not currently 
available through a technical resource pool: 
3) provide resources for RAGs to reach out into their conm1unities and 
gain an understanding of their needs; 
4) assist RAGs in developing their internal structure, aims and methods 
of working; 
5) maintain an on-going interchange between RAGs so that they can 
continue to learn from their fellow RAGs and to share common concerns 
and new techniques; 
6) to strengthen RAGs to the point where they form a tight coalition 
for action with their councillors and develop an information based 
forum so that RAGs and other community groups can work together 
on city~wide concerns. 
The association, as it was then called, would be governed by a 
co-ordinating council or board composed of representatives from each 
RAG. The organization would have staff to perform clerical and administrative 
functions~ research and fact pool building functions, and communication 
resource~ with and between RAGs. Added to this would be a resource 
pool of community organizations and resource organizations. 
Based on these objectives~ the ACT organization submitted to 
the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs~ a submission for funds to 
support such an organization. 
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The submission was held up by the city in the Tri-Level Committee 
and the idea was rejected by the City Executive Policy Committee. It 
was thought for awhile that the idea was dead but on October 17~ Winnipeg 
City Council in a surprise turn around, agreed to accept the Federal 
Government's offer of $230,000 over two years. 
Included in this package from the Federal Government was $25,000 
for the City to establish the position of Information Officer to aid the 
City in getting information out. This decision of the city was a 
surprising one after the fears expressed previously by many councillors 
but the reason for the change of heart may have had something to do with 
the joint strength that the RAG groups were showing and with the 
accountability whiCh councillors were suddently faced with. 
At this writing~ however~ the Federal Government has not yet 
approved the proposal and the RAGs are continuing much as before. 
Legislated citizen participation~ as the RAG system has been referred to, 
is not the panacea for all of the ills of our urban systems. 
The transition period for new Council structure will probably be 
much shorter than that for the Resident Advisory Group structure. The 
new Council is not a radical departure from tradition; the Resident 
Advisory Group structure is~ and as such will require a longer period of 
134 
gestation before its potential will be realized. 
And~ the system does have potential. An easily recognizable 
vehicle for involvement on the community level is there and~ though it 
has to date dratm only the activists, that is to be expected, especially 
in the transition period. But, as case studies in the follotdng section 
will demonstrate~ when an issue of some concern appears, then the average 
citizen can use the RAGs to express his feeling~ gain information~ and 
mobilize support for one position or another. 
The RAG system has led people to become more involved on a more 
constant level than has been the case in the past. The RAG system started 
off with great expectations, became bogged down in bureaucracy and 
parochialism and has in some areas lost all drive. The creation of ACT 
added a new dimension to the RAGs and the federal money could, if approved, 
reinforce them even further. On an overall assessment, their performance 
during the initial period has been, as compared to what traditionally it 
was, very encouraging and they deserve the opportunity to complete the 
very difficult transition from yesterday to tomorrow. 
But, there must be some major changes. To begin with, City 
Council must take a far more active role in defining the position of RAGs. 
For many politicians~ the RAGs were a new idea and many saw them basically 
as a source of opposition. At the same time, because RAGs were populated 
by activists who often tended to be critics, they reinforced the negative 
image councillors held of RAGs. 
To overcome this, Council could set up a special committee to 
develop a policy of Council on RAGs and citizen involvement, and to work 
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tdth RAG members to define responsibilities. The possibility of federal 
support for re8earch and information services for RAGs provides an 
opportunity for joint consultation between councillors and RAG members. 
Council should move soon to deal with the problem of RAGs. 
The provincial government could also assist by providing 
assistance to the city to provide support services for RAGs and to set 
out in amendments to the City of Winnipeg a dear description of the 
function RAGs should perform in the overall structure of city government. 
In other words~ as is true with other aspects of the new city structure, 
things were left incomplete. The idea of RAGs was a good one. But, 
there was not much followthrough to insure that they would become viable 
institutions. The transition period shows that in respect to RAGs, the 
job of creating a new vehicle for citizen involvement in Winnipeg has 
really just begun. 
SECTIO N 
THE TRANSITION 
* ISSUE ORIENTATION 
* ommTOWN DEVELOPMENT 
* TRIZEC 
* NEW DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES 
* METROPOLITAN DEVELOPfv'IENT PLAN 
* ZONING AND LAND USE 
* PUBU C HOUSING 
* TRANSPORTATiON CASE STUDY 
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This section of the report will examine the way Council dealt 
with issues in its first two years of operation. To begin with, there 
will be an overview of voting patterns to see if there are any basic 
alignments in the new system of government. Then, there will be a series 
of case studies in the areas of housing~ planning, and of development in 
an effort to determine the process that was followed and to determine 
patterns in the operation of the new system. From these ttwo approaches, 
there should be some indication of whether the new system has made a 
difference in the treatment of issues. 
Issue Orientation 
The pattern of councillor support on issues shows en initial 
trend on Council in favour of policies of grm~th and development. This 
trend is most pronounced in the ICEC caucus, and among suburban councillors. 
For example, Table 28 shows voting patterns on four issues that can be 
viewed as development issues: the building of the convention centre, 
the support of a grant to the Industrial Development Board, the re-zoning 
of Unicity Mall (a major shopping centre complex in Assiniboia opposed by 
the Commissioner of Environment) and support for the Trizec proposal 
(a major complex to be built on the corner of Portage and Main). 
On these issues there is a tendency for the Council as a whole to 
strongly support the pro-development position, reflecting the very strong 
support coming from ICEC members 9 particularly those from the outer city 
or suburban wards. NDP support is generally opposed to the development 
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Tabl~ 28 
Respondents 50 29 21 37 7 
Total Suburban Inner City ICEC NDP 
Building 
Convention 
Centre 
Yes 35(70%) 22 (76%) 13(62%) 29(78%) 2(29%) 
No 10(20%) 3(10%) 7(33%) 4(11%) 6(57%) 
D.K./N .A. 5(10%) 4(14%) 1(5%) 4(11%) 1(14%) 
Grant to IDB 
Yes 20(40%) 12(41%) 8(38%) 18(49%) 1(14%) 
No 21(42%) 11(38%) 10(48%) 14(38%) 4(58%) 
D.K./N .A. 9(18%) 6(21%) 3(14%) 5(13%) 2(28%) 
Unidty Mall 
Yes 33(66%) 23(80%) 10(48%) 28(74%) 1(14%) 
No 12(24%) 3(10%) 9(43%) 5(13%) 5(72%) 
D.K./N .A. 5(10%) 3(10%) 2(9%) 5(13%) 1(14%) 
Trizec 
Yes 36(72%) 24(82%) 12(57%) 30(81%) 1(14%) 
No 8(16%) 1(3%) 7 (33%) 2(5%) 5(72%) 
D.K. /N .A. 6(12%) 4(15%) 2(10%) 5(14%) 1(14%) 
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issues~ with the exception of one councillor. Thie pattern is not 
noticeably different from the previous orientation of the old Metro Council 
or previous municipalities. The structural ch2.mge has n.ot, therefore, 
resulted in a policy shift. However, where the institutional change appears 
to have had an impact is in giving outer city political forces increasing 
control of the city government apparatus. Because of the shift in 
population, political power has shifted to the suburbs and the councillors 
representing these areas reflect the views of this middle income, 
property owning group who are very conscious and supportive of programs 
that appear to generate revenue and keep taxes doi>-m. It -;;qould be far 
more difficult for a reform~ anti-development group to gain a majority 
in Winnipeg than in Toronto~ because Winnipeg's unified system gives the 
suburban politicians power for the whole system, while in Toronto the 
suburbs and the central ~ity are separate jurisdictions and the power is 
divided. Equally, the objective laid out in the provincial government's 
White Paper of insuring that the enlarged city could better tackle inner 
city social problems may in fact be more frustrated under re-organization 
than before, because of the new political alignments. The pre-eminence 
of suburban interests is not likely to lead to a priority being placed on 
social issues. This can be seen in examining voting patterns on the cluster 
of issues that constitute approaches toward social initiatives of city 
government. The pattern of cleavage between inner and outer city 
councillors 5 or ICEC and NDP, is not sharp, indicating a lack of clear 
focus or leadership in these issues. In a series of questions asked 
relating to councillors' stands on the following "social" issues: support 
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Table 29 
Councillor~' Views on Selected Issues 
Respondents 50 29 21 37 7 
Total Suburban Inner City ICEC NDP 
Public Versus 
Private Housing 
Yes 3(6%) 2(7%) 1(5%) 1(3%) 1(17%) 
No 14(28%) 9(31%) 5(24%) 11(30%) 
D.K./N .A. 33(66%) 16(55%) 15(71%) 24(65%) 5(83%) 
Increase Staff 
for~ Inspection 
Yes 26(52%) 13(45%) 13(62%) 19(51%) 4(67%) 
No 9 (18%) 6(21%) 3(14%) 7 (19%) 1(17%) 
D.K./N .A. 10(35%) 5 (24%) 10(27%) 1(17%) 
Grant to Mount 
Cannel Clinic 
Yes 16(32%) 9(31%) 7(33%) 9 (24%) 4(17%) 
No 16(32%) 6(21%) 10(48%) 14(38%) 1(17%) 
D.K./N .A. 14( 48%) 4(19%) 1(3%) 1(17%) 
More Power to 
RAGs 
Yes 10(20%) 7(24%) 3(14%) 6(16%) 
No 26(52%) 15(52%) 11(52%) 22(60%) 2(33%) 
D.K./N .A. 1(24%) 7(33%) 9(24%) ft.(67%) 
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of public housing~ increasing staff for public health home inspections~ 
a grant to the Mount Carmel Clinie, and giving more a!!:sistance to Resident 
Advisory Groups, the voting patterns show closer similarities in support. 
' 
This pattern of pro-development decision-making and limited 
initiatives on social issues should not be surprising. Other authors, 
particularly Harold Kaplan in his examination of the I>tetro system of 
Toronto, have observed how the politics of regional government support 
59 physical development projects, l!Yhile ignoring social issues. The fact 
is that capital works and development projects can be accepted by most 
councillors because they fit the conventio~al wisdom of municipal 
government that growth is good because it contributes increased tax 
revenue and contributes to a thriving city. 
On the other hand, programs to tackle such problems as inner city 
poverty~ reform of social assistance, demands for low cost housing, 
protection of the urban environment engender strong conflicts and require 
some degree of leadership to carry them forward. As recent studies have 
shown, local government systems that have some degree of partisan politics 
are more likely to deal with such issues. 60 Here the weaknesses of the 
present political arrangements are most evident~ and have little to do 
with the structure or form of the system. 
The situation in Winnipeg~ however, is not static. As the case 
studies will sho<t<3, there are forces emerging which take issue with a one 
sided development approach and which are having some influence on the 
59. Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1967. 
60. Charles Adrian, "A Study of Three Communities", Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 18,. 1958, p. 208-213. 
politics of Council. The new structure of city government gives these 
new political forces an arena in which to operate; namely~ through the 
sy~tem of the RAGs and Community Committees, as will be seen in the study 
of the dispute over railway relocation. Therefore, the structure is having 
some impact on the character of politics 9 but it will be a long term 
impact and still in a state of limited animation. 
Also of importance is the manner in which the changes in the 
system have affected the overall development process. Bill 36 included a 
number of provisions on the procedures to be followed in processing 
building applications and zoning changes. Thes~ have been the cause of 
controversy with the housebuilders in the city claiming, in particulars 
that this is a major cause of the severe shortage of land, the low number 
of housing starts, and the escalating rise in housing prices. 61 
To more fully assess this relationship between the new structure 
of government and the politics and process of development~ a series of 
events related to development issues are reviewed in the following section. 
From these cases, one can begin to develop a better sense of what has 
happened over the past two years. 
Downtown Development 
When the majority group (ICEC) of Council took office, it had no 
development policy for Winnipeg's dotqntown area. The major initiative on 
the books was the Downtown Development Plan which had been approved by 
the former City of Winnipeg Council and the Manitoba Legislature. The 
61s Winnipeg Fre~ Press~ May 24, 1974. 
Downtown Development Plan was a program to encourage $126 million of private 
investment in the city centre through the public spending of $46 million 
on parks, parking facilities and public buildings. This plan included 
the Winnipeg Convention Centre, the central library at Graham Avenue 
between Donald and Smith, and the Trizec Develo~ment, while not specifically 
mentioned in the plan, suited the general objectives of the Downtown 
62 Development Plan. Although Council continued with the Convention Centre 
and with the central library and although it initiated the Trizec 
arrangement, it has never officially endorsed the plan. 
The Downtown Development Plan 9 which originated under Metro, had 
allotted $15 million of public money for the construction of the Convention 
Centre. Following the commencement of excavation for this, developers 
announced that they were ready to go ahead with the construction of 
hotels, apartment buildings and office towers. 
It would appear that the Convention Centre did indeed provide the 
catalyst for intensive private enterprise building activity in the downtown. 
Thb activity includes a twenty storey apartment tower and the Lakeview 
Square development consisting of a nineteen storey hotel, two 250 suite 
apartment buildings~ an office tower and a second hotel or office tower. 
The buildings of Lakeview Square are to be woven together by a Japanese 
Garden financed by the City, the Province and the Japanese Government. 
This activity in turn has ~pawned the development of numerous small 
specialty restaurants and the prospect of future major initiatives in the 
downtown area is imminent. 
62. Metro Corporation 9 Downtown Development Plan. 
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vfuen the new Council came into office~ they had to face the 
reality that construction had begun on the Convention Centre, that private 
a.ct:ivit:y dependent on the completion of the Convention Centre was in 
process, so they had no real choice but to agree with and continue the 
project. Thi~ the Council did in Febntary of 1972~ when it delegated to 
the subcommittees on the Convention Centre the authority to make and 
implement decisions regarding the design and construction of the Convention 
Centre. 
In 1971~ before the Convention Centre construction got under way, 
the cost was set at $15 million, half of which would be paid by the 
Province. But costs continued rising and by November of 1972, City Council 
had to vote for an increase in cost of over $8 million, bringing the total 
cost to over $23 million" The Provincet however, said they were committed 
to paying only $7.5 million and that the increase of over $8 million 
would have to be born by the City alone. 
What was never documented, at least publicly, was whether the 
increase in public expenditure of $8 million would be balanced in terms of 
increments in property revenue and revenue generated from the new commercial 
establishments. While the Convention Centre undoubtedly sparked growth, 
the question still is open on whether it was a good economic deal. 
Indications are that revenue from the property and business taxes on new 
construction already committed will be over $3 million, which would cover 
amortization costs of the Convention Centre. A proper economic assessment 
of Convention Centre impact, however, would be worthwhile. 
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Many councillors recognize this lack of information~ but Council 
dealt with this issue ~dth little questioning and little expressed 
disagreement, although it is difficult to determine what might have been 
said behind closed doors or in the corridors. It reveals how the easy 
acceptance of development proposals with little questioning at the time 
of decision can lead to unintended results and increases in costs at a 
later date. 
The new Council acted no differently from its predecessors in this respect. 
Proposals for "growth" projects were championed by a fetY' key councillors 
who possessed what appeared to be irrefutable arguments to back up their 
case. There were not councillors of an anti-gr~.rth attitude who possessed 
equal information or influence. Thus, the debate on such projects, at 
least in the public forums, was very limited. And the new system of 
government has done little to change this state of affairs. Decisions on 
development projects are still basically unexamined in terms of the full 
range of costs and benefits that should be explored. City government does 
not employ a rational system of decision-making on development issues, 
which lays out the full equation of return for major public investments. 
If jobs, economic growth and increased municipal revenue are major objectives 
of city government, the issue of how to best solve them is rarely asked. 
It is assumed that large scale development is the answer, although 
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evidence is beginning to mount that such is not the case. 
63. While a full assessment of the cost-benefit of ltJinnipeg downtown 
development is not available, other studies have been done that show 
how city governments rarely estimate real costs, and often inflate 
expected revenue. For example, see Robert Kessler, Chester Hartman, 
"The Illusion and Reality of Urban Renewal: Case Study of San Francisco's 
Yerba Buena Center1', Land Economies, November 1973, Vol. XLIX~ No. 4. 
T . 64 l"J.Zec 
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As mentioned previously, the Downtown Development Plan called for 
the stimulation of private construction in the downtown by a variety of 
methodso One of these was City financed parking stntctures. 
In 1971 there were informal discussions about a Bank of Nova 
Scotia development at the corner of Portage and Main and in 1972 when 
the new Council took office there were no formal binding development 
agreements covering this project. 
During the spring and summer of 1972. the City entered into formal 
discussions with Trizec Holdings Ltd.~ the largest landlord in Canada. 
The City and Trizec controlled most of the land on the west side of 
Main Street between Portage Avenue and Graham Avenue. It seemed, therefore, 
to the new Council to be an excellent opportunity to jointly develop this 
corner in accordance with the Do~rntown Development Plan. 
The proposal called for a $65 to $80 million development~ with 
the city building a 1,000 car parking structure and leasing the air rights 
to Trizec which would build a Bank of Nova Scotia building and two office 
towers. The city ~1ould lease the air rights for 99 years at 7% a year of 
50% of the total land acquisition costs. This was agreed to in principle 
by the City Council in June 1972. 
64. Because this study has set a limit of looking at the first two years 
of the system, some of these cases are superceded by recent events. 
In the ease of Trizee. Council made final decisions on the proposal in 
January of 1973 and development is now beginning on the city parking 
structure. 
The public announcement of the proposal was accompanied by very 
impressive and exciting information about the benefits this new project 
would provide. The newspaper reports of that month spoke glowingly of 
the excellent deal the city was getting in this instance. 
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It would cost the city $8 million to build the parking structure. 
Amortized over 20 years this would cost the city $935~000 a year. But, 
the revenue to the city would be $1,510,000 a year~ thereby giving the 
city a profit of $575,000 compared to its past tax revenue of $90,000 a 
year for that site. 
Rowever, as discussions progressed, it became more questionable 
as to how sound the arrangement really would be. Environment Committee, 
in their discussion of the arrangement, came up with four points which 
they felt were essential for Trizec to agree with: 
1. The agreement committed the city to building the parking garage but 
did not commit Trizec to build the forty storey office tower above it. 
2. The agreement did not have any time limit during which Trizec had 
to enter into a proper development agreement. Without this~ Trizee 
could have, in effect, a ninety-nine year option on the air rights. 
3. The company established to build and manage the complex should have 
some assets. The company Trizec planned to establish wuuld have no 
assets other than its lease on the air rights. 
4. The agreement did not prevent Trizec from assigning the lease to 
someo~e else. This would mean Trizec would have no obligation to 
build and neither would the new company holding the lease. 
In other words, Trizec was having to commit very little; the City a great 
deal -- a questionable situation for the City to be in. 
The entire que~tion by this time was becoming an item of public 
discussion, but City Council acted quickly to ensure that a decision was 
made. Trizec, Executive Policy Committee and Environment Committee met 
in a closed meeting and the agreement was approved with no changes in 
Trizec's position. City Council then, operating primarily through the 
committee system which is closed to the public and the press, with no 
real debate in full Council, quickly approved the agreement. 
This issue well demonstrates Council's capacity to quickly decide 
on issues and its willingness to make concessions for fear of losing 
development0 It also demonstrates a continuing pattern of unquestioning 
acceptance of development projects based on limited information. 
This would seem to indicate that the 50 man Council structure and 
the standing committees can indeed work efficiently; and when the ICEC 
wants to~ it can operate as a party. The key role in this process is 
played by the committees where the ICEC is dominant and where the chairman 
of each of the committees, each of whom is from a suburban seat, has 
particular influence. In fact~ after the first year of Council, there 
was a mini purge on the committees with the result that during 1972 the 
crucial Environment Committee had no NDP members and only two independents 
out of a total of eleven members. The reason it works well for development 
issues is primarily due to strong pro-development attitudes of many 
suburban ICEC councillors who have a majority on Council and in the 
committees and who occupy the crucial positions of Standing Committee 
Chairmen. It does not work on social issues because no one group is 
strong enough and concerned enough to make a concerted effort to sell their 
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ideas in these areas. l.Yhen decisions cannot be reached on these issues, 
the blame is put on the structtn:e. But if the structure can function 
efficiently on some issues then it has the potential to be able to do so 
on other issues. There was after all only a period of three weeks of 
decision-making process for the initial decision on the Trizee issue. 
Following the settlement of an agreement~ Councillors who had 
voted in favour of the issue began to say, as they had following the 
Convention Centre question~ that they had been misled and that they 
voted on the basis of very little of the available information. 
This would seem, however, simply an attempt to rationalize their 
real voting motivations. Trizee came up again briefly in October of 1973, 
over a year later. The question was regarding demolition of the Portage 
and Main site. The deadline for tenders had been the beginning of 
September, but Trizec waited until a few hours before a City Council 
meeting six weeks later to submit tenders to City Hall. In this case, the 
mayor acted as the salesman when he brought the issue up five minutes 
before the Council was due to adjourn. He claimed that if an immediate 
decision was made on the tender the City eould save $20,000. Some opposition 
to the quick decision began to become apparent so the mayor quickly 
suggested that the Executive Policy Committee be delegated authority to deal 
with the tenders on the following morning. The Executive Policy Committee, 
a very pro-development body, made the decision with the help of the mayor, 
who is the chairman of the Committee. 
A further indication of the present Council's ability to decide 
efficiently is the ready acceptance of a walkway connecting the Richardson 
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complex on one side of Portage and Main with Trizec and commercial ventures 
on the other side. A $60,000 feasibility study was commissioned. Its 
findings for an underground system were disregarded as being too expensive 
but a $2.4 million budget was set aside to build some form of connecting 
link. This was a further public subsidy to the benefit of commercial 
downtown groups, again approved with little discussion or debate. 65 
New D~~town Develppment Guidelines 
In October of 1972 the Environment Committee discussed and approved 
the Downtown Development Plan. The Plan was then forwarded to Executive 
Policy Committee, which referred it back to the Committees on Finance and 
Works and Operations. 
The question of the D~~town Development Plan did not come up 
again until March of 1973 when the City administration prepared a report 
on development which stated that the guidelines for future development in 
the plans presently covering the Winnipeg area were outdated and should 
be revised. This report not only referred to the Downtown Development Plan, 
but also to the Metropolitan Development Plan which will be discussed at 
a later point. 
The following month~ City Council held a special seminar to discuss 
the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study, the Metropolitan Development Plan 
and the Downtown Development Plan. At this seminar the administration 
urged the councillors to make up their minds on policy decisions concerning 
65. It should be noted that in most other cities such linkages are paid 
for by the private developer of such projects. However, the City 
Council, in the case of walkways, tunnels and pedestrian corriders, is 
taking the position that these amenities are local improvements in the 
~ame category as sidewalks and should be financed in the same way. 
This policy is supported by the Board of Commissioners but no firm 
Council policy has yet been agreed upon. 
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these issues. The Commissioners were hoping for the Council to either 
endorse these plans or make changes in them so that the administration could 
get on with the job of implementing policy. 
The councillors, however, saw this seminar as an informational and 
discussion meeting and not as a decision-making meeting. 
No decisions were reached at the seminar but following the seminar the 
Executive Policy Committee was to send video tapes of the explanations of 
these plans and printed material containing opinions expressed during the 
discussions to all community committees. However, these video tapes of 
the meetings were not available due to technical difficulties arising 
from lack of adequate planning in the set up and facilities available for 
the seminar. Recommendations which originated with the community committee 
and its local residents were then to be considered by the councillors in 
various committee meetings. 
There was very little followthrough to the community committee level 
and very few community committees had any meaningful discussions regarding 
the Downtown Development Plan or the Metropolitan Development Plan. This 
was due to several factors: the lack of cooperation and information from 
the City Council and the Administration66;the parochialism of many of the 
suburban community committees; and the overshadowing of these issues by 
the Railway Relocation and WATS issues. This latter issue 9 discussed at 
length elsewhere in this report, demonstrates the way in which a planning 
issue can go through City Council and go to the Community Committees for 
meaningful discussions with citizens before any Council decision is made. 
66. This issue is dealt with at length in the section on Community Committees. 
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However~ Executive Policy Committee was criticized by councillors 
and residents alike for sending the plans to the Community Committees 
for discussion before EPC had made any recommendations on the plans, In 
EPC decision would have given the Community Committees a point from which 
their discussion could begin. 
Three months after Executive Policy had given the Downtown and 
Metropolitan Development Plans to the Community Committee, City Council 
on the recommendations of the Executive Policy Committee approved a major 
development policy. This policy was primarily a set of guidelines concerning 
development in the Downtown and in the entire Winnipeg ~rea. During this 
three month period, very few Community Committees had an opportunity 
to discuss development and to refer their recommendations back to EPC or 
City Council. However, many did do so on the question of transportation 
which was also included in this development policy. 
As it affected the Downtown Development Plan, this policy endorsed: 
improvement of the environment in the central core of the city through the 
establishment of climate controlled walkways and malls; increased open 
space and the removal of unnecessary vehicle traffic; a continuing program 
of land acquisition for public use, including riverbanks. This policy for 
the downtown was simply a re-affirmation of the basic concepts contained in 
the Downtown Development Plan. 
Metro's Downtown Development Plan envisaged a series of interconnected 
weather-protected pedestrian walkways sixteen feet above ground level 
throughout the downtown area. This type of structure had been proposed 
from the Trizec complex heading west, where it would be a matter of only 
three blocks before it would connect to the Northstar Inn from which 
there is already an enclosed connection with the Eatons Store. 
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~~ile present development under the downtown plan is concentrated 
on the Convention Centre to the south and west of the Trizec development, 
a series of pedestrian walkways and a start on the proposed concourse 
would represent at least a moral victory of Metro planners and backers of 
the development plan. What these development guidelines do not include 
however is any real control over spot building or development in the 
downtown area. The whole idea of downtown development is to have an 
integrated pattern of office buildings, apartment blocks, open spaces~ 
transportation routes and walkways. Under the present City of Winnipeg Act~ 
however, if any one builder who owns property fulfills the zoning require-
ments, any kind of building can be erected. Thus on Smith Street there 
is now a jumble of high rise buildings with no open space. Obviously 
there must be a different set of powers available to the city if they are 
to exercise a controlled plan of downtown growth. This is something that 
still has not been squarely faced by Council. 
It has taken City Council one and one-half years to come up with 
basic policy guidelines for the development of the downtown, although much 
actual development had been approved and begun during th~t time. The 
period of transition was a difficult time for City Council to make long 
range policy decisions but not for them to make the ad hoc decisions which 
ultimately add up to a policy statement. There is no reason to conclude, 
however, that the length of time it took to make decisions or the manner 
in which decisions were made was a direct consequence of the new structure 
of government. Certainly~ the decision-making process on downtown development 
prior to 1971 was not noticeably more efficient~ more open, more rational 
in approach. But~ the first two years of operation of the new system 
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demonstrated that there still are many deficiencies in the way that planning 
and implementation of downtown development takes place. It still suffers 
from a fragmentation of responsibility, and a lack of clear overall direction. 
Part of this can be attributed to the committee system of Council. 
The three standing committees have become the source of policy initiatives 
and relate most directly to administrative staff. The Executive Policy 
Committee~ which was supposed to be the body where central policy making 
and planning was to occur, has not fulfilled this role, This is partially 
explained by the complete lack of staff serving the Executive Policy 
Committee or in the mayor's office. They are forced, therefore. to react 
to initiatives coming from the separate committees and do not set overall 
guidelines within which the separate committees should work. This problem 
becomes even more apparent in the following case dealing with the overall 
development plan. 
Metropolitan Development Plan 
Downtown development was only one aspect of the development question. 
There were major questions related to development on the suburban fringe 
of the city and out of this major differences emerged between Council and 
Commissioners and between the City and the Province. 
The City's Commissioner of Environment, David Henderson, two months 
after his appointment, presented Environment Committee with a document 
containing policies relating to housing, the Downtown Development Plan, 
Advisory Services to Community Committees, Planned Building Groups, Zoning 
Bylaws and District Plans. 
The major points contained in the document were: 
The city should not continue to be in the housing business. 
City inspections of rental residential properties. 
Minimum fines for housing code violations. 
Development agreements to assure adequate public open space, 
landscaping and recreation facilities. 
Uniform housing bylaws. 
No subsidies from the city for housing construction. 
The provision of advisory services to Community Committeese 
Some authority for approval of development plans should be delegated 
to Environment Committee. 
Following the development of district plans, Community Committees 
should undertake a review of zoning bylaws. 
1.55 
City Council accepted the report and adopted it as a set of policy 
guidelines. They did~ however~ make one small wording change which in 
effect changed an area of policy direction. An amendment was proposed to 
remove the word 'notv from the phrase "the City should not continue to 
be in the public housing business'1 • The amendment was passed by one vote 
and this in essence meant that the City would continue to remain in the 
public housing business. However, when interviewed two months earlier, 
only nine councillors had been in favour of the City remaining in the public 
housing business and again since that time Council has repeatedly expressed 
its wish to get out of the public housing business. In May of 1973 City 
Council voted to ~ell the majority of its interest in public housing to 
the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation. 
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One explanation for the voting in August of 1972 to remain in 
the public housing business has been that, faced with the large package 
of policy guidelines~ some councillors failed to notice the significance 
of the removal of one ~ord in the phrasing. 
The Commissioner of Environment has throughout the transition 
period been the major source of policy proposals for the City of iUnnipeg, 
and this has been a source of recurring differences between the Commi~~ioner 
and Council and it~ committees. 
This was most obvious on the question of whether or not the city 
should follow the development plan it had endorsed or whether it should~ 
in the traditional way, amend it to suit the needs of large developers. 
A case in point was the request by two development firms for 
re-zoning in order to construct two large shopping centres in the St. James-
Assiniboia area. This request not only would require amendments to the 
Metropolitan Development Plan, which saw the area as low density with a 
prepoti!derance of accommodations for families with school age children and 
requirements of open space for recreational facilities, but would also 
tend to promote development in the additional zone, an area beyond the 
Perimeter Road 9 in order to increase their markets -- a move -vthich Ci.ty 
Council had steadfastedly refused to do~ at least overtly. 
The Commissioner prepared a policy report on shopping centre 
development which recommended that the Development Plan be amended to 
include only one shopping centre and that east, not west, of the Red River. 
This would effectively stop any shopping centre construction in St. James-
Assiniboia. 
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There was an immediate outcry from the developers about this 
proposal of the Commissioner of Environment. They went so far as to say 
that all development would stop if developers continued to be harassed. 
They felt that the city should simply be concerned with the be@t use of 
land and that they should leave development decisions to the private sector. 
They claimed to have the people on their side, and to have consulted 
residents and shaped their plans accordingly. 
Three days: later the two developers got together and announced 
that only one shopping centre would be built, but that the other site 
should be re-zoned for other commercial or residential development. The 
one which they thought should go ahead was the Unicity Mall which would 
require the re-zoning of 33.6 acres. The re-zoning was approved by the 
civic Environment Committee the same day. 
The Unicity Mall's resident support was mostly ethereal it 
appeared later, when some 400 residents started an action in the Court of 
Queen's Bench to have the development stopped. The question is at present 
still before the Courts. 
Four months after the reazoning approval, the Committee on 
Environment produced a report which was accepted by City Council. The 
report recommended amending the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan to provide 
for a minimum of six major shopping centres in the city during the next 
twenty-five years. The amendment justified the Unicity Mall complex. 
Environment Committee recommended that the City Council approve the 
amendment to allow 11 the greatest possible flexibility and freedom from 
restriction for those who would choose to compete in the market place". 
Another source of conflict between the Commissioners and the 
private sector and, therefore~ with the Council as well, has been the 
whole question of development in the fringe areas of Winnipeg. Development 
in the additional zone which surrounds Winnipeg has been frozen and 
developers suggest that increasing land and housing costs will result, 
as this will limit the supply of land. This is somewhat the same 
argument as they used to sway Council from the shopping centre policy. 
However~ although some councillors are in favour of allowing development 
in the additional zone~ the Commissioner of Environment and the Environment 
Committee in the summer of 1973 endorsed the est~blishment of a buffer 
zone which would control urban expansion around the city. Lengthy 
hearings have been held on the issue and it new rests with the provincial 
government. This buffer zone would contain minimum lot sizes to control 
haphazard and spot development and would protect the additional zone from 
these same development problems. 
The very fact of the Commissioner of Environment taking some 
initiatives in the area of policy development has, according to councillors, 
caused some friction between councillors and the Commissioner, and this 
feeling has been reinforced by the friction between the Commissioner and 
representatives of the building industry. 
These differences between councillor~ Commissioner and industry 
are compounded by even more serious difficulties faced in the area of 
zoning and land use. 
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Zoning and Land Use 
Development to a great degree depends on the zoning and re-zoning 
process. Six days after Council took office~ it was predicted that 
i .I "'h ld k h 1 . d f . 6 7 re-zon ngs unuer ~ e new system wou ta e a mue onger per1o o t1me. 
Council at this time took no noticeable recognition of this problem and~ 
in fact~ it was over four months before they appointed a Commissioner of 
Environment~ whose department is responsible for processing zoning and 
development applications. This delay in getting the machinery started 
would prove very costly. 
Zoning has been the major problem in the development of the 
Winnipeg area during the transition period. The ne~v Community Committee 
structure has: given citizens much more opportunity to raise their voices 
against changes in zoning in their areas. Developers have criticized 
the entire process, saying that a zoning application is holding up their 
68 developments and costing everyone money. They do not like the system 
because of the large number of re-zoning applications that can be held up 
by citizen representatives at four or five stages of consideration. 
Hearings are held at the Community Committee level, Environment Committee, and 
Council, and if there are still objections, the Minister of Urban Affairs 
can refer the issue to the Municipal Board. In fact, it has been estimated 
that over ninety steps are required to gain approval on subdivisions. 
67. Winnipeg Free Press, January 6, 1972. 
68. Just recently a report prepared for the House Builders has documented 
the process that is required and the costs that this involves. 
See Winnipeg Tribune, February 21, 1974. 
These difficulties in zoning and the procedures for subdivision 
approval have been a major if not exclusive cause for the increasing 
shortage of land that began to plague 'IUnnip~g beginning in the spring of 
1973. Developers claimed that the shortage of land is due to the hold-up 
in processing development plans, and to the fact that they q:annot begin 
to subdivide land in the additional zone. On the other handt the City 
Environment Commission claims that some builders are deliberately withholding 
land from development that has already been approved. 
What is apparent is that there is a severe shortage of both 
industrial and residential land. A report from the city administration 
in November of 1973, claimed that within two years the City of Winnipeg 
would have little utilizable industrial park land left and that would mean 
the end of one of the major attractions for industry. This shortage was 
blamed on the slow decision and policy-making processes of the City 
69 Council. This would appear to have been accurate, at least in part 
the previous October the Commissioner of Environment had recommended that 
guidelines should be established in assigning priorities for servicing 
and developing land to the city's expanding requirements. The report also 
recommended that in order to keep land prices down 5 land throughout the 
city and not just in one area, should be earmarked for future development. 
City Council had also been told in January of 1973 that the city could only 
supply small lots to industry and that steps should be taken to alleviate 
this problem. 
69. ~innipeg Free Press, October 17~ 1972. 
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Another important question is the impact that the long process of 
zoning and the additional zone freeze has also had on rising land costs. 
Research10 has shown that during this period land costs rose about 15% to 
20%~ both within the Perimeter route of Winnipeg and in surrounding 
rural municipalities. These are figures in line with the figures in other 
cities. However, Winnipeg itself has a slow rate of population growth 
and should therefore not feel the same pressures as other urban areas. 
vlhile the purpose of the freeze on the additional zone, limiting development 
to specific zones~ and then only for large lots, is laudable, in the 
absence of other programs to ensure an adequate supply of land, it is 
11 quite possible that it is a factor in boosting land costs. 
It would be wrong, however, to place the onus entirely on government. 
It would appear that most developers were not interested in adapting to the 
new system by doing things such as aiding communities in developing district 
plans which would greatly simplify the process of zoning within a community~ 
or more seriously, not anticipating the need to adapt to new procedures. 
Developers could have become more involved in helping the ne~.y sys tern work 
than they have been~ and therefore must share responsibility for its 
malfunctioning. 
This points to an important aspect of transition: the difficulties 
encountered by private interests who are closely related to city government 
in making their own adjustments to a changed situation. The system for 
making decisions and implementing public policy is not confined to politicians 
70. Terry Zdan~ "Land Prices in the Periphery of l\linnipeg", unpublished 
research paper, Institute of Urban Studies, January 1974. 
71. Ibid. 
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or civil servants. It is a. system that involves both public and private 
sectors. This fact was given little countenance when the new system was 
introduced. There was no effort to consult with different private groups 
to work out means of overcoming the problems encountered due to a change 
in systems. In a crucial area such as land development and housing, one 
might have expected close co-operation between provincial, municipal 
authorities and private organizations. This did not happen~ nor has it 
yet happened. The result -- a major problem and continuing confusion. 
Winnipeg is not alone in facing the ever increasing inflation in 
land costs~ nor has its performance in dealing with this issue been 
noticeably worse. But, this is no excuse, because unless some definite 
action is taken the inflation will accelerate. Action, however, will 
require more than introducing a simple panacea. The House Builders claim 
that if city procedures are changed, the problem will be over. The city 
and provincial leaders, like Mr. Schreyer, suggest that it is the fault 
of the developers withholding land. 
The fact is that the issue of land development needs attacks on 
a broad range of fronts, by all levels of government. Inflation in land, 
and poor development in land is a consequence of tax policies that encourage 
land speculation; zoning and subdivision approval procedures that are 
outmoded; a shortage of municipal capital for servicing; development 
guidelines and transportation policies that encourage low density and 
scattered development; a non-existent urban growth policy in the province; 
and previous omission by public authorities in banking land. It all adds 
up to the fact that neither the city nor the province has even paid much 
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attention to the need for a policy on urban land, but have acted only in 
an ad hoc way" relying on the market to order priorities on the use of 
urban space. 
This omission cannot be blamed on any structural defect or 
institutional weakness, but to a lack of urban policies on both levels of 
government. It shows that almost too much attention is being paid to 
issues of institutional reform and not nearly enough to real hard ease 
substantive policy decisions. 
In one area t.fltere there was a major policy initiative taken by 
Public Housing 
In 1970, the Manitoba government launched a major program of 
public housing to meet the need for low cost accommodation. They set 
forward a target of 3,600 units in 1971, 4,000 in 1972~ and 4~400 in 1973, 
with an overall target in five years of 21,800 units. 72 
An unstated, but obvious part of this program, was the need to 
build many of these units in the middle income residential suburbs of the 
city 5 as there was not sufficient land available in the inner city, nor 
was it desirable from a social point of view. 
Thus, at the very time of the creation of the new city system!\> there 
was to be a major push on public housing in the city of Winnipeg. This 
72. Actual production has fallen short of these targets. The number of 
units built are as follows: 1971-72 - 3~600 units; 1972-73 - 3~600 units; 
1973-74 - less than 500 units. The total built over four years -
7 ~ 500 units. 
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was to engender strong negative reactions from suburban residents~ typical 
of the reactions that have taken plac.e in almost every urban area t.rhere 
73 public housing has been located in the suburbs. 
t~at was strange about provincial action at this time was that 
under the new City of Winnipeg Act, the province had surrendered its 
rights to do as it wished on provincial mmed land and subsumed all its 
actions to the regulatory control of the City of Winnipeg. Thus, it gave 
up a major advantage it '!V'ould normally have had just on the verge of a 
very tough battle to introduce public housing in the suburban areas. A 
major conflict between the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba 
thus arose over public housing as the Province became frustrated at the 
reluctance of the City to speedily process its proposals for public 
housing projects. In effect, the Province was forced, much to the chagrin 
of its officials~ to live by the rules they had set. 
The disagreement between the City and the Province also has a 
political overtone. There has always been antagonism between the suburban 
Liberals and Conservatives who control Council and the NDP Provincial 
Government. This City-Province split becomes very evident in the area 
of province-initiated low cost housing developments. 
The problem has its roots in developments which occurred prior to 
Unicity. The large public housing complexes built in the early sixties 
by the city~ the province and the federal government were very bad 
examples of public housing. They involved large scale relocation of 
residents, the creation of a defined low income enclave and isolation of 
low income tenants. 
73. Anthony Downs~ Opening Up the Suburbs, New Haven, Yale University 
Press. 19 73. 
Then came the federal government's freeze on urban renewal~ the 
concern for the development of new concepts in public housing and the 
formation of the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation. Throughout 
the 1960's~ private apartment dwelling development was slow and steady, 
and public housing development was virtually nonexistent. Beginning in 
1969~ however, private apartment construction suddenly increased more 
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than threefold and MRRC also began to develop public housing. Both the 
private sector and the public sector made mistake~ at this time. The 
private sector overbuilt and had in some eases vacancy rates of up to 43%. 
Some of the blame for these high vacancy rates was attached to competition 
from MHRC low income housing and to the location of MHRC sites which 
made areas less desirable for high income residents. Accordingly, 
developers began putting pressure on the city to have them slow down the 
public housing development. 
The provincial government, for its part, made many mistakes in 
the beginning. It had seen a great need for public housing and it reacted 
quickly, perhaps too quickly. Many of MHRCws projects were poorly planned, 
being too large and poorly located. The location question especially was 
a crucial one. Because of cheaper land costs, many of these projects were 
located in the suburbs, and had been placed there with little or no 
consultation with area residents or with municipal governments, or with 
developers who were building or planning developments adjacent. 
This poor planning led to the city being besieged by requests for 
both new and improved bus routes, for more recreation space~ more schools~ 
etc. There was concern over increasing tax rates 9 and, underlying it all, 
a general apprehension and at time strong bias against locating low income 
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people in these areas. Very little was done to appease these fears. As a 
result, the suburban residents~ who had never been strong supporters of 
the provincial gove.mment, reacted strongly. 
They began accusing the NDP government of playing political 
games -~ of trying to upset the affluent suburban communities by locating 
low income residents in high income areas. The NDP government reacted 
by saying that suburban residents were just supporting private enterprise 
against the NDP government and had strong prejudices against people who 
were not of similar socio-economic status. 
The political differences be~Yeen City Council and the provincial 
government grew throughout 1972 and 1973 and each side began to become 
more and more dogmatic. The City Council began to wave the flag of private 
enterprise and Ken Galanchwc, ICEC councillor~ summed up their feeling~ 
"If a private developer puts in 30 units~ the city isn't presented with 
the same problems as if MHRC was putting in 30 unitso The :residents of 
that private development are going to have money for memberships in the 
community club. They are going to have their own cars. They're a 
different caliber of person than occupies MHRC accommodation. These people 
need assistance. Maybe they don 1 t have cars and they can't contribute 
the same towards the cost of their services. They have to be subsidized". 
Reaction in the suburbs became very intense and some ugly 
prejudice began to show. St. James-Assiniboia went so far as to propose 
caveats for development agreements to ensure that the developer will not 
be providing homes for low income people. These caveats call for high 
rents in all apartment complexes and high purchase prices for all single 
family and row dwellings. 
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Engineered Homes Ltd., a large building firm~ who were to build 
a public housing project in St. James-Assiniboia~ abandoned the project 
even after Council approval for construction had been given. The company 
was afraid of the bad publicity affecting their ability to develop higher 
income developments in the suburbs. Each side felt persecuted by the other 
side and when MHRC began applying to the city for building permits and 
zoning variations to build more housing complexes, City Council began to 
stall their programs, requesting further details. ~IRC aggravated the 
situation by trying to ignore the Act tvhich it had created and by 
beginning construction of office and government buildings without city 
building permits. 
The situation reached a head over the question of a washroom in 
Memorial Park. The provincial government wished to build the 't.Yashroom 
and required the usual building permit. ~lhile there was no apparent legal 
or technical reason to oppose the permit, the permit was held up for 
months. Because there seemed to be no valid reason for the city to withhold 
the permit, the province went ahead with the construction w::f~thout a permit. 
Councillors became very irate and attempted to use public opinion and the 
anti-socialist feeling widened the gap further between the city and the 
province. Most councillors recognized the entire issue as a trivial and 
silly move and thought that some of their colleagues were simply making 
it a political issue to discredit the provincial government. 
Mayor Juba~ with his usual flamboyance, entered the fray. He rose 
to speak on the question in the Provincial Legislature and had to be 
ejected. Outside the Legislature he had a portable washroom erected and 
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he tacked on a sign proclaiming the washroom as the proper office of the 
Provincial Minister of Public Works. 
The issue~ and in particular, the object of the construction, 
made the whole question and the Council almost a laughing matter. Finally, 
when the reaction of the public began to penetrate to the Council Chambers, 
councillors began to change their minds and eventually issued the permit. 
The solving of this problem paved the way for some relaxation of 
dogmatic positions on the public housing question. As well~ the province 
appointed as Chairman of the -r.m.RC Board the Deputy Hinister of Urban 
Affairs~ lii'ho was a former commissioner of Parks in the old Metro system, 
and he was able to strike a more cordial and ~onciliatory rel~tionship 
with city officials than those adopted by other MHRC spokesmen who had 
been very strident in their dealings with the city. 
The province agreed to consult communities before projects were 
planned in those communities and to abide by their own rules. The city, 
for its part~ agreed to send to the province a copy of all proposed 
development proposals to determine whether there would be a possibility of 
including some public housing units. However, the detente is still a 
very shaky one and if the public wish is to prevail, a solution~ if one is 
possible, will have to await the next Council election. The last 
provincial election returned the NDP government and only time will determine 
if the ICEC can survive another municipal election. 
The larger issue of what kind of low income housing program to 
have in the city has never been seriously dealt with by Council. They 
have passed, l-1ith inadvertance, a resolution stating that the city will 
stay in the public housing busine~s ~ although they passed another resolution 
stating that they will attempt to sell the public housing they now own~ 
and there have been some general references to the possibility of using 
re-claimed land in the Midland railway for low income housing. But~ 
city government has as yet not established concrete objectives or programs 
relating to need, location and city involvement in low income housing. 
The province for its part has also seemed to lose heart. In 1973t it 
built less than 500 public housing units throughout the whole province. 
In part, they blame city recalcitrance for this, but this is only a 
partial explanation. MHRC has sites in the city it has not built upon, 
even though they are approved. More germane is the political fear of 
voter reaction. In the 1972 Federal election,. a federal NDP member came 
within a few votes of losing the riding of Selkirk, where there had been 
strong anti-public housing feeling, and Premier Schreyer in 1973 won his 
riding by a little over 500 votes in the same area. Unfortunately~ no new 
programs have emerged to replace public housing~ even though a strong demand 
is there. 
From the standpoint of examining the impact of the new city 
government structure on this issue, any assessments must be only tentative. 
One assessment is that a unified city government, dominated by politicians 
representing suburban, property owning interests can exercise strong 
leverage againl'lt the senior government. The provincial government is no 
longer dealing with fourteen municipalities which could be played off against 
each other. There is now only one and it is run by people who are not 
favourable to the provincial government. 
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At the same time$ the new structure did not bring into existence 
any alignment of political forces that would be committed to developing 
an aggressive city attack upon low income housing. Suburban politicians 
will not look kindly upon efforts to build low cost housing in their areas. 
The initiative will more than likely have to come from the provincial 
government. The stage is thus set for a long and continuing conflict 
between the two levels of government. Unless of course the issue of low 
income is just dropped~ proceeded with on a very limited scale~ or a 
different political group emerges on City Council, which is more 
sympathetic to the low ineome housing need. 
While the situation in relation to major progress in the field of 
housing looks dim, there is some hope in the area of transportation where 
some re-thinking of conventional practices seems to be taking place. 
How this came about will be examined in the following case study. 
Transportation Case St~ 
74 This case study describes a process of citizen advocacy planning 
which saw an independent citizen organization making use of the new 
framework of city government. 
Although the group, its formation and activities, were all separate 
from the Resident Advisory Group and Community Committee structure, this 
case study is illustrative of the way in which groups can use these aspects 
of the structure to participate in the planning and decision-making processes 
of the city. 
74. This case study is a revised version of Chapter 4 in the study, 
Transportation Advocacy Planning, written by Terry J. Partridge for 
IUS in 1973. Thanks go to the author for this revised version. 
1 
This group was known as c.o.s.T. (Coalition on Sensible Transport) 
and it was formed in reaction to the Railway Relocation Plan being 
considered by Winnipeg City Council in 1972. 
The subjects of the debate were the freel<Jay proposals contained in 
W.A.T.S. (Winnipeg Area Transportation Study) and a plan to relocate the 
major Trans Canada railways that currently pass through the city centre to 
new routes passing through suburban locations. 
The v1.A.T.S. plan was first publblhed in 1968, and perhaps due to 
its long range nature, received comparatively little public attention. 
The railway study was published in mid 1972. This time, the proposals to 
move lines into the suburban locations, and to re-use vacated routes for 
freeways appeared to pose an immediate threat. Protest immediately sprung 
up in the suburbs, and uncertainty began to emerge in the central areas. 
By the end of 1972 the railway study had moved to the forefront of public 
discussion, much of it occurring in the community committees and resident 
advisory groups. A number of community organizations in the central area 
were being asked questions by concerned local residents, but they had little 
information to go on. 
Responding to the need for more information~ Neighbourhood Service 
Centres (N.S.C.) called a meeting of about a dozen social agencies and 
interested community groups for December 20, 1972. Each group reported its 
concerns and knowledge of the railway and road plans. Various individuals 
undertook to circulate information they had available before a further 
meeting called for January 17, 1973. The Institute of Urban Studies (I.U.S.) 
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was to be publishing a special newspaper on Transport: Planning in lJinnipeg 
on January 12, and this would be distributed. 75 
On January 9 ~ members of IUS and the University of Manitoba School 
of Social Work appeared on a television panel show to discuss transport 
problems and to introduce the IUS publication. This began a media campaign 
to promote public awareness of the issues. On January 12, the newspaper 
itself was released, beginning a direct mail phase of the campaign. 
After the initial mailing to resident advisors, community groups, and 
municipal~ provincial and federal politicians and administrators~ the 
response from others quickly depleted all available copies. 
By the time of the second N.S.C. meeting, the material had been 
digested by the participating groups, and discussion quickly got down to 
the issues. Did those attending really feel there was a problem and, if 
so~ what role could or should they play? Although reactions were very 
ad hoc~ there was a growing concensus that the link between W.A.T.S. and 
Railway Relocation was the key issue. At these initial meetings there 
were no suburban representatives present, and views on removing the 
central yards and tracks were quite neutral 11 although it was felt that 
local people should have a say in planning the re-use of any lands released. 
The chief concern was that released land would be used for freeways, 
creating a greater degree of blight than existed at present. The first 
goal was to point out this danger and, if possible~ to remove the W.A.T.S. 
threat. 
75. Institute of Urban Studies~ Urban Issues~ Special Edition on Transport 
Planning, University of Winnipeg, January 1973. 
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The discussion then turr~ed to the question of a.ction. ~pres:entathres 
from the Community Welfare Planning Council (C.W.P.C.) suggested holding 
some form of t-rell advertised public panel discussion or forum, with the 
aim of attracting media coverage and stimulating public debate. A 
subcommittee of the main group was formed to pursue this idea, with C.W.P.C. 
undertaking to act as co-ordinator. A meeting was then called for the 
following week to discuss content and approach. It was also decided t.o 
invite representation from Resident Advisory Groups (RAG) and suburban 
communities to participate in the planning!> as the issues were area wide and 
a broadly based approach would be more effective, 
In the week before the first forum meeting, t,,ro events transpired 
that helped to crystallize the action pla.n. First of all~ a series of 
articles on rail relocation by Val Werier in the Winnipeg Tribune explained 
the proposals, the advantages argued by the planners, and the problems 
outlined by the critics. He intervie"red the planners about the charge that 
freet.;ay routes t,;ere the basis for the rail relocation proposals and reported 
their denials that this was the case. 
Second, the city held a public meeting on rail relocation at 
R. B. Russell School on January 22, sponsored by four central area Community 
Committees. Advertised at public expense, the meeting dret.v a capacity 
crowd of 175 people. In this community 9 where rails were to be removed, 
the Rail't'iay Study Committee expected quite a different response from that 
in the suburbs. As it was, the meeting was quite subdued, debate was stifled, 
and little was said to ease the frustration of many present. 
The chairman of the meeting kept to an information format. The 
initial presentation by the Rail Study Committee took two hours, with the 
1 
four alternative plans being presented in tedious confusion. Neighbourhood 
benefits were described at length, but roads were never mentioned. The 
response to questions from critics was to dismiss freeways as only one 
remote possibility in a wide range of options for re-use~ and one which 
would not take much land in any case. The Rail Committee urged that a 
decision on railways ~hould be made first, and then consideration of road 
needs could follow. The presentation using slides was, however, very 
professional and served as a powerful propaganda technique. 
on January 
24 to discuss forums~ some opinions and ideas had begun to take shape. 
First~ the city 1 s meetings t-1ere too well controlled and the public had too 
little initial information on which to base their questions. The Rail 
Study Committee presentations were stressing the positive aspects and selling 
the package they felt was worthwhile. They would be contacting residents 
throughout the city in a series of meetings. The alternative, a couple of 
large forum meetings, would have a one-shot effect rather than. a continuous 
impact. The group felt it would be better to plug into the city meetings, 
if possible~ and generate debate by posing '!11ell prepared questions. 
If this could be done, it had several advantages. It would give 
the group greater exposure; it l'170uld present the public t11ith t~.ro points of 
view at the same time, with an opportunity to cross-examine either party; 
and it would be easier to get people out to one rather than two meetings. 
Besides, it would be organizationally and financially preferable to take 
advantage of the city's advertising and hall arrangements. 
It was also obvious that~ if this were to be done, the groupijs 
contributions would ha,ve to be kept short to allow time for questions and 
for full of citizen views. It vmuld be necessary to concentrate 
on basic issues and to ru•ve clear,. sophisticated and well substantiated 
arguments to counter the carefully prepared slide show of the Railway 
Committee. 
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It wasw therefore~ decided that the group 'i-muld prepare their o"Ym 
slide show. After several modifications~ agreement was reached on an 
outline prepared by IUS which illustrated the connection between released 
railway mainlines and the proposed radial freeways of the W.A.T.S. plan. 
Finally, the subcommittee turned to an immediate problem. The 
Executive Policy Committee would be presenting a resolution to City Council 
that same evening asking for approval to appoint consultants to conduct 
a series of public rail meetings at all thirteen Community Committees. The 
expressed purpose was to give the subject a full airing, after whiCh a 
decision would be made to adopt the most acceptable program or modified 
program and then proceed to design and implementation of phases of the 
study. The group was concerned~ based on the R.B. Russell School experience, 
that this would not result in a full discussion of community views and 
that, with consultants in control~ they would be frozen out. 
That afternoon~ several members of the group phoned their councillors 
and expressed these concerns. As it happened~ some councillors liTho had 
attended the earlier meeting were of the same view, and that night Council 
adopted instead a resolution calling for the Community Committees to 
arrange their own meetings, and for the city administration to make staff 
resources available on request. A deadline of May 1 was set for the 
meetings to be completed. The door t.;ras open, but time 'Ylas running short. 
The following week~ a meeting of the main group was called at N.S.C. 
for progress reports. General agreement was reached on the forum strategy. 
Other members would provide feedback of residents 1 responses and notify 
the forum planners of questions that people '!4anted investigated. 
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February was a hectic month of preparation on two fronts, with 
IUS and Pollution Probe developing the content of the slide presentation 
and the Community ltlelfare Planning Council (C.W .P .C.) refining and 
directing the organizational strategy. 
Events were changing quickly, and with new information becoming 
available almost daily, attempts were made to incorporate this into the 
group 1 s presentation. Val lo7erier of the Hinnipeg Tribune, continuing his 
series of articles on the railway issuej reported that the C.N.R. could 
vacate the massive East Yard area at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine 
Rivers without moving the mainlines. In earlier Rail Committee presentations, 
it was argued that the release of this area would result from rail 
relocation and this was presented as a major benefit of the program. The 
critics could now argue that this benefit could be achieved ~ithout moving 
the mainliiRes. 
On February 15, a meeting of the forum subcommittee was held, with 
several members of the parent group in attendance~ as well as RAG members 
from a few Community Committees~ and representatives of ACT, an embryo 
central association of the RAG groups. The aim agreed upon was to be 
included on the program at each of the Community Committee rail meetings. 
The desired format would inelude presentations by the city and the forum 
group, considerable time for questions and expression of views by local 
residents~ and an independent chairman such as the chairman of the Community 
Committee. It was suggested that this could be achieved through official 
channels, beginning with the RAGs~ which had been incorporated into the 
new Unicity structure~ largely with the idea of creating a vehicle for 
local participation. 
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The idea was to approach the RAGs~ explain the aims of the forum 
group, and ask them to adopt a resolution calling for the Community Committee 
to hold public rail meetings of the form suggested prior to the May 1 
deadline set by Council. They would also be asked to assist in publicizing 
the meetings to get the widest possible participation. Ultimately~ success 
would depend on whether the Community Committee councillors accepted the 
RAG resolutions. 
This general approach was agreed upon, with some flexibility~ 
depending on the situations in different Community Committees. In some 
cases the newly formed RAGs were heavily involved with detailed work 
passed down to them by the councillors, and would not feel like taking the 
responsibility for such an initiative themselves. Other groups hardly 
existed, and in some cases the RAGs would simply not be interested. For 
these reasons~ and partly because of the tight time schedule, it was agreed 
that the forum subcommittee would~ where necessary~ approach the Community 
Committee chairman either directly or through the RAG chairman, or would 
appear as delegations at Community Committee meetings. In the end, all of 
the approaches were tried in different areas. 
Some members of the parent group who had not been involved in the 
forum subcommittee were concerned that the whole action program was being 
put together far too quickly, allowing too little time for a wider degree 
of public participation in its planning. With a May 1 deadline 9 there 
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seemed little alternative and it was decided to proceed nonetheless~ with 
the hope that the groups 1 contribution would at least give local people 
a point of reference from which to begin. 
In order to establish initial contact~ ACT sent a letter to the 
chairmen of all RAG groups, introducing the advocates and describing their 
aims. The task of contacting RAGs and Community Committees was then 
divided among several members of the group, and over the next couple of 
weeks a number of contacts were made and the process set in motion. During 
this period no firm dates or agreements on approach were reached, although 
there was evidence of interest and a fe'<t tentative meetings were scheduled. 
On February 27, a final meeting of the forum group was called to 
wind up the month of preparation before launching into the public campaign. 
The slide show had been completed and was presented to the group for the 
first time by members of IUS and Pollution Probe. It received enthusiastic 
support~ some suggestions for changes, and general agreement that it should 
remain as objective as possible, concentrating on the main issues decided 
on earlier. 
Finally~ members who had been contacting the Community Committees 
reported various experiences and degrees of success. It had become 
obvious that some name would be necessary to identify the group, and this 
had been specifically requested by some Community Committees for the purpose 
of advertising meetings. After some discussion, the name Coalition On 
Sensible Transport was decided on as a reflection of the group's composition 
and the subject. The monogram, COSTs aptly illustrated a major and 
important concern. A letterhead was designed on the spot and arrangements 
were made to have stationery printed. The group was now formally in business. 
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During the February preparations~ things had been fairly quiet 
elsewhere~ except for one railway meeting in East St. Paul~ where one 
hundred residents turned out to protest relocation through their area. A 
few suburban candidates~ getting an early start for the anticipated provincial 
elections~ had also begun to voice opposition. 
On March 1, the COST presentation received its first public airing 
at a Manitoba Environment Council seminar. The sparsely attended meeting 
nonetheless received widespread coverage in the major newspapers and on 
radio the follm~ing day. Later that week~ the COST presentation was shown 
at a panel discussion of the Central Area Council and by the Winnipeg 
Citizens Transit Committee at a public meeting in St. James. On March 26, 
the Railway Study Committee had their say before the Manitoba Environment 
Council, and a different approach to that at R. B. Russell was taken. 
This time the consultants stated quite openly that the railway study had 
assumed that the freeway plan would be implemented. Although the presentation 
was limited to the Railway Committee, a representative of COST was all~1ed 
a few minutes to make a statement from the floor. Although the COST 
objective to share a platform with the Railway Committee had still not been 
achieved, the meeting did stir considerable discussion, and again the COST 
issues received newspaper coverage. 
While these meetings were taking place~ work continued on the main 
strategy, bolstered somewhat by a letter to the RAG chairmen from the 
Commuaity Planning Association of Canada, endorsing the COST presentation. 
In East Kildona.n an appearance of a COST delegate to a regular Community 
Committee meeting~ explaining the case, was sufficient to elicit an 
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invitation to appear on the railway panel, and a date was set for the 
public meeting. In Fort Rouge and Lord Selkirk communities~ presentations 
of the full slide show were made to the RAGs prior to their deciding 
whether to recommend having COST appear at their public rail meetings. 
In the case of Fort Rouge, the RAG proposal was accepted by the Community 
Committee and two public meetings were eventually held, although the 
format tvas not as planned. Only t\i-10 of all the community meetings follmV'ed 
through exactly as intended, although the process helped develop a 
growing body of public contact and participation. 
Attendance at meetings was limited, but media coverage had 
expanded the audience well beyond the local, interested parties who 
attended. The Manitoba Environment Council meetings had been well covered 
in the city papers and radio, and community newspapers had carried lengthy 
reports on the RAG-COST meeting in Fort Rouge. Ecospeak and Prairie Dog 
76 Press had also published newspapers on transportation and city planning 
issues, broadening the scope still further. 
The main point of the COST presentation linking the freeway and 
railway plans wa~ being well made, and was picked up by some councillors 
who had seen the presentation. The railway consultants were freely 
acknowledging the connection. But from the line of questionning that was 
emerging, it was becoming apparent that COST would have to go the next 
step and question whether the freeways were necessary in the first place. 
Council had just approved $450.000 for unspecified road design studies and, 
based on past performance, these funds seemed slated for freeway plans. 
76. Ecospeak~ Vol. 4, Issue 1, Hinnipeg Pollution Prove Inc.~ March 1973; 
Prairie Dog Pr~ss, Winnipeg 3 February 2, 1973. 
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The first of the series of zed ra:U 
held in the Fort Rouge area at Churchill School on April 24. Somehow 
>dres l'lere crossed and the city representatives failed to show. COST 
made a presentation and tried to fill in some of the gaps they had expected 
the city to do. 
councillors. 
About forty people attended, includi:ng some local 
The second mee.ting was held at Grant Park High School for residents 
in the West End of Fort Rouge and in the As$iniboine Community Committee 
area. There was a fa:Lr turnout of about eighty people. This time 
pres en tat ions ;:.ren~ made by the city and by COST. The city repr~sefitative ~ 
apparently unaware of the scheduled format~ was not prepared to debate. 
It was agreed instead that he uould make his presenta.tion and ans'!!1er 
questions first before leaving the platform to COST. l~ile the planned 
debate did not materialize, it was nonetheless the first time that the two 
presentations and points of view were heard at one meeting. 
The next two meetings went more or less according to format. In 
Fort Garry on Hay 7 ~ the raih1ay committee was represented by the consultants 
Damas Smith. Presentations by Smith and COST sparked a U:vely d!!!lbate 
informative debate. The ~.;ell attended meeting proved very satisfactory to 
many present including members of the People First group who had launched 
the first suburban revolt. On May 15 a meeting in the Midland Community 
heard presentations from COST and city representatives~ and again a 
lively debate ensued. 
During the April-May period there had been considerable difficulty 
getting some of the meetings organized. Several were cancelled or postponed, 
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and COST was forced to keep revising plans throughout. There were rumblings 
that city technical staff 111ere not pleased at the prospect of entering a 
political debate, or of defending plans that were officially a product 
of the five party consortium, even though they had played a major role 
in preparing them. 
Early in June, COST discovered that a fresh round of meetings 
were to be organized 9 this time going back to the original idea of 
contracting the job out to the consultants. All of the Community Committees 
were to be included in five regional groups. The meetings were to begin 
the following week and be completed ten days later. 
A COST meeting was promptly called on June 8. As the COST present-
ation was no longer included on the public meeting agendas, it was decided 
to distribute a handout at the door outlining the COST position instead. 
As the public meetings had been arranged with indecent haste, and 
little apparent publicity, it was decided to boost attendance with a COST 
press release sent to all media. The release stated who was holding the 
meetings~ the place and the time. It announced the reasons why COST 
wanted a good turnout and included a copy of the handout entitled, "Concerns 
of COST". This last sheet covered most of the main points made in earlier 
presentations~ plus the new information that the historic site at the 
junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers might not be released for 
parkland after all~ as the CNR and Great West Life Company were negotiating 
about a new office building there. 
The first public meeting of the new round took place two days 
later for the Centennial and Midland Communities. Members of COST arrived 
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to distribute the handbill. Following the official presentation~ a motion 
was put from the floor asking to see the COST presentation. The motion 
was passed almost unanimously by the people present and the show lvent on. 
A good debate followed similar to the Fort Garry meeting. The next day, 
the meeting and the COST viewpoint received good coverage on radio, 
television and both city papers, prompted largely by the COST press release. 
The remaining four meetings were attended by COST solely in a 
watching capacity without further presentations. ~·concerns of COST" was 
circulated at each, and the points raised were often picked up by the 
people. In addition, the COST points ~-tere covered by the community 
newspapers with the Fort Lance reprinting the sheet almost verbatim. An 
editorial in the Leisure section of the Free Press also gave COST and its 
concerns good play. The final meeting of the series signalled also the 
end of COST activities for the summer. 
On July 18, 1913, the new Unicity council produced its first 
71 general policy statement on the major city plans. This was a culmination 
of the process officially set in motion by the councillors' seminar back 
in April. Many of the resolutions were vague, and the voting roll rt1ent 
unrecorded. Nonetheless, in an important statement of principle, Council 
decided to reject freetil'ays in favour of an expanded arterial street system, 
with increased emphasis on public transport. This reversed the position 
taken by the former Metro Council~ and in so doing, realized one of the 
principle aims of COST. 
17. City of Winnipeg, Minutes, Council Chamber, Winnipeg, July 18, 1973. 
At a further meeting on August 1~ Council refused to endors~ 
rail :relocation in principle, but after consideration of the consultants 1 
report on the community meetings, asked for a further study of a "Do Nothing" 
78 
option. This option would essentially leave it to the railways as to 
whether they wished to move their yards or not for commercial reasons. 
The consultants' report that had accurately summarized the prevalence of 
suburban protesters at meetings, had ignored the COST compromise, calling 
for study of positive action on yard removal 9 leaving the mainlines where 
they are. They were opting instead for an all or nothing approach which 
threatened to put centre against suburb, now that the common interest 
brought on by the freelilays was no longer at hand. It was left to await 
results of the further study. 
This case study is interesting not primarily because of the matter 
that it dealt with, nor because of the success that is certainly important; 
it is interesting because it demonstrated a form of citizen organization 
which was innovative 9 and because it demonstrated a process which was 
innovative. 
The organization itself was innovative for f~~r major reasons: 
1. The recruitment and use of professionals~ Professionals have been a 
part of citizen groups in many other places and at other times, but 
they have not usually been employed to lend much more than status and/or 
prestige to a group. In this case, however~ they were used to prepare 
a sound and well documented case regarding the proposals and their 
implications. 
78. Ibid. 
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2. Th~ area-wide base of the organization. Even though the actual 
proposals affected only a fet..- areas of the city~ attempts: were made to 
interest all areas in this question. This was on the whole a success~ 
as most areas were aware of~ if not actually involved in, the process. 
3. The level of the debate. It has been the general case that groups 
opposed to governmental proposals have tended to argue on an emotional 
level dealing with things as neighbourhood character~ preservation of 
the environment, etc. In this case~ the level of debate was much 
higher. While it most certainly contained emotional arguments, it also 
contained a very well researched and well documented appraisal of the 
faults in the original proposal study. The research and documentations 
done by preofessionals was one of the greatest factors contributing 
to the success of the group. 
4. The secunding and volunteering of numerous technical resource and 
citizen groups. The groups that were involved with the COST group were 
numerous and varied, and provided the group with the technical, 
organizational~ informational and clerical tasks so necessary for 
success in an operation of this type. 
The process was innovative in that it took place in a system which 
is innovative. It demonstrates the value of such a system and also of such 
an approach within this type of system. 
Had this debate occurred three years ago, it is doubtful whether 
the group would have been able to appear on the same panel as the people 
presenting the city's proposals. Indeed it is even doubtful that the city 
would have held informational and discussion type public meetings at all. 
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The group made good use of the new structure. They contacted 
Resident Advisory Groups~ worked through them to the Community Committees~ 
and finally to the Environment Committee of Council. Presentations were 
made to RAG groups and to Community Committees. Again, it is doubtful 
that under the old system such presentations would have been allowed. 
These presentations allowed them to obtain the support of residents, RAG 
groups and Community Committees, and individual councillors. 
They also had a legal forum where alongside the presentation of 
the facts by the city,. they could give their presentation and their 
interpretation of the facts and the proposals. This legal forum is very 
important in terms of future citizen participation in the process of 
decision-making. 
The old pattern of the city giving its proposals~ of citizens 
objecting with little or no information and of the city being able to 
confuse people with their technical experts appears at an end. Now 
citizens have begun to secund their own technical experts and to prepare 
their own proposals and solutions and n~1 they have a forum wherein they 
can challenge and possibly defeat the formerly secure city representatives. 
The old adage, "You can't fight City Hall" is beginning to become forgotten. 
The question is hmq will city officials and politicians adapt to this trend. 
They have in existence an institutional form that could lead to a generally 
co-operative arrangement between citizens and officials on planning 
matters, if it is properly used. Or~ a basic conflict situation can 
emerge as has occurred in other cities. At this stage, there has been 
some signs of willingness by officials of the planning department to use 
the RAG system, and there are some councillors "tvho have joined in the 
spirit of the Community Committees. There is needed, however~ a major 
analysis by Council of ho't.Y they rdsh to deal t-7ith the n~.v facts of 
"urban populism" and how they can develop the RAG-Community Committee 
system. This was recommended in the previous section and is reinforced 
by the material presented here. 
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In assessing the establishment of the new local government system 
in Winnipeg, and the transition period of that new system, several important 
observations can be made. 
Limits of Structural Reform 
First, the design of the system placed too much faith in the 
efficacy of structural reform. Built into the approach of the provincial 
government '"as the implicit assumption that a re-organization of structural 
arrangements of government would bring about certain desired changes in 
the performance of local government. The system was not designed with 
the political and social realities of Winnipeg in mind, but tV'as predicated 
on the basis that those things wrong with the system were of an institutional 
not a political nature and could be corrected through structural engineering. 
Unfortunately, the system of government, designed as it was in a short 
space of time by consultants from outside of tUnnipeg~ did not take into 
account the interrelationship bet\.reen political factors and structural 
factors~ and did not encompass hm-;; the political dynamics of local government 
in Winnipeg would affect the institutional arrangements. This is a failing 
of proponents of government re-organization, generally. As Robert Wood 
notes, "By ignoring the effects of their proposals: on existing power 
structures~ by failing to set an alternative and better political process 
as a goal and most of all~ by slighting individual values~ advocates of 
regionalism~ consolidation or even federation thus raise inseparable 
problems of representation and shifts: in political influence." 79 
190 
The provincial blueprint for change did envbion a change in the 
form of choosing a mayor, from direct election to election by Council, 
and did propose the Resident Advisory system~ both of which could have 
effected some change in the politics of Winnipeg. But, the first was 
ultimately abandoned and the other never supported, which indicates that 
the provincial cabinet underestimated the effects of the local political 
process upon their reforms. Yet as the previous discussions have shown, 
the governmental consolidation brought together an array of political 
forces which previously had occupied different jurisdictions, without 
providing a central integrating force to form majorities, hence the lack 
of decision-making power. The consolidation also tended to reinforce the 
conservative tendencies of local government by providing a strong block 
of representatives from areas where defence of property interests and 
disinterest in social matters could be expected. This suggests that the 
provincial government lacked any analysis on how to affect change on the 
political process of Winnipeg and did not envision how they were creating 
a political system that would lend itself to fragmented decision4making. 
The designers of the system would have done well to remember that when 
one engages in structural engineering~ it is not enough to kno~1 how to 
arrange the bricks and mortar, there should also be a good understanding 
of the political foundation upon tvhich the structure rests. 
79. Robert Wood, 11A Division of Powers in r.fetropolitan Areas"~ in Area and 
Power, Arthur Mass (ed.), Glencoe Free Press, 1959. 
191 
Community Committees 
Too much haste and too little thought is also apparent in the 
treatment given to the poor definition of responsibilities given to the 
Community Committees. It has been suggested that the Community Committee 
system was a way simply of appeasing suburban members of the NDP Cabinet 
so 
who couldn 1 t stomach total amalgamation, although a brave face was put 
on the construction by heralding it as a form of decentralizing political 
power. If this was a compromi~e, it explains the lack of any clear 
definition of the role and responsibility of the Community Committees. 
Bill 36 set them out as subcommittees of Council but without clear powers 
except for the supervision of local services. In the follm-1ing year, it 
was clarified that the Community Committee had only 11 advisory" pot<Ters 
Yet many of the other processes of government, such as zoning, are 
initiated by the Comuunity Committees. This confusion in role and 
responsibility has led to many of the delays and time lags in making 
decisions. Administrators and councillors are not sure what the right 
steps are between Community Committees and Council~ so they insist that 
every possible step be taken. The result is confusion. On the one hand, 
in the matter of zoning a number of costly and duplicate hearings must 
be held. On the other hand, Council may disregard the position of Community 
Committees on matters of local plans and services. 
Because of this duplication of procedures, where the Community 
Committees have an ambiguous set of responsibilities and po~rers and 
because there is confusion by officials as to the role of the Community 
Committee, it is apparent that one of the real advantages of decentralization 
80. See Tom Axworthy, "Politics of Innovation", Institute of Urban Studies~ 
1972. 
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has been lost. Decentralization of local government, as demonstrated 
in several studies, does little to produce economies in service or in the 
81 
efficiency of decisions on a metropolitan wide level. What it can 
contribute to a government, however, is important. By moving certain 
decisions to a smaller level~ there can be a clearer view of the priorities 
of residents. There can be an elimination of many local decisions from 
the agenda of the regional Council and there can be a counter-balancing 
to the power of administrators who thrive under a centralized system. 
All these positives, however, are not working to the optimum in Winnipeg 
because decisions made at the Community Committee level must be made at 
the Council level anyway, and usually by a Committee of Council in 
between. 
This suggests that a serious review should be made of the principle 
of decentralization and its expression through the Community Committee 
system. There should be a specification of which decisions can be made 
at the Community Committee level, with Council retaining just the power 
to consider appeals. This could apply in areas such as zoning~ local 
improvements, recreation, and the delivery of certain services in health 
and welfare. It may be that a move toward a two tier system, with 
appropriate levels of decision, while retaining the concept of councillors 
serving on both tiers might be advisable. This may allow Council to 
apply itself with more time and application to metropolitan wide decisions 
in areas such as transportation~ hou~ing, and social policy, while 
leaving local decisions for disposal in the Community Committees. This 
81. See Rabinovitz et al, 'Reform of MetroP.olitan Governments, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1912. 
is not a specific proposal that the return to a two tier system is 
preferable, only that it should be re~earehed as posing an alternative 
to the present situation. 
~ition Procedures 
Another area of difficulty that should be looked at carefully 
by other provincial governments contemplating changes in local government 
is the haste with which the new system succeeded the old 9 with a minimum 
of planning and preparation. The Winnipeg system was brought into being 
within six months of Bill 36 being passed. The efforts by the provincial 
government to aid in the transformation were minimaL A group of three 
task fcn:ce$ which had only advisory powers developed position papers which 
contained some guidelines and recommendations, and some consultants were 
hired by the province to help the city deal with personnel and administrative 
matters. There was no attempt to educate politicians or administrators 
to the new system nor time to allm~ them to become conditioned to the 
change. Compare this to the British experience; in those cases where 
local government units were to be merged~ periods of two or three years 
were taken in transition. Joint committees composed of aldermen and 
administrators of the respective jurisdictions were brought together to 
map out the transition, work out personnel problems, and most importantly~ 
overcome their suspicion about the new system. A study of this merger 
process emphasized that unless time is given for those in the old system 
to become accustomed to the new, they will oppose it and feel uncomfortable 
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with it ~= a situation that has obviously developed in Winnipeg. As 
the authors of the British study point out~ re-organization plunges all 
employed in local government into a sea of uncertainty~ Secure 
expectations about the future, characteristic of the system in the past 
dissolve and are replaced by a high level of uncertainty about the future. 
The jobs of elected members and most of their staff will change and they 
will have to establish their competence and authority in new work roles. 
There is evidence that while many are stimulated by a~d enjoy challenges 
83 
of this kind, for many others unhappiness and frustration is the result. 
If one looks at the degree of unhappiness and frustration reported 
by Winnipeg administrators and politicians, it is possible to speculate 
that some of those feelings are a result of the rapid move into the new 
system without an opportunity to work out proper procedures or to gain a 
sense of confidence and understanding of the new system. If the British 
method of employing a form of joint committees working at both the political 
and administrative level had been employed, and if there had been careful 
preparation of steps and procedures to follow as outlined in the Long and 
Norton studyt then it is quite possible that several of the difficulties 
reported in earlier sections dealing with civil service unhappiness, 
political antagonism to the system, and administrative confusion might 
have been avoided. 
The reason. for pointing this out is not simply to show the virtues 
of hindsight. A lesson to be learned by this government and others is 
82. Joyce Lang, Alan Norton, Setting~ New Authorities, Charles Night 
and Co., London, 1972. 
83. Ibid. 
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that making a ne'>'J' policy or de~igning a nevY program is only the beginning. 
Effective implementation is equally as crucial to the success of the 
84 program. Planning of how to execute the new system of local government 
should have been very careful and very extensive, but it wasn 1 t and the 
re-organization of government suffered as a result. 
Of equal note~ however 9 is that it is still not too late to cope 
with problems of transition, even though the system is now over two years 
old. There is still room for setting up special committees or task 
forces to work out difficulties in procedures or administrative arrangements 
or to tackle some of the problems of educating administrators in new 
management techniques that could be employed under the new system. It is 
also important to recognize that much of the dissatisfaction that is 
currently being expressed stems not necessari.ly from the structure itself, 
but from the unease and frustration that many officials and politicians 
have experienced in the transition. These feelings are apt to dissolve 
over time~ especially if there are some efforts to educate and train 
those in responsibility to the demands of the new government. It is 
important, therefore, to view many of the present complaints as less 
institutional in nature and more psychological and administrative, not 
requiring legislative change. 
While psychology may be at the root of many problems. there are 
still demands for legislative action. The most insistent demand is a 
84. For a good discussion of this, see Thomas B. Smith~ "The Policy 
Implementation Process 11 , !_olicy Sciences 4, 1973. 
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change in the size of Council. Recently the mayor of Winnipeg publicly 
:requested a change in the size of Council. His position is supported~ 
as ~ras noted in the attitude surveys, by t~.ren t;y-fou:r councillors. The 
same criticism has also been expressed by certain media commentators. 
They all see the 1;resent fifty ward a:rrangement as being a major cause 
of confusion and poor decision=making. 86 Their thesis is that reducing 
the size of Council ~<Till make it: more manageable~ thus better able to 
transact the public business. 
Opposed to this position are the arguments advanced by the 
government in its White Paper and since pursued by original architects 
of the proposal, namely that the small size of the wards improves the 
representative quality of local government. This argument takes two 
forms. One, that the small electoral base increases the opportunity for the 
citizen to have contact with hie councillor and to become involved in his 
government. This is an argument that has a long history in the theory 
of democratic government. The other argument is that the number of wards 
enables minority groups within the electorate to choose their own 
representative~ or one who at least is more likely to be sensitive to their 
concerns. Graham Fraser makes the case, for example~ that the rise of 
the reform aldermen in the inner city wards of Toronto was due in part to 
the break-up of the large ward system. 87 
85. Winnipeg Free Press~ November~ 1973. 
86. Interviews. 
87. G:r<l!d'~am F·raser, FigM::ing Back, H<!llkkert~ Toronto 9 1972. See also!> 
Harold Kaplan, _QP.dt., and C1arkson 9 op.dt. 
Which thesis bears out? Would efficiency of Council be significantly 
improved by having fewer seats? On the other hand~ does the small ward 
necessarily improve the representative quality of local government? At 
this stage there can be no definitive answers to either question 9 although 
there is some evidence to suggest that neither thesis is entirely correct. 
To begin with, there is nothing to suggest that the cleavages in the 
political system of Winnipeg and the lack of an effective executive 
mechanism or an effective party structure would be eliminated by reducing 
Council :in half. For those administrators and politicians who harken 
back with fond nostalgia to the days of the small suburban Councils~ Metro 
Council or City Council~ when ten or twelve elected representatives would 
gather together and make decisions by consensus, it must be pointed out 
that this was only possible because they were working in forms of 
government dealing t..rith a limited number of functions. Each of the old 
jurisdictions had a limited piece of the action and worked within a 
political jurisdiction where there was a high degree of homogeneity. Even 
on the former Metro Council, which presumably acted for the whole city, 
it should not be forgotten that because of the peculiar form of pie-wedge 
constituencies, almost all the councillors won their election by appealing 
to a suburban, property owning electorate. As well~ the consensus on 
policy that seemed to operate in Metro Council did so in part because its 
functions were limited. There were serious conflicts in local government 
in Winnipeg, except they occurred between Metro and the other jurisdictions. 
Now all the conflicts, cleavages and differences in interest that 
are part of urban politics are contained within one multipurpose regional 
government jurisdiction. Thus~ there is bound to be political conflict 
and stalemate~ :no matte.r hffl<T many members of Council. ~.fuat is lacking 
is the means of organizing the conflict in an orderly way~ developing 
forms of organization that provide a basis for building majorities behind 
a consistent set of programs and policies. 
At the same time~ the connection between smallness in scale and 
improved representation is not exactly clear cut. To begin with~ as 
the phone survey showed~ thare is somewhat less contact and vis::i.bility 
between citizens and elected representatives under the new system than 
there was in the old. This 5 however~ cannot be taken to be conclusive. 
Of more importance is the extensive research by Sydney Verba and Norman Nie 
which has shown that particularly in urban settings the size of constituency 
is not the sole, or even a key factor in contributing to the degree of 
participation by citizens in government in its various forms. 
To begin with, their study indicates that participation. is directly 
related to such variables as socio-economic class, ethnic background, 
education, membership in organizations and other personal characteristics 
pertaining to the individual citizens. 88 When it comes to the kind of 
jurisdiction which induces a higher degree of participation it was found 
that size tY'as less a factor than a quality they call "community boundedness". 
By this the authors mean the degree to which a community has a clear 
autonomous identity and meaning to individual citizens, ~here he or she 
f hi . • i 89 ocus t e r act1v1ty or attent on. The most obvious example is the 
small independent community that has a high degree of eo~~unity identity 
as opposed to the amorphous downtown community where there is little 
attachment. One can measure the degree of "community boundedness" by 
88. Sydney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in. _Americf!~ Harper and 
Rot..r, New York, 1972, Ch. 6-12~ --
89. Ibid., p. 243-244. 
looking at a set of "indicators relating to the degree to which the 
community can be considered to have a life of its own", 90 i.e., the 
number of organizations, mobility of participants, etc. The authors 
199 
conclude that there is a clear connection between the degree of "community 
boundedness 11 and the degree of participation. 
It appears, then, that ward size is less important than the 
question of how the scale of the jurisdiction contributes to the sense 
of community. It must be large enough to contain certain services and 
functions~ but not so large as to be amorphous or have no relation to 
community configurations. 
In specific terms of the Hinnipeg situation, there are two 
considerations. One is that the present structure of wards and community 
committees could be used as the basis for implanting certain government 
servicess offices and activities which will help create different 
community foci throughout the city with which people can relate. Already, 
city welfare and social services @_re being decentralized on a trial basis 
within the community committee structure. Thus, the present structure 
could be viewed as not providing for instant citizen involvement~ but as 
a base for community building within the city. Many authors have pointed 
to the lose of community in urban areas and the need to shape distinctive 
91 forms of committees within the larger urban area. One effective way of 
doing that is through the decentrali~ation of local government services 
leading to increased face to face cootaltit between citizens and govli!irnment 
90. Ibid., p. 244. 
91. Herbert Gans, People and Plan~, New York Basic Books~ 1968. 
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officials. It is a strategy that would lend it~elf to the new structure 
within Winnipeg. 
Secondly~ if there is to be any revision it should be preeeeded 
by comprehensive research on what the optimum size is that could be used 
to determine the nature of electoral boundaries. 
Obviously such research did not preceed the introduction of Bill 36 
-- an abstract population figure was formulated and the size of wards 
chosen accordingly. As has been shown» however, this is a crude and at 
times~ misleading way of shaping ~olitical constituencies. There could 
be a more sophisticated understanding of what variables should be used in 
determining electoral boundaries leading to boundaries with a greater 
sense of the "community" fit that is required, balanced by the need for 
efficiency in Council operation. 
The advocates of Council reduction should be particularly wary 
in this respect for their proposals may lead to a new set of problems 
without solving any of the old. As the following pages show~ if the 
mayor's plan was followed and the councillors were chosen out of the 
six districts used to separate public works administration~ one of the 
immediate results wuuld be a serious mal-apportion in the vote. A second 
problem is that these districts cut across traditional suburban lines in 
the city~ which creates its own problems. 
A third problem is the loss of minority ~roup representation that 
the present ward system now provides. If nothing else, the existing system 
gives access to political representation to poor groups and ethnic groups 
92. Michael Lipsky~ "Street Level Bureaucrats", Urban Affairs Quarterly VI~ 
June 1971. 
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in the central party system. They would lose this access if there was 
a return to larger wards~ as their voting strength would be submerged 
in a larger ward. 
Another value of the small ward system that should also be 
recognized is the way they support the quicker mobilization of political 
change. It is easier to organize dissident or opposition forces within 
a small t.J'ard systeme Groups dissatisfied with the status quo find it 
easier to concentrate efforts within a smaller jurisdiction to elect a 
representative of their point of view. Thus, if there is a concern for 
promoting political reform and political competition, the small ward 
93 
arrangement is preferable. 
What~ then, about changing to a six district electoral system? 
According to the map of the si:~e: district system for the Department 
of Works and Operations prepared by Urwick, Currie and employing 1971 
Census data, the population of each district is as follows: 
93. In a study of electoral systems in American cities, it was shown 
that non-partisan elections and at-large or large district elections 
favour the incumbent. See Charles E. Gilbert, Christopher Claque, 
"Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities", 
Journal of Politics 24, May 1962, p. 323-349. 
:~_300 
Six District Area~ 
Area I 92,000 
Area II 70~000 
Area III 91,000 
Area IV 86~000 
Area v 80,000 
Area VI 111,000 
According to the proposal~ anywhere from three to four to ~ix 
councillors would be elected from each new district. 
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The objective~ of the politicians are twofold. Firstly, they 
hope to eliminate parochialism by unifying both adjacent suburbs or parts 
of the inner city with one or more suburbs. Thus, it is expected that 
they will be found to think in terms of the interest of a large community 
cutting across historical/political boundaries. 
Two inner city Community Committees, Midland and Centennial, 
become Area I, St. James remains integral as Area II, West Kildonan~ a 
suburb~ joins Lo.rd Selkirk and the western half of St. John's, both 
originally part of the inner city, as Area III. East Kildonan, Transcona 
and the east half of St. John's become Area IV, St. Vital and St. Boniface 
are Area V and Assiniboine Park~ Fort Garry and Fort Rouge become Area VI~ 
blending what used to be Charleswood, Tuxedot Inner City and Fort Garry. 
These districts are of course designed for administrative purposes. As 
the earlier table shows there is a wide variation of the population of 
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each Community Committee but that does not pose problems in administering 
to variations in population. The variation goes from 70,000 in St. James 
This variation has great implications regarding principles of 
representation. If, as has been rumoured~ each district will have an 
equal number of councillors (perhaps from 4 to ~ then a district of 
low population like St. James will have stronger representation than 
district VI. Under a system of six representatives for each of six 
Community Committees the numbers of people that councillors would represent 
in the six districts would vary significantly: 
Table 31 
-·------
Six District Area Re~resentation 
Area Population Residents per CouncilloL 
I 92,000 15,400 
II 70~000 11,700 
III 91,000 15,200 
IV 86,000 14~300 
v 80,000 13,300 
VI 111,000 18,500 
Under such a system, a councillor from Area VI would be representing 
about two-thirds more people than a councillor from Area II. Areas I~ III 
IV ~d v~ having more equal populations~ would have low@r ratios. Such 
variations depart from the widely accepted and valued principle of 
proportional representation. 
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If, on the other hand~ a system of proportional representation 
were employed l-Ihere each councillor was to represent approximately 
14,000 - 15~000, the following number of councillors would be required: 
Six District Area R~~~atio~ 
No. of 
Area Councillors 
I 6 
II 5 
III 6 
IV 6 
v 6 
VI 8 
Although representation is equalized in the above situation, we now have 
a variation in the numerical strength of each district. Area VI would 
have two-thirds more representatives than Area II and 30% more 
representatives than each of the other districts. If they can work in 
concertt they could dominate the others on Council. 
~lliat all the above tinkering shows is that drawing new districts 
and developing new representation proportions results in problems as 
complicated as the problems existing at the beginning that is~ 
parochialism due to an uneven distribution of population. 
Another problem in trying to tinker with the present community 
committee boundaries is the constantly growing population of the suburbs 
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and constantly declining population of the inner dty. If one tries to 
anticipate this trend and plans for several years from now~ the inner city 
may be under represented while the suburbs are over represented. 
According to 1971 Census figures. these are the areas of highest 
growth between 1966-1971: 
Table 33 
----
Area Growth Rates 
1966 1971 % Chan~ 
St. James 59,255 71~431 24% 
Fort Garey 21,177 26"127 24% 
North Kildonan 11,955 17' 713 49% 
St. Vital 29~528 32.963 12% 
St. Boniface 43~:214 46 ~ 714 8% 
Transcona 19 ~ 761 22,490 14% 
Charleswood 7$373 12,180 65% 
The inner city as a whole has experienced a decline :bt population: 
Inner City 257~005 246,246 4.2% 
Meanwhile, the City as a whole has grown from: 
Winnipeg 508,759 540,262 6.2% 
In the inner city~ the population is basically steady with most 
census tracts showing a small decline or small increase varying from 4% 
decline to about 4% increase. 
This is not intended to suggest that the fifty ward system should 
necessarily remain frozen. Rather, it is a recommendation that the time 
between now and 1975~ when a review of the Bill is required, be used to 
seriously examine the issue of electoral boundaries so that revisions can 
be made on the best research possible. To tinker with the system now 
would be a mistake; but so 't.rould neglect of proper investigation about 
what kinds of jurisdiction should be formed to gain maximum participation 
along with efficiency. 
An.other area of proposed change in the system centers on the 
executive-administrative branch of government. Problems should have been 
expected in these arrangements after the provincial government changed 
the electoral system of the mayor, making for direct election. t~at they 
didn't do was alter other parts of the executive machinery which depended 
for their workability on the ability of chief executive controlling a 
majority group on Council. Once the mayor was freed from having to be 
responsible to a majority, the concept of the executive policy committee 
acting as a form of Cabinet operation fell through. To make the system 
work, once the electoral changes were made, the mayor should have been 
given some prescribed powers to wield vis-a.-vis Council~ which would have 
enabled the mayor to exercise some initiative and staff support in his own 
office to enable him to take initiatives. The model that could have been 
employed would have been the strong mayor system employed in certain American 
1JJ1 
cities where the mayor's office has pm-Jer of initiative in appointment~~ 
94 budget making and a veto over Council bylaws. 
Contrary to this, howevers the proposed changes being mooted 
about by certain councillors and by a provincial study group is to make 
the mayor into a ceremonial figure and to elevate the position of deputy 
mayor. In effect~ the deputy mayor who would be elected by Council would 
take the mayor's place in being a member of the executive policy committee 
and ex officio on other committees, tirhile the directly elected mayor would 
fill the figurehead position. 
This again is a form of tinkering, fraught with difficulties and 
severe consequences in the political system. It is obviously born out of 
frustration with the present inctmbent of the office who at least 
according to many councillors pays little attention to his executive 
responsibilities. But, one could imagine the kind of internecine warfare 
that t<~ould ensue in the future between a strong minded, directly elected 
mayor~ who might be the champion of a certain group on Council, and a 
deputy mayor who represents another group, both sharing some executive 
control. It would lead to shambles. 
Preferably~ any changes to be made in either the position of mayor 
or deputy mayor should be designed to consolidate the powers of the executive 
and give them the ability to take policy initiatives. This requires 
giving the office of mayor certain policy making powers, such as budget, 
and a capacity to shape an administration according to his tastes through 
the appointment of officers. It also requires setting up certain agencies 
94. Wallace Sayre, Herbert Kaufman, The Governing of Ne:V' York_f.it,.,!, 
New York. W.W. Norton, 1965. 
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with the executive system that would give the central policy making group 
some support resources and staff. 
At present~ for example~ the Executive Policy Committee and the 
mayor's office have no staff for research, co-ordination or policy making 
similar to groups such as the Privy Council office in Ottawa or the 
Policy Planning Groups of Cabinet on the provincial level. They must 
rely totally on line departments for policy initiatives, requiring a 
transmission first through the respective committees of Council. This 
severely limits the creation of a central policy thrust or the planning 
of a legislative program for Council. 
If there are to be changes in the organization of the executive 
policy making system of local government, then it should be in the direction 
of creating an executive body with both legal po~o1ers and staff resources 
so that it can take initiatives and manage innovation effectively. As 
one author, David Rogers, points out, strategies for innovation in 
management may be more effective in gaining improved delivery of municipal 
services than structural changes in government. The strategies he 
proposes are as follows: 
1. Lateral integration of the fragmented agencies of city government and 
between it and the private sector~ e.g., superagencies~ public private 
development corporations. 
2. Adrrui,nistrative decentralization and increased community participation, 
e.g.~ community health centre. 
3. Parallel structures to city bureaucracies prodding them to be more 
responsive, e.g.~ community planning boards~ neighbourhood city halls. 
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4. Improving the planning, information and administrative capacity of 
h i b . 95 t e c ty ureaucrac:uas. 
Of particular significance in implementing these strategies is 
a reform in the municipal civil service. There must be effective ways 
of training new urban managers, appraising performance and productivity 
and developing more effective means of decision making than the present 
hierarchial arrangements. Thus, if there is to be a change in the new 
city system~ the most productive effort would come from addressing the 
issue of management and civil service. 
Administrative Overhaul 
Closely tied in with the issue of executive re-organization is 
the need to review and correct several serious malfunctionin~s in the 
administrative process. In the last session of the Provincial Legislature, 
the City of Winnipeg prepared a number of housekeeping amendments designed 
to clarify the meaning of the Act and these should be acted upon. More 
importantly~ though, is the need to revise the powers of certain agencies 
to bring about more effectiveness in decision making, without sacrificing 
political or public control. One area where re-design of institutions 
would be appropriate would be in the development field. There is now 
serious confusion and overlapping in responsibilities between various 
agencies and committees of Council. This has caused, as noted in the case 
studiesw problems of land shortage and a lack of hard bargaining and 
95. David Rogers, ~he Mana~ement o~tie~, Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, 1971~ pp. 155-157. 
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serious examination of major land development proposals. These difficulties 
will become more widespread when the city becomes involved in activities 
of neighbourhood improvement~ land assembly or future downtown projects. 
In each of these cases. there is a premium attached to having a body able 
to make decisions without constant referral to many different agencies. 
To solve this, the city and the province would be well advised to 
look at the model of various forms of public development corporations 
being employed in several American states and cities. For example, the 
New York State Urban Development Corporation has the powe~ to assemble 
land~ float its own bonds~ transcend local bylaws and override local 
planning ordinances. It is now actively involved in a number of satellite 
town, inner city development and low cost housing projects and has greatly 
speeded up development time. In other cases~ Boston and St. Louis being 
good examples~ development corporations were set up by the state and the 
city~ but tv-ere governed by boards of private people. Perhaps the most 
imaginative scheme was the one proposed for the state of New Jersey, where 
a network of community development corporations were planned that would be 
jointly run by public officials and citizens.96 
The point is that not only should there be a cleaning up of 
administrative difficulties and a re-defining of powers as was recommended 
in relation to community committees~ there should also be efforts at 
institutional innovation. The city needs effective new instruments to 
96. Lloyd ~o/orthy, Jim McNiven~ George Simmandas, Urban Developmen~ 
Corpo,ration£!., IUS study, 1971; and Richard Rosenbloom and Robert 
Morris~ Social Innovation for the C~ Harvard University Press, 1972. 
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implement the more difficult tasks of managing and shaping gro't-Yth and 
development and these are not available under the present Act. 
Open Government 
~fuile it is imperative that there be a strong executive system, 
it should not be a closed system. As our case studies have shown, there 
is a high propensity in Winnipeg's new government to meet behind closed 
doors and not to use consultative processes with citizens~ particularly 
on development issues. Yet, as those studies have also shown, particularly 
in regards to railway relocation~ the city might have saved itself a 
good deal of grief if a procedure of open hearings had been adopted. Even 
the mayor of Winnipeg has been moved of late to call for greater openness 
97 in Council meetings, recognizing the dangers inherent in the closed shop 
system of government. 
Some state governments in the United States have enacted environmental 
acts which require hearings to be held and impact studies to be publicly 
disclosed on all projects that might significantly affect the environment. 
Arguments were made at the provincial legislature committee meetings~ 
prior to the enactment of Bill 36, for similar kinds of provision, and the 
Bill did include a provision (see 635(1)) requiring an impact study to be 
conducted on all major public works. The city had not honoured this 
requirement until very recently)> and then the impact study goes only to 
Council for review. The private citizen eannot challenge in any legal way 
a city action if the impact study reveals serious environmental damage. 
The provincial government itself has not manifested any particular 
concern in this area. In fact, in its handling of environmental matters 
97. Winnipeg Free ~ress, November 15, 1973. 
212 
directly under its purview, it h~s sho~na a marked reluctance to di,~lge 
information or engage in open public hearings. Yet, the need to open the 
process of government is there, and the machinery in the form of the 
Community Committee-Resident Advisory system is in place. All that is 
needed is first the enactment of provisions making the holding of in-camera 
meetings of Council committees restricted to only certain issue areas, 
i.e., personnel~ and only after there is unanimous approval of Council. 
And, secondly, there should be a provision requiring local government 
(provincial government for that matter) to hold hearings on programs of 
major environmental impact, as well as assistance for advocacy groups to 
enable them to make an effective case on the issue under debate. With 
this requirement in place, City Council would then have to formulate a 
set of guidelines on the procedures for processing major development plans 
and projects. There is now some initiative being taken to provide city 
employed planners to help develop "action area plans" as set down in the 
new legislation, although after over two and one half years there has 
been virtually no progress made in establishing such plans. But, there 
still remain major issues of railway relocation, transportation systems, 
downtown development, industrial parks, new communities~ and if past 
practices are followed 9 those "Jill be decided in an ad hoc l<Tay, with a 
minimum of information supplied and almost no attempt to garner public 
views or engage in any form of comprehensive planning. 
Other cities are trying out forms of public involvement in the 
planning process. The Greater Vancouver Regional Planning Commission 
developed a major program of community consultation on transportation. 
Some American cities have undertaken an extensive process of consultation 
involving various techniques of public meetings~ group participation and 
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survey research to arrive at basic goals and programs in urban development. 
Nothing like this has been tried in Winnipeg, even though the system for 
operating such a decentralized consultative process is in place. There 
is a need to re-structure the development process in Winnipeg, to eliminate 
impediments to effective decision making~ to simplify the procedures~ and 
to open up the system and ensure that there is full disclosure of information 
and accountability on decisions. The beginning of this re-structure 
could come from the provincial government in setting out a legislative 
framework for open meetings and public hearings. 
Resident Advisory Groups 
Another area where there is need for major improvement and 
clarification is with Resident Advisory Groups. This ~as a major 
innovation in Bill 36, but as the previous assessments have shown, the 
RAGs as they are called were orphaned by the provincial government as soon 
as the Bill was passed and have been treated since with guarded indifference 
by city government. As a result, the RAGs have had a spotty and sporadic 
existence. Various studies and authors have commented on the general 
99 decline and ineffectiveness of the RAGs as a medium of citizen participation. 
One glimmer of hope is the recent agreement by the Tri-Level Group, 
a joint committee of federal, provincial, municipal representatives, to 
allow the RAGs to receive a $230~000 grant from the Federal Ministry of 
98. For an interesting analysis of how a city involves citizens in "goal 
formulation~ see Johns. Jackson III, Wm. L. Shady, "Citizen Participation, 
Democratic Representation and Survey Research"~ Urban Affair.s Quarter!~, 
Volume 9, No. 1, September, 1973. 
99. See Meeting the Problem~ and Needs of Resident Advisory~, op.ci~.; 
Inland Magazine, Volume 1, No. 4, November 1973; Winn!P~ Press, 
~~Tribune reporters. 
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Urban Affairs. This money, to be used to supply the RAGs with research 
and communication assistance~ should be of real help in overcoming some 
of the obvious weaknesses of RAGs in being able to cope intelligently 
with issues that concern them and to make some beginnings in informing 
the general public what is going on. 
It must not be expected, however, that under the present structural 
arrangements of Winnipeg's government that the RAGs will become the vehicle 
of widespread citizen involvement. Right now they attract the citizen 
activists~ that small minority of men and women who take an interest in 
local issues. They have no signif::Lcance to most citizens l~hose only 
concern with government is how well does it deliver services.100 If and 
when the Community Committees become more responsible for decisions on 
service delivery, then the RAGs would increase the scope and range of 
their reach. Thust in part, the future of the RAGs is closely tied to a 
revision of the powers and responsibilities of the Community Committees~ 
as previously outlined. 
Even ~dthout this occurrence, however, the RAGs have an important 
role to play. Acting as an arena for activist involvement is in itself 
an :important function in several ~Jays. The RAGs bring the different 
activist groups together and force some process of decision making between 
them, perhaps leading to a certain consensus on issues. They also bring 
the activists into continual contact with city coundllors and officials, 
a relationship of benefit to both. The activists gain a sense of the 
100. Several authors have dealt with this issue of activi~ts versus the 
general citizen. See Verba and Nie~ fart~~ation~~' 
orp.cit®; Scott Greer, The Urban~' New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972; John S. Jackson III, William L. Shade~ "Citizen 
Participation, Democratic Representation, and Survey Research", in 
Urban Affair~ Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1~ September 1973. 
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realistic constraints government people operatE! under; the go,rernment 
officials gain a sense of community thinking and have new options open to 
them, 
As well, we saw in the railway relocation case how the RAGs have 
the potential of from time to time becoming the location of major debate 
and discussion on neighbourhood priorities and concerns~ and that potential 
is :i.tself worth preserving so it can be used when it is needed. 
What is apparent is that the RAGs~ like other parts of the new 
system, were introduced without a very clear idea of what they would do~ 
how they would operate and what impact they would have. It was simply 
a virtuous thing to connect citizens in t..vith local go'l;ernment. H'hat is 
needed~ nm:v~ however, is a clearer definition of the role and place of 
the RAGs in the scheme of things, based on an extensive investigation of 
the role they have played, and the effect they have. 
This study of RAGs should be encased in a larger investigation of 
the citizen participation philosophy of this new city government. It is 
somewhat remarkable to note that there is yet to be any kind of real 
debate and siscussion in city government on RAGs or the general issue of 
citizen involvement. In fact, it is possible to hypothesize that Council 
and senior officials have only concentrated on those ~spects of city 
government familiar to them~ treating the other newer aspects with which 
they were presented in Bill 36 with indifference or dislike. Hopefully 
this neglect will be rectified as the newness ~-1ears off or as a nev1 
generation of councillors and officials who are not tied to past experience 
come to the fore. 
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!t1tergQ_vemmen.tal Rdations 
A further notable .11s:pect of the new system is the relations that 
have been established with senior levels of government. One benefit that 
might have been expected is the ability of city government to deal in a 
more coherent and consolidated fash:ton with senior levels of government. 
Under the old system~ there were a number of local government units which 
was both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, senior levels of government$ 
especially the provincial level, could deal with a number of local 
government units and play one against the other. Now, there is only one, 
stronger and more potent~ and this has occasioned serious disputes between 
city and provincial officials over housing and finance. It can be expected 
that this pattern of conflict 't~ill continue as the bargaining power of 
the city increases, its political leadership continue~ to be different in 
attitude and values from the present provincial leadership, and there is 
an increasing demand by the city for new revenue. This, however, ma.y work 
to the benefit of the citizens of the Winnipeg area as they now have only 
one spokesman pursuing their interests rather than man.y separate units* 
The tangible benefits of this new bargaining position have thus far been 
minimal, although the city has made its case for a share of the grmfth 
101 
taxes. 
A provincial government s: tudy has reportedly recommended a new 
committee to be set up to provide a continuous negotiating forum. This~ 
however, is likely to be of little significance. The arbiter of 
101. Hinnipeg Free Press, March 22, 1973. 
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provincial-city relations lf1ill likely be sheer pow·er politics and '~<till 
be a consistent issue in the province over the coming decade. 
Where there has been a degree of mixed benefit in the ne~.v structure 
is in the functioning of the tri-level committee. This group? organized 
primarily through federal initiatives, has been a place where projects 
involving all three levels have been discussed and at times decisions 
made, i.e., railway relocation. This would have been far more difficult~ 
if not impossible, to organize previously when there w@re fourteen local 
units i.n existence. Thus, there has been an improvement in the inter-
governmental consultative process. 
There is one serious drawback to this process, however, and that 
is its secrecy. Tri-Level meetings are normally held monthly, with a 
number of important items affecting Winnipeg residents on the agenda. Yet~ 
there is never any announcement of meetings or agenda items. nor any public 
reports to respective elected assemblies. Obviously, there is need from 
time to time for informal discussions between governments. But, often such 
discussions lead to de facto decisions with little reference to legislative 
bodies. It is just one further example of legislative responsibility being 
102 
eroded and one further step into a form of administered state. In time, 
this aspect of local government policy making will have to be examined to 
see if it is working in the best interests of the city. Certainly the 
example of the tri-level decisions setting up the Railway Relocation study 
shows that this kind of decision-making can become distant and removed. 
102. For a discussion of this issue, see Richard Simeon~ Federal-Provincial 
Diplomacy~ University of Toronto Press. 
from public sentiment and outlook~ and "wuld benefit if there were a 
clear cut system of reporting tri-level meetings back to respective 
legislative bodies. 
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Finally, a word on research and evaluation. As stated at the 
outset of this report~ the new system of local government in Winnipeg is 
a subject of widespread interest. As such~ it deserves a comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation~ conducted over a period of time. There are a 
variety of areas that need to be researched, i.e., structural, 
administrative and financial areas. 
Thus far~ a comprehensive, co-ordinated research effort has not 
been mounted. There are several different academic and governmental groups 
pursuing different evaluations. Each of these are inadequately funded~ 
and in no way organized so that they support and eomplement one another. 
As a result, the opportunity to put together an effective research effort 
is being lost. 
Some efforts have been made at co-ordination, but the problem of 
politics, academic and otherwise, have interfered. Government has thus 
far been unwilling or unable to support an extensive research effort, 
fearing who might be doing it, or what they might find. The responsibility 
for correcting this clearly lies with the provincial government. Bill 36 
was their creation, and by law in 1975 there must be a review of hot.r 'vell 
it is operating. It would be in their interests to have as honest and as 
comprehensive an appraisal as possible. After all~ they have not taken the 
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initiative in br:lnging together the different groups in,mlved in doing 
partial bits of research to see what combined effort could be mounted. The 
example they might consider is the consortium organized by the University 
of London to review and evaluate the re-organization of Greater London. 
Under the auspices of the University a number of different aspects of 
research have been started and organized in a co-ordinated way. Thus~ 
there is a maximi.zation of staff and resources and a minimization of 
duplication. 
There is another advantage -~ it is an independent evaluation. 
Nothing could be worse than the authors of the scheme also being the judges 
of their own handiwork. It would stretch credibility a little too far to 
assume that the creators of a ne~.r policy can also be objective evaluators. 
This local government reform in Winnipeg is too important to simply be 
left for some staff group of government to give it a glowing bill of health. 
SECTIO~~ ~ 
CO~~C LUS lOt'~ 
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The new scheme of local government in Winnipeg was a bold, if 
flawed, institutional innovation. It brought to Winnipeg a government that 
incorporated several structural changes that have been advanced as in-
gredients of modern urban government -- regional organizations, decentralized 
neighbourhood units, integrated financial systems. But, it was a new 
structure that by itself could not change many of the basic ills pertaining 
to the political system. 
The difficulties in decision making on social and economic issues 
that characterized the old system were simply transferred to the new, only 
this time the stalemate and conflict occurred within the same governmental 
unit rather than between units. Where there was a lack of concern on 
social problems in the old 1 this persists in the new. Where there was a 
tendency to quickly approve major development projects under old Metro 
and City Council, the same tendency was true in the new. In other words. 
this particular re-organiz~tion did not prompt any major change in priorities 
or administrative and political practices. As Frances Frisken states 
"Obstacles to effective metropolitan political unification have their roots 
in the wide disparities in goals, attitudes and social characteristics 
which prevail throughout metropolitan areas. Until these disparities 
decrease~ administrative decrees which affect the representational structure, 
quality of leadership~ or the scope of formal responsibilities of metro-
politan political organizations are likely to have only limited success 
in increasing the willingness or the ability of those organizations to 
103 influence areawide development 91 • 
103. Frances Frisken, "The J:.ietropolis and The Central City", Urban Affairs 
Quarterly. Vol. 8, no. 4, June 1973, p. 418-19. 
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The changes that will occur will come more slowly as the new system 
of ward representation, community committees, resident advisory groups, 
begin to gradually affect the style and practice of local politics. There 
is a potential for more openness, more accessibility, more representation 
of minority groups if these particular arrangements are retained and in 
the case of community committees and RAGs, given more power and responsibility. 
Delivery of services under the new system has thus far remained 
relatively unchanged. The new system has not meant a new form of admini-
stration or appreciably new innovative management. But, again these changes 
will take time. 
l~ere there is need for serious review and perhaps correction is 
in the area of the political policy making agencies, primarily the office 
of mayor and the Executive Policy Committee. A hybrid system was concocted 
in Bill 36 and there was no sufficient provision of executive powers given 
to the mayor to enable him or her to induce support for policy measures 
on Council. There is confusion on where initiatives should emanate and 
how a coalition of support can be developed for consistent programs. 
Thus, accountability is lost. 
The system also suffers from the lack of a municipal party system 
which could also provide some cogency and leadership. This is partially 
a product of the history of non-partisanship in Winnipeg. But, it also 
is due to the fact that, as yet, there is no well defined set of issues or 
a strong enough sense of dissatisfaction in the electorate that could give 
rise to new political formations. 
With neither a strong political executive nor a party system, the 
policy making process is fragmented. There are a variety of coalitions 
which cluster in support of an ad hoc series of proposals. Those measures 
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which require a high degree of political skill, patience and fortitude 
to pass are forgotten because there is little in the system to compel 
those attributes to be displayed. Individual councillors seek their own 
electoral self-interest by avoiding identification with unpopular moves. 
The only area where there is consistent direction is in the development 
field where there are certain councillors supported by a strong coalition, 
and on ceremonial and festival type issues which receive the attention of 
the mayor. However, the new system has created some added difficulties 
in these areas. Because of the awkward zoning provisions, land development 
is more costly and time consuming. This has contributed to a shortage of 
land. The mayor, for his part, is now subject to more criticism, competition 
and has less informal influences on councillors than he had in the old 
city. 
At the same time, there are some distinct policy benefits. The 
unified tax and financial system has ended fiscal disparities between 
parts of the system. The city, while still in a junior position, has more 
leverage with the provincial and federal governments which could result 
in more revenue for the city. There ate some signs that the first stirrings 
of citizen protest have been felt by the planners of transportation, 
which·could yield a more envi.~onmentally responsible transportation system. 
The reforms that should be made in the system are from this point 
on not structural in character, with the exception of some minor adjustments. 
The reforms should be political and administrative. There is need for a 
new "community" politics in Winnipeg, centered around issues of democratic 
control, i.e., how decisions are made and issues of quality, i.e., what 
kind of city do we want? There is also need for a more innovative management, 
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one that uses the most modern techniques of public administration to cope 
with the many changing facets of the city. 
Finally, we must simply know more about how our city operates, what 
goes on, what the impact and effect of certain decisions, policies, and 
programs are. This requires a greater commitment to the investigation of 
the urban scene, understanding it and translating that knowledge into 
public policy. Perhaps this is the first step in the reform that Winnipeg~ 
with its new structure but old politics, still needs. 
OTHER IUS PUBLICATIONS 
URBAN GOVERNMENT 
Lloyd Axworthy~ editor, The Future City: A Selection of Views on the 
of Government in Greater Winnipeg. 1971. 
225 
Tom Axworthy. The Future City: The Politics of Innovation <Report No, 2), 1972. 
Lloyd Axworthy, editor, )he Citizen and Neighbourhood Renewal (Future City 
Series- Report No. 3), 1972. 
Lloyd Axworthy, James McNiven? and George Siamandas, The Structure an':!_ 
Organization of Urban Development Corporations, 1970. 
Lloyd Axworthy, Maureen Grant, Jim Cassidy, and George Siamandas, Meetina 
the Problems and Needs of Resident Advisory GrouQs, 1973. 
HOUSING 
Uoyd Jl.xworthy, editor. Mark VIII lnfill Housing Project, Phase Two Report, 
1973. 
Eric Barker, A Report on the Rehabi I ltatlon of Older Houses In a lower Income, 
Inner City District, 1971. 
J. D. McNiven, An Evaluation of Kinew Housing incorporated, 1971. 
Eric Barkerp Design Feasibi I ity Study for Injecting an "lnfi I I" Housing System 
into an Older, Residential District~ 1972. 
Donald Epstein~ ed!tore Neighbourhood Improvement and Housing lnnovatio~~ 1974. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Lloyd Axworthy, James Cassidy, Jocelyne O'Hara, and John Badertscher, 
A Pub! lc Communication System, 1971. 
James Cassidy and Dick Houston, Urban Forum Project: A Report on Community 
Communications in Six Canadian Urban Centers, 1972. 
SOCIAL PlANNING 
David B. Vincent, An Analysis of Four Social Planning Interventions in the 
Fort Rouge Area of Winnipeg, 1971. 
David B. Vincent, The lndian-Metis Urban Probe~ 1971. 
TRANSPORTATION 
Terry J. Partridge, Transportation Advocacy Planning In Winnipeg: The Case 
of COST~ 1973. 
